ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00060702

Parties:

	Complainant	Respondent
Parties	Haleigh Davidson	St Joseph's Secondary School, Rush

Representatives

Mark Curran BL instructed by Mason Hayes & Curran

Complaint(s):

Act	Complaint/Dispute Reference No.	Date of Receipt
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977	CA-00073878-002	29/07/2025
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998	CA-00073878-003	29/07/2025
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998	CA-00073878-004	29/07/2025
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 14 of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 2003	CA-00073878-005	29/07/2025
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998	CA-00073878-008	10/09/2025
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998	CA-00073878-009	10/09/2025

Date of Adjudication Hearing: 10/11/2025

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: David James Murphy

Procedure:

In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 and Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.

The Complainant was concerned about this matter progressing by way of an adversarial hearing and did not want to be in the same room as one of the Respondent’s employees who attended the hearing. She requested this matter be dealt with by written submission and the Respondent agreed to this in recognition that the vast majority of the exchanges between the parties have been in writing and are available to me.

The Complainant had, between direct emails to the WRC and cc’d emails to other entities such as her union, the Minister for Education, the Ombudsman and the patron organisation of the Respondent, sent approximately 100 separate emails over the five months that this file was live. I have not sought to address each and every argument raised in these emails. Many of those issues relate to matters outside of my jurisdiction.

This decision is focused on the statutory complaints before me and the written evidence the parties have provided.

The Complainant has requested that this decision be anonymised on the basis that children might be indirectly identified. The Respondent has objected to anonymisation unless it would result in the identification of children. I reserved my position in the hearing and on review of my decision I note that it does not result in the identification of any children and as such there are no special circumstances justifying anonymisation. The decision does refer to the Complainant’s own family status and childcare requirements, but this would be normal in the context of an allegation of discrimination on the basis of family status.

CA-00073878-005 under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 2003 was withdrawn by the Complainant in the hearing.

Background:

The Complainant is a teacher in the Respondent secondary school.

The Complainant was due to return to teaching at the start of the autumn school term after having taken an approved career break for the 2024/2025 school year and maternity leave for the 2023/2024 school year. She sought a job share arrangement (i.e. reduced teaching hours with an associated reduction in pay) to be timetabled over three days in both 2024 and 2025. The Respondent would not agree to this and would only offer the job share hours on the basis of a four day timetable. This is untenable for the Complainant it would mean needing full time childcare while working on part-time hours.

The Complainant submitted complaints under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, Employment Equality Act, 1998 and the Parental Leave Act 1998 on the 29th of July and then a further claim of victimisation on the 10th of September 2025. The Complainant submitted a further complaint under the Payment of Wages Act on the 30th of October 2025 and this was assigned to me separately under ADJ-00063048.

Summary of Complainant’s Case:

The Complainant alleges that she has been discriminated against, on the basis of her family and gender status, that she has been constructively dismissed and that she has been penalised for requesting flexible working arrangements which, due to childcare, are key to her being able to return to the workplace.

I have referred to her written submissions and evidence, where relevant in the findings and conclusions section of this decision.

Summary of Respondent’s Case:

The Respondent disputes the allegations entirely. They submit that the Complainant has not made out coherent cases under the above legislation and that they have engaged with her job share requests extensively and tried to resolve them. They submit that they followed the terms of the circular governing job share arrangements.

I have referred to their written submissions and evidence, where relevant in the findings and conclusions section of this decision.

Findings and Conclusions:

CA-00073878-002 Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

It is accepted by both parties that the Complainant remains an employee of the school and as such no dismissal, constructive or otherwise had occurred at the date the complaint was lodged.

Complaints CA-00073878-003 and CA-00073878-004- Time Limits and Relevant Period

Complaints were lodged on the 29th of July 2025 under the Parental Leave Act 1998 and Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015 (“EEA”).

Section 77 (5) (a) of the EEA states: Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.

I have jurisdiction of a Parental Leave Act dispute by way of Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, sub section 6 of which states Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

In light of the time limits outlined above my jurisdiction is to consider complaints of penalisation, discrimination and victimisation which occurred within 6 months of the date the complaints were lodged, that is from the 29th of January 2025.

