ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00059544
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Jose David Sierralta Madriz | A.P. Haslam Limited |
Representatives | Self Represented | Keith Haslam, Director of Respondent |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00072475-001 | 16/06/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00072841-001 | 26/06/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 05/11/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Michael MacNamee
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2021 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
Background:
The Complainant was employed as a Workshop Operative with the Respondent, whose business is the provision of industrial electrical components and solutions, from the 19th of February 2024 to the 30th of June 2025. The Complainant initiated several claims, two of which are the subject matter of the present decision. The claims the subject matter of the present decision are as follows: CA-00072475-001 - A claim pursuant to Section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 CA-00072841-001 - Section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 (as amended) (“the EEA”) Both claims were then heard together along with other claims which are the subject matter of separate decisions.
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Summary of Complainant’s Case:
In a WRC Complaint Form received by the WRC on the 16th of June 2025 the Complainant made the following submission: I am submitting this complaint because my employer made a unilateral change to my pay structure, I noticed a month ago that on December 18th, 2024, my pay structure changed without any prior notice or consultation. My payslip, which previously displayed “G Basic Rate,” began showing “G Salary” instead. This change was made unilaterally by my employer, without my knowledge or consent, and without any written communication explaining the reason or impact of this change. While the overall amount I currently receive has not changed significantly, the structure of how I am paid was altered in a way that affects my employment rights, including how overtime, holiday pay, and future variations in hours are treated. I believe this change constitutes a breach of my terms of employment. Additionally, because the change was imposed without my agreement, I believe it also constitutes an unauthorised alteration to my method of pay, potentially falling under the Payment of Wages Act 1991.
In a written submission delivered in advance of the hearing the Complainant made the following points: Payment of Wages Act 1991, Section 5 Employers may not make deductions or alter pay structures without the employee’s consent. Employees must not be subjected to threats or coercionfor asserting their rights. Around December 2024, my payslip changed from “G Basic Rate” to “G Salary” without notice or agreement. This unilateral change affects overtime, holiday pay, and future pay variations.
Employment Equality Acts 1998–2021, Sections 6, 8 & 77 Prohibits discrimination in employment on grounds of race. Employers must provide equal treatment in conditions of employment, including pay and bonuses. Employees may complain to the WRC if they experience less favourable treatment. Statement (Summary from CA-00072841) I believe I was treated unfairly in the distribution of bonuses. Despite longer service than some colleagues, I received a smaller bonus. Certain staff members received an additional €100through Revolut, without transparency or explanation. This unequal treatment appears discriminatory and unrelated to performance or seniority. At the hearing the Complainant made further submissions and gave evidence in support of a claim that he was discriminated against in relation to his remuneration by reference to named comparators. Thie detail is discussed below in this decision under the heading “Evidence”. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
In a written submission delivered in advance of the hearing the Respondent contended as follows: Payment of Wages
Discrimination/Equality
The Respondent was represented by Mr Keith Haslam, a director of the Respondent who made submissions and also gave evidence on behalf Respondent. At the hearing the Complainant made further submissions and gave evidence in support of a claim that he was discriminated against in relation to his remuneration by reference to named comparators. The Respondent was offered time to consider and respond to the submission and evidence of the Complainant. Mr. Haslam indicated that he was ready to proceed. |
Findings and Conclusions:
Evidence The Complainant represented himself. He gave evidence on affirmation. Payment of Wages Claim The Complainant accepted the Respondent’s position that in relation to the change from ‘G Basic Rate’ to ‘G Salary’ on the payroll system insofar as the Respondent had not made an unlawful deduction affecting his remuneration and he withdrew that part of his claim which related to the Payment of Wages Act.
Equal Pay Claim At the start of the hearing the Complainant submitted that he had identified three comparators who are Irish, who were paid at a higher rate than himself and that he wished to pursue an equal pay claim pursuant to the Employment Equality Act (“the EEA”). He identified two named individuals. The Respondent’s Director, who represented the Respondent was asked whether he wished to consider this new information and evidence and to provide a written response, but he indicated that he was ready to proceed with the hearing. The Complainant identified three comparators by name and the Respondent’s Director accepted that they were correctly identified and were employees of the Respondent and were Irish nationals. The Complainant said that the first and second named and identified comparators, “Comparator A” and “Comparator B” were both paid €1 per hour more than himself and the other named and identified comparator, “Comparator C”, also an Irish national, was paid 50 cent per hour more than himself. The Complainant’s rate of pay was €15.50 per hour. All three comparators were doing the same work as the Complainant. Of the three, only Comparator A had more service than the Complainant. However, the Complainant had superior previous experience to all three Comparators, having worked for three years in Argentina repairing ATM machines whereas Comparator A had previously worked in a charity shop and Comparator B’s experience was in stock purchasing. The Complainant alleged that he was treated differently to the Comparators because of his race/nationality. The Respondent’s director said in response that he did not challenge the factual accuracy of any of the above evidence regarding rates of pay. He was not in a position to comment on the experience of the Complainant or of the Comparators. However, he said that there were three other Irish National who were paid at the same rate as the Complainant and some, perhaps two or three, who were paid less. The rates of pay for every employee was agreed at the interview stage and did not change thereafter for any employee. He could only say that there was a range of hourly rates from €15.50 to €18.50 which varied depending on experience. He thought that some employees at the interview stage may have sought higher rates, but he could not say with certainty as he was not involved in the interviews. He did recall talking to Comparator A who said that he was earning a certain amount in his then employment (in another job) and he recalled telling this individual that the rate was €16.50 and that was all that he could be offered and this led to agreement, in the case of Comparator A, to the rate of €16.60 in his case. Mr. Haslam could not comment on the previous experience of Comparator A. As regards his own recruitment the Complainant said that he was interviewed and afterwards he received an offer with the rate already set. Mr. Haslam did not controvert this evidence.