As the Complainant was on unpaid leave at that time and alleges that that unpaid leave was forced on her by the conduct of the Respondent my findings start with the Complainant’s decision to apply for a career break in 2024.

Complaints CA-00073878-003 and CA-00073878-004- Findings of Fact

The Complainant commenced maternity leave in the Summer of 2023. In the Summer of 2024 she engaged in talks with the Respondent to agree flexible working arrangements for her return to work that autumn. In particular she sought a three day working week on a job share basis to facilitate childcare.

The job share scheme is set out in a circular 18/98 and the process requires a teacher to apply for a job share by the 1st of March and this application is approved or denied by their employer in spring for the following September. At that point the teacher will know that their teaching hours will be reduced to 11 hours per week. They do not know their timetable. The circular sets out a number of principles related to timetabling but is clear that the decision sits with management: The timetable arrangements for job-sharing teachers should be designed within the spirit of the scheme to facilitate the teacher so far as is practicable. The particular needs of teaching posts will largely determine what patterns of job-sharing are possible. Every effort will be made to notify job-sharing teachers in advance of their timetabled hours and the pattern of job-sharing. The managerial authorities shall determine the particular attendance regime to apply to each shared post.

The Respondent was able to facilitate a job share arrangement but would not timetable these hours on the basis of three days or less. The Complainant was restricted by the very practical issue that if job share was to work, she would need a schedule that allowed her to obtain part-time childcare or she would end up in the position of working on a part-time salary with full-time childcare costs.

The Respondent did not provide the Complainant a final timetable until mid-August 2024. The Complainant submits this put her in an impossible position regarding childcare. The Respondent’s position was that this is when timetables are normally provided.

The Complainant took an unpaid career break for the 2024/2025 school year which the Respondent agreed to.

The Complainant submissions of the 1st of September 2025 are clear that in so far as she is alleging that she was treated differently in regard to timetabling and the offer of a three-day working week in August 2024, this was due to her having taken measures to oppose workplace bullying. The Respondent disputes this.

The Complainant’s submissions indicate that she obtained other employment during this time and that the Respondent stopped her accessing the Google Drive and email accounts in November 2024. On the evidence available to me it is not clear if this was in any way deliberate. At the time the Complainant raised this with her Union official rather than the Respondent.

On the 28th of January 2025 the Complainant notified the Respondent of her intention to return to work for the 2025/26 school year. This was acknowledged by the Respondent on the 31st of January.

The Complainant sought a job share again in May 2025 through her Union. This was a reapplication of her previous request and she again requested a three day timetable. In her letter requesting the same she was clear that the request was predominantly childcare related and separate from WRC complaints she had filed at that point. Those complaints were under the Industrial Relations Act 1969 and the Respondent would later object to their proceeding on the basis of the exclusion of secondary school teachers from that avenue as that provided for under Section 23 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990.

The Respondent replied on the 12th of May indicating they would accept the request for job share subject to certain conditions. They were clear that job sharing is normally arranged over five days and while they could consider timetable concessions, such as late starts or mornings only, acceptance of the job share could not be conditional on them agreeing to such requests.

The Complainant’s job share application had requested that she be given her timetable as soon as possible and on the 9th of June the Respondent had replied to her Union that they would have this by mid-August which is the normal such time period they would have this available. Correspondence from 2024 and 2025 would indicate that this is the case.

In the same email on the 9th of June 2025 it was apparent that the Respondent was offering, at best, a four day a week job share. The Complainant emailed the Principal directly on the 11th of June noting her disappointment and outlined that she could not agree to such a working arrangement. She highlighted that she believed that other colleagues in job share arrangements are not receiving this sort of timetable but did not elaborate who or what she felt distinguished her from them. She accepted this was a matter for the Principal to decide and sought to withdraw from the job share and return full time.

The Complainant requested her full timetable as soon as possible. There was further engagement via the Complainant’s husband, who is also a teacher at the school, and the Principal on the job share proposals on the 19th of June 2025 which I do not have the benefit of oral evidence on.

The Respondent replied to the Complainant on the 24th of June indicating that the timetable would be available in August 2025 as normal. The Respondent’s reply mainly deals with the Complainant’s objections related to job sharing over four days and does not address the Complainant’s withdrawal from the job share. In the same email the Principal confirms that the Complainant’s email address is live and should be accessible. She is referred to IT for any issues related to her accessing the system and correspondence and her own submissions would seem to suggest that her issues in accessing IT related to her dual factor authorisation being linked to an old phone.

The Complainant’s withdrawal from the job share does not seem to have been processed until well into August and after this complaint was submitted. However, I note that the Respondent has provided correspondence of their continuing to engage with the Complainant’s Union official on the issue of job share in August so there appears to have been some ongoing engagement on the possibility between the parties after the 11th of June. It does not appear that it was entirely abandoned at that point.

The Complainant sent an email to the WRC the same day she submitted her complaints stating:

My employer continues to ignore my attempts to know my scheduled return to work on 21st August 2025, this is in less than three weeks. Despite repeated, reasonable efforts to engage in a productive dialogue, I continue to be completely disregarded. It is crucial that I make necessary childcare arrangements, it is already physically impossible in such a short amount of time. This is the second year in a row, it is purposeful. This is my fifth submission. I am requesting that it be treated as a matter of urgency and flagged for priority adjudication. The handling of my case to date has been marked by miscommunication, administrative delays, and unnecessary stress, resulting in multiple retractions through no fault of my own. I am under significant financial pressure, and my rights as an employee and a working mother have been severely neglected. This is all a result of following union advice on 8th November 2022, by informally asking a female [former member of staff] to please stop upsetting me at work. I do not deserve this discrimination. I have attached my written submission request and included it with the re-submission.

The Respondent has supplied the email on the 13th of August outlining the Complainant’s timetable to her Union official as well as the email of the 15th of August in which the timetables went live to all staff.

CA-00073878-004 Parental Leave Act 1998

Section 16A of the 1998 Act provides that an employer shall not penalise an employee for proposing to exercise or having exercised his or her entitlement to parental leave, force majeure leave, leave for medical care purposes, domestic violence leave or his or her entitlement to make a request referred to in section 13B(1) or 15A(2), which relate to flexible working arrangements.

The Complainant was requesting flexible working, in the form of a job share split over three days a week, from 2024. Not being granted a specific, or indeed any, flexible working arrangement is not penalisation as prohibited by the act. Penalisation concerns detriment caused to the employee in retaliation for seeking or being granted flexible working.

I do not conclude that the 2024/2025 career break was penalisation as defined by the act. It was requested by the Complainant who could not return to work due to childcare restrictions and the Respondent’s failure to agree to her requested schedule.

I do not see how the other matters the Complainant has raised during the relevant time period could be related to her having requested flexible working. It would not be unusual for an employee on a career break to lose access to systems and databases as they are not actively working for the employer and I see no detriment arising from such loss of action. The Complainant was not necessarily entitled to use the Respondent’s teaching materials, even those generated by her, outside of her work for the Respondent. For the avoidance of doubt the Respondent disputes deliberately removing her access from the system.

The Complainant did not have her timetable at the time she lodged the claim however there is no evidence anyone else did and the evidence supplied by the Respondent would seem to suggest that her colleagues did not have their timetables at that point.

CA-00073878-003 Employment Equality Act, 1998

The Complainant lodged a complaint on the 29th of July 2025 that she has been discriminated against on the basis of the family and gender grounds.

Sections 6 and 8 of the EEA prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of gender. For the purposes of the complaint before me, the most relevant parts are:

“6(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—(i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

[…]

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

[…]

(a) that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”), […]

(2A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsections (1) and (2), discrimination on the gender ground shall be taken to occur where, on a ground related to her pregnancy or maternity leave, a woman employee is treated, contrary to any statutory requirement, less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated.

8. (1) In relation to—(a) access to employment, (b) conditions of employment, (c) training or experience for or in relation to employment, (d) promotion or re-grading, or (e) classification of posts, an employer shall not discriminate against an employee […

Section 85A of the EEA provides for the allocation of the probative burden between a complainant and a respondent as follows:

“85A.–(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

Mr Curran for the Respondent has cited Southern Health Board v. Mitchell [2001] ELR 201 (the “Mitchell Case”), the Labour Court held:

“The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination.