Applicable Law Section 6(1) of the EEA provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where:
“a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) ...”.
Section 6 (2) sets out the grounds in respect of which discrimination, as defined above is prohibited. Of relevance to the present case is ground (h), “the ground of race” which is a situation where, as between two individuals, the discriminatory grounds arise from the fact:
“(h) that they are of different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins (in this Act referred to as “the ground of race”)”
In a claim of this nature a comparator is required to establish liability pursuant to the above provisions.
Section 8 (1) paragraph (b) of the Acts prohibits discrimination against an employee in relation to conditions of employment. The EEA has specific provisions relating to equality in pay with reference to the specific grounds specified in Section 6 (2). The EEA permits of an employee who has a particular characteristic to compare him or herself with another worker or workers who does or do not possess that relevant characteristic. The comparison applies where the employee and the comparator(s) are engaged in like work as defined in Section 7. Included in the definition of like work in that section is a situation (of relevance to the present case) where the Complainant and the Comparators were doing “the same work” as per Section 7 (1) (a). The entitlement to equal remuneration is specified in Section 29 which (where relevant to the present claim) provides as follows. (1) It shall be a term of the contract under which C is employed that, subject to this Act, C shall at any time be entitled to the same rate of remuneration for the work which C is employed to do as D who, at that or any other relevant time, is employed to do like work by the same or an associated employer. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), in relation to a particular time, a relevant time is any time (on or after the commencement of this section) which falls during the 3 years which precede, or the 3 years which follow, the particular time. (3) [Not relevant] (4) Section 19(4) applies in relation to C and D as it applies in relation to A and B, with the modification that the reference in it to persons of a particular gender (being As or Bs) is a reference to persons (being Cs or Ds) who differ in a respect mentioned in any paragraph of section 28(1) and with any other necessary modifications. (5) Subject to subsection (4), nothing in this Part shall prevent an employer from paying, on grounds other than the discriminatory grounds, different rates of remuneration to different employees. Subsection (4) adopts and transposes the text of Section 19 (4) with necessary modifications. Applying those modifications, the text of the provision as it applies to Section 29 (4) is then as follows: (a) Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision would put persons of a particular [race] (being [C]s or [D]s) at a particular disadvantage in respect of remuneration compared with other employees of their employer. (b) Where paragraph (a) applies, the persons referred to in that paragraph shall each be treated for the purposes of subsection (1) as complying or, as the case may be, not complying with the provision concerned, whichever results in the higher remuneration, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving the aim are appropriate and necessary. (c) In any proceedings statistics are admissible for the purpose of determining whether this subsection applies in relation to C or D.
Section 85A of the EEA makes specific provision in relation to the burden of proof in Discrimination Claims. Section 85A (1) states that: “Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”
In the case of Teresa Mitchell v Southern Health Board (Cork University Hospital) AEE/99/8, [2001] 12E.L.R. 201, the Labour Court concluded that:
“a complainant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment”
The Labour Court has held in Hallinan v. Moy Valley ResourcesDEC-S2008-025 that to establish the relevant facts the Complainant must: (a) establish that he or she is covered by the protected ground; (b) Establish the specific treatment has allegedly taken place; (c) The treatment was less favourable than was or would be afforded to a person not covered by the relevant discriminatory ground. Summarising the foregoing with regard to the present case, to succeed in establishing discrimination in relation to pay, the Complainant must prove:
If the Complainant successfully establishes the proofs outlined at 1- 3 inclusive above, the Burden of proof then shifts to the employer who must show that there are grounds, other than the protected ground, for the differences in pay as between the Complainant and the Comparators. Application of Law to Facts The Respondent did not contest any of the following:
This being so, pursuant to Section 85A, facts are established by the Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him and thus it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary. In proving the contrary, the Respondent must show that there are grounds other than race for the differences in pay. As to the grounds advanced by the Respondent at the hearing, it should be noted that the Respondent was offered time and if necessary, an adjournment of the hearing, to prepare a response and to provide any documentary or witness evidence in rebuttal of the evidence given by the Complainant but the Respondent’s director indicated that he wished to proceed with the hearing. The Respondent relied solely on the evidence of Mr. Haslam a director of the Respondent who also acted as the Respondent’s representative. No other witnesses were called, and no documentary evidence was submitted by or on behalf of the Respondent. The Respondent’s evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination reduces itself to two propositions: Firstly, the fact that other Irish National were paid the same or, in some cases, a lower rate than the Complainant and secondly, that the differences in rates arose at interview stage when those rates were individually set with the interviewees who were then subsequently employed. With regard to the overall distribution of the differences in pay as