It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

Mr Curran also highlights the Labour Court decision Melbury -v- Valpeters EDA/0917 which discusses the facts a complainant must establish to shift the burden of proof, stating:

“All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule”

The EEA prohibits the Respondent from treating the Complainant less favourably due to her gender and family status as compared to other employees who are male or have no children. On review of the allegations made by the Complainant related to the relevant period she has not established a presumption of discrimination.

While her unpaid career break stemmed from the realities childcare it does not follow that this constituted discrimination by the Respondent. The EEA does not entitle parents to special leave. The only reasonable accommodation obligations that arise under the EEA relate to disability.

As outlined above the Complainant does not appear to have been given her timetable later than her colleagues were given theirs. The Respondent had been clear from the outset of her application for job share that their approval of the arrangement could not be contingent on the Complaniant’s acceptance of the final timetable and that her continuing to work five days was possible and that timetables would be set in August. Despite this clarity on the Respondent’s part the Complainant appears to have had entirely different expectations as to what should emerge from her job share request and when.

This complaint also referred to a complaint of victimisation. In so far as the Complainant alleges, in her email of the 29th of July, that the actions of the Respondent are retaliatory, they are not alleged to be retaliation for having raised a complaint of discrimination. Instead, they alleged to have resulted from her interactions with a former member of staff.

CA-00073878-008 and CA-00073878-009 Employment Equality Act, 1998

Victimisation is prohibited by the EEA and is defined by Section 74 as dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to—(a) a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer, (b) any proceedings by a complainant,.

The Complainant submitted further complaints of victimisation on the 10th of September 2025 by way of a letter. Due to this format, i.e. other than the WRC complaint form, the WRC appears to have created a duplicate complaint.

This letter states:

Dear Registrar,

I am writing in connection with my pending adjudication scheduled for 10 November 2025 (Refs: CA-00073878-002 to -005).

In addition to my existing complaints, I wish to add a complaint of victimisation under Section 74 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015. The basis is that CEIST and the Board of Management have explicitly stated they are ignoring my correspondence because I exercised my statutory right to pursue a WRC claim. This is in direct contravention of the Minister for Education’s Office, which has confirmed that, as governance, they are the legal employer and cannot ignore me.

The letter goes on to outline a number of matters which predate the Complainant’s complaint of discrimination (CA-00073878-003) and as such they cannot be victimisation for that complaint. She also raised a number of complaints against her Union who are not the Respondent in this decision.

In addition to her having raised the Respondent disengaging with her due to these complaints, which appears to be the focus of her victimisation complaints, she does also raise the following which are alleged to have occurred since the 29th of July complaints were lodged.

· referrals to MedMark without due process;

· disclosure of my WRC case details to colleagues, which became a “well-known fact” within the school;

· defamation of me and my WRC case that spread to other schools, destroying my professional reputation;

· withholding of timetables and return-to-work schedules until hours before resumption of duties — treatment opposite to my colleagues, used as a form of punishment;

CA-00073878-008 and CA-00073878-009 – Findings of Fact

Following the lodging of the complaint on the 29th of July 2025 the Respondent was notified of the complaints by way of letter dated the 31st of July. In early August continued to engage on the job share arrangements and return to work via the Complainant’s Union official.

At this point the Respondent had already made it clear in writing that they would not facilitate a three day week. The Complainant’s Union official sent an email on the 13th of August in which he outlined a belief that the Principal had agreed to a three day week on a phone call with the Complainant’s husband on the 19th of June 2025. The Principal replied to this email disputing that any such assurance had been given.

The rest of the Complainant’s colleagues received their timetables on Friday 15th of August. On that same day the Complainant emailed the Respondent withdrawing from the job share arrangement and seeking to return to school full time. She also sought her login details and highlighted the complaints she had made to the WRC on the 29th of July. The Principal acknowledged the email that day and indicated that he would bring the application to withdraw from job share to the board for their approval.

On the 16th of August 2025 the Complainant sent an email to Board of Management cc-ing the WRC and ASTI. This highlighted her previous request to utilise a job-share contract in 2024 and the resulting career break as well as her dissatisfaction with the Principal’s actions more generally. She requested written reasons as to why a three-day week could not be facilitated and sought information on her colleagues’ job share arrangements, though anonymised. The Complainant restated her request for a three-day job-share. She alleged her login details were withheld and that she was blocked access from school systems until the 12th of August. She then goes on to request login details to that system. The email refers extensively to the WRC complaints and to other legislation.

The Complainant sought information from Department of Education payroll who confirmed that as of the 19th of August she had not yet been returned to payroll by the Respondent. She immediately highlighted his with the Principal by email.

The Complainant wrote to her Union and the WRC on 11am of the 20th of August indicating that she was being prevented from returning to work on the 21st of August due to her having made WRC complaints. At 12:56 she emailed the Minister for Education outlining the same allegation. More specifically she highlighted an allegation that her role was being backfilled by a substitute while the Respondent was refusing to let her return to work. She emailed her Union and the WRC three further times that day restating and elaborating on these allegations.

A letter issued from the Principal by email on the 20th of August indicating that the late withdrawal from job share was approved and welcoming the Complainant back to work. This went to the Complainant’s work email which she asserted she did not have access to in other correspondence and was sent by the secretary of the school to her at 5pm. The email outlined that a timetable would be available on the Respondent’s system later that day.

While classes did not resume until the 1st of September teachers were to return earlier. Some of the working time related to this period involved “Croke Park hours.” This seems to be a bit complicated in the Complainant’s case as her career break did not formally end until the 1st of September and Croke Park hours are treated differently for salary purposes. Despite these complications the Complainant is clear in correspondence that she is being excluded from the workplace from the 21st of August. Her non-attendance appears due to her not receiving timetables or login details and then later relate to other requests. There is no suggestion that the Complainant tried to attend the workplace and was turned away at the gate.

On the 23rd of August the Complainant wrote to her Union, cc’ing the WRC, to note that the Respondent had objected to the WRC hearing complaints under the Industrial Relations Act as they had previously. The Respondent points out that this on the basis of the exclusion of secondary school teachers from that avenue as that provided for under Section 23 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990.

On the 25th of August the Complainant and her husband wrote to the Department of Education, cc-ing the WRC and outlined that until a comprehensive safety statement addressing workplace bullying and discrimination is provided by the school was it unsafe for the Complainant to re-enter the workplace and to put them on notice that they believed the Respondent might mis record leave.

On the 28th of August the Respondent sent a letter to the Complainant by registered post noting that she was supposed to have returned to work on the 21st of August and that she was current absent without leave.

The Complainant wrote a further email to the board on the 1st of September noting that she had received this letter and thought that it was punitive. In this email she outlined that she was trying to return to work but was being prevented. It is not entirely clear how she alleges she is prevented from attending the workplace but she again requests passwords, email access and a safety statement.

On the 1st of September classes resumed but the Complainant did not attend work. In emails she outlined an expectation that her salary would be paid regardless. In a further email sent to the Board of Management that same day the Complainant demanded that the Respondent cease sending registered letters to her home.

On the 3rd of September the Principal sent the Complainant her timetable and School Health and Safety statement by email. He restated that her email account is active and in use since August and gave her the contact to reset the password. He pointed out he had sent her the other login details on the 18th of August.

On the 3rd of September the Chairperson of the board also responded to the Complainant and outlined that it would not be appropriate for her to respond as there are ongoing WRC proceedings in relation to the issues raised. The Complainant outlined in correspondence that she was then on sick leave and suggested that this non-engagement was retaliation for having brought the WRC claims. This was the start of a two-week period of sick leave which the Complainant submitting unfit-for-work certification.

On the 4th of September the Complainant reframed her previous demands in the form of a formal legal notice to the Chairperson. Despite the Principal’s reply of the 3rd, she again sought a copy of the health and safety statement and login details. She also included an additional requirement that the Respondent allocation of different reporting line as that the school’s Designated Liaison Person for Tusla is under investigation for serious bullying. It is not clear which investigation the Complainant is referring to. In addition the Complainant sought to direct the board how to respond and required a signed written response from all members of the Board of Management, including teacher and parent representatives, confirming that each member has reviewed and agrees with the Board’s stance but also that the Principal must not be included in this because he was not a member of the board and should only receive information from the WRC and not the board. She restated her request for administrative leave with pay until the WRC adjudication had concluded. The Chairperson of the board replied and pointed her to the Principal’s previous email.