between Irish and non-Irish workers this assertion relied on Mr. Haslam’s oral evidence which was that there were three other Irish National who were paid at the same rate as the Complainant and some, perhaps two or three, who were paid less. No documentary evidence identifying the full list or relevant workers and detailing their respective nationalities rates of pay was not put forward. Furthermore, in relation to those Irish workers who were alleged to have been paid at a lower rate than the Complainant, this is inconsistent with Mr. Haslam’s evidence that the rates on offer for these positions were from €15.50 to €18.50, since if the Complainant was paid at €15.50 this was already the lowest rate which was on offer and thus it is difficult to understand how and in what circumstances the “2 or three Irish workers” who were paid less were paid less than what was on offer. As to the evidence regarding the rates being set at interview, Mr. Haslam was the only witness called Although he was not involved in the interviews, he said that there was a range of hourly rates from €15.50 to €18.50 which varied depending on experience. The Complainant in his evidence said that he had previous experience superior to any of the Comparators. The only other evidence offered by the witness was a discussion he had with Comparator A which appears to have been based on a discussion about the rate of pay he was getting in the job that he was then doing which appears to have generated an agreement with regard to his rate of pay. There was no evidence regarding this rate being set based on his experience. Regarding Comparator A’s experience, the Complainant said that his own experience was superior to that of Comparator A which was not controverted. He also said that he was given an offer of employment with the rate already set. In such circumstances there is insufficient evidence regarding the linkage if such there were as between experience of the Complainant and the Comparators and the rate paid which was paid to each. The only other possible explanation of the different rates paid to the Complainant and the Comparators is that the latter negotiated a higher rate at interview. In the absence of any evidence whether through a witness or by way of interview notes it is impossible to say what happened during the interviews and the only available evidence was from the Complainant who said that the rate of pay was just offered to him after his interview. Aside from the absence of interview records or a witness who made the selections following the interviews there was no evidence to support the establishment, prior to the interviews of clear criteria to measure and weight the previous experience of any candidate or as to how such metrics were applied to the Complainant and the Comparators. Even though both of the issues raised by the Respondent are potentially relevant to identifying a ground other than race as the basis for the differences in pay I find for the reasons identified above, that insufficient oral or documentary evidence has been adduced such as to establish the veracity of either proposition. In all of the circumstances, I find on the balance of probability that the Respondent has not adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination raised by the Complainant and accordingly I find that the Complainant’s claim for discrimination in pay succeeds. Redress in Relation to the Complainant’s Equality Claim Section 82 of the EEA provides for the appropriate form of redress where a discrimination claim succeeds and provides (where relevant) as follows: “82.Redress which may be ordered (1) Subject to this section, the types of redress for which a decision of the Director General under section 79 may provide are such one or more of the following as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case: (a) an order for compensation in the form of arrears of remuneration (attributable to a failure to provide equal remuneration) in respect of so much of the period of employment as begins not more than 3 years before the date of the referral under section 77(1) which led to the decision;… …(c) an order for compensation for the effects of acts of discrimination or victimisation which occurred not earlier than 6 years before the date of the referral of the case under section 77….” The evidence demonstrated that Complainant was paid €1 per hour less than the Comparator. The Complainant worked 38.75 hours per week and was thus paid €38.75 per week less than Comparators A and B. It was agreed that the Complainant was employed from the 19th of February 2024 to the 30th of June 2025 which is a period of 71 weeks. Accordingly, the total pay difference (€38.75 x 71) is €2,751.66. I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant the sum of €2,751.66 way of arrears of remuneration pursuant to Section 82 (1) (a) of the EEA. I further order the Respondent to pay compensation to the Complainant pursuant to Section 82 (1) (c) for the effects of the discrimination suffered, including the necessity to initiate and purse this claim, in the sum of €2,500. This award represents compensation for breach of the Complainant’s statutory rights as distinct from remuneration or remuneration-related compensation and is therefore not subject to tax or other deduction. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint(s)/dispute(s) in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
CA-00072475-001 – Claim withdrawn CA-00072841-001 – The Respondent discriminated against the Complainant. The Respondent is directed to pay the sum of €2,751.66 to the Complainant way of arrears of arrears of remuneration The Respondent is further directed to pay the sum of €2,500 to the Complainant by way of non-remuneration-based compensation for breach of the Complainant’s statutory rights.
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Dated: 05-12-25
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Michael MacNamee
Key Words:
Race/Nationality Ground – Equal Pay - Employment Equality Acts 1998- 2021 –Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, Section 19, Section 29, Section 82, Section 85 A - Teresa Mitchell v Southern Health Board (Cork University Hospital) AEE/99/8, [2001] 12E.L.R. 201 - Hallinan v. Moy Valley ResourcesDEC-S2008- |