The Complainant appears to have ignored these replies and on the 5th of September she emailed the Respondent’s patron body and Minister for Education demanding the Respondent either confirm provision of the basic requirements for a safe return to work (as outlined in my repeated requests since April 2024 and again since April 2025), or To place me formally on administrative leave with full pay and entitlements from Monday, 8th September 2025, pending the outcome of the WRC adjudication and compliance with employment law. She restated these demands in two separate emails on the 8th of September and asked the board to provide a decision on her request for paid administrative leave and or in the alternative dismiss her. In these emails she asserts that she cannot engage in reporting lines due to her experiences since 2021. She sent a further email to the Minister that same day.

On the 9th of September the Complainant sent an extensive Data Subject Access Request (“DSAR”) to the board seeking all board minutes and other documentation going back to 2021 related to any of the issues she had raised before. She sent a further email on the 9th of September directly to the WRC outlining that the Respondent had failed to offer her a safe place of work or grant her paid administrative leave and as such she had been forced onto medical leave. That same day she later wrote to the Respondent again asserting an entitlement to paid administrative leave and seeking a decision on the same.

The Minister replied to the Complainant on the 10th of September outlining that the Respondent is her employer and any of these matters sat with them. The Complainant forwarded this to the Respondent and asserted that the duty to engage with her was the board’s alone and non-delegable.

While it was not until the 11th of September, after this complaint was filed, that the Complainant received notification that she was being referred to Medmark, the Respondent’s actions in arranging the appointment clearly happened before the complaint was filed. That same day the Chairperson of the board of management confirmed that administrative leave would not be considered.

The Complainant continued to send an increasing number of emails to the Respondent, the patron body and the Department. Of relevance after the date of the complaint is that the Respondent again wrote to her on the 19th of September enclosing the Grievance procedure and flagged this as the appropriate route to raise issues related to her employment.

Returning to the Complainant’s letter lodging these complaints on the 10th of September she alleges the following adverse treatments which I shall consider in turn.

The Board of Management have explicitly stated they are ignoring my correspondence because I exercised my statutory right to pursue a WRC claim. This is in direct contravention of the Minister for Education’s Office, which has confirmed that, as governance, they are the legal employer and cannot ignore me.

If the Respondent had completely ceased to engage with the Complainant in response to these complaints I think that could be reasonably described as an adverse consequence and therefore victimisation. However, that is not what occurred in this case. The Complainant was engaged in excessive emailing to the board and other organisations repeating the same points, often in multiple emails over the course of the same day. The emails were legalistic, wide ranging and sought to direct her employer’s voluntary board how they should engage with her. It was not unreasonable for the Respondent to decide that correspondence should be directed through her line manager, the Principal. The Respondent continued to engage with the Complainant and for the most part their replies were ignored in her ongoing emails. There was no right to administrative leave and failure to reply to this unusual request immediately can hardly be considered victimisation.

referrals to MedMark without due process;

The Complainant was lodging sick certificates while raising a series of issues in correspondence which would reasonably give rise to concern for her health. She had been signed off sick when she was supposed to return to work for the first time in more than two years. In the circumstances I do not conclude that the Respondent’s referral to occupational health was punitive or linked to the Complainant’s EEA complaint.

disclosure of my WRC case details to colleagues, which became a “well-known fact” within the school; defamation of me and my WRC case that spread to other schools, destroying my professional reputation;

I have no evidence on these points.

withholding of timetables and return-to-work schedules until hours before resumption of duties — treatment opposite to my colleagues, used as a form of punishment;

The evidence points to the Complainant being given her timetable before her colleagues. When she withdrew from the job share arrangement on the basis of that timetable she was given a full time timetable with a few days. She appears to have issues accessing the system but it is not clear why. The Respondent sent her login details and put her in contact with a person to revolve any IT issues with. I do not conclude that the Complainant was treated adversely in these matters.

More generally the Complainant throughout her correspondence outlines an expectation that the Respondent was required to take measures, such as changing reporting lines, for her to return to work without her actually providing any detailed formal complaint, much less that complaint being investigated and findings having issued. The Respondent’s refusal to engage with this position is not unreasonable and is unrelated to the complaints of discrimination.

Decision:

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.

Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.

Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.

CA-00073878-002