ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00058588
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Maria Monzon | CK Executive Services Ireland Limited |
Representatives | Jones Magee Solicitors | Peninsula Business Services Ireland |
Complaints:
Act | Complaint Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00071092-001 | 25/04/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00071092-002 Duplicate of -001 | 25/04/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00071092-003 Duplicate of -001 | 25/04/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00071092-004 Duplicate of -001 | 25/04/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00071092-005 Duplicate of -001 | 25/04/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 | CA-00071092-006 Withdrawn | 25/04/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00071092-008 | 25/04/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 28/11/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Catherine Byrne
Procedure:
In accordance with section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 - 2015, these complaints were assigned to me by the Director General. I conducted a hearing on November 28th 2025, at which I made enquiries and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence relevant to the complaints. The complainant, Ms Maria Monzon, was represented by Mr Patrick Jones of Jones Magee Solicitors. CK Executive Services Ireland Limited was represented by Mr Hugh Hegarty of Peninsula Business Services. Mr Hegarty was accompanied by CK Executive’s risk manager, Mr John Clare, who gave evidence in support of the employer’s position.
Three days after the hearing of this complaint, on December 1st 2025, Mr Jones sent some additional documents to me at the WRC, including copies of emails between Ms Monzon and Mr Clare. In my conclusions which are set out below, I have taken account of the submission provided by Mr Hegarty on behalf of CK Executive Services Limited, the documents submitted by Mr Jones on behalf of Ms Monzon and the evidence of both sides at the hearing.
While the parties are named in this Decision, from here on, I will refer to Ms Monzon as “the complainant” and to CK Executive Services Ireland Limited as “the respondent.”
Background:
The respondent provides security services to clients on an outsourced contract basis and the complainant was employed by them as a licensed security officer. She commenced in her role on January 20th 2024, and was assigned to a financial services company in south Dublin. When she was dismissed on March 25th 2025, her hourly rate of pay was €15.52. The complainant was on probation until July 24th 2024; however, on July 16th, her probation was extended for two months due to her failure to follow correct procedures regarding the handling of keys, ID badges, contractors on site and other security protocols. On July 19th, she wrote to the managing director and asked for additional training to address the issues that caused her not to pass her probation. When she was working on the night shift on September 12th 2024, the complainant left a gate open at the facility in south Dublin. This was reported by a member of the client’s staff and by a security officer coming on duty the next morning. Following this incident, the complainant was moved to a smaller and less complex building in Dublin city centre which houses a museum. In February 2025, the complainant was suspended when it was discovered that she was using the gym on the site where she worked until September 2024. She gained entry to the site when her mother, a member of the cleaning staff, “swiped” her in. She had no permission from the client’s site manager to use the gym. When an investigation into this matter was under way, another incident came to light when it was reported that, on February 6th, the complainant didn’t check that everyone had left the museum and two members of the public were briefly locked in. An investigation meeting took place on February 21st 2025 and this was followed by a disciplinary meeting on March 5th. The complainant was issued with a final written warning, dated March 19th 2025 for serious negligence in the performance of her duties, categorised in the warning letter as gross misconduct. Also on March 19th, the complainant’s supervisor in the museum reported that, when she locked up the building for the night, she left a fire door open and a heater plugged in at the reception desk. From the respondent’s submission, it appears that a meeting took place on March 20th 2025, at which the complainant was asked to hand back her uniform and security badge. On March 25th, she received a letter from the risk manager, Mr Clare, informing her that she was dismissed with effect from that date due to her “performance operating as a security officer on our behalf.” |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
CA-00071092-008: Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 On behalf of the complainant, Mr Jones submitted that using the gym facilities wasn’t so serious an incident that a disciplinary investigation was required. On February 6th, when two members of the public were briefly locked into the museum, the complainant was working with a colleague, who informed her that just two people were left in the building. The complainant wasn’t aware that her colleague was referring to himself and the complainant. Regarding the final issue, Mr Jones said that the complainant denies the allegation that she left the fire door open and a heater plugged in. Considering the issue of fair procedures, Mr Jones submitted that the complainant wasn’t given details of the incidents discussed at the meetings on February 21st, March 5th and March 20th. He said that she wasn’t informed of her right to be represented and she didn’t get time to review the evidence against her. She wasn’t given an opportunity to challenge the person who made the complainants about her and, for all these reasons, Mr Jones argued that the meetings were unfair and not impartial. Compounding the unfairness of the respondent’s procedures, Mr Jones noted that the complainant was not informed that she had a right to appeal against the decision to terminate her employment. CA-00071092-001: Complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 The complainant claims that she received no wages when she was suspended from work in February 2025 and that she is due 35 hours’ pay for this period, equivalent to €543.20. The complainant was paid monthly by the respondent. Her final payslip, a copy of which was provided at the hearing, is dated March 27th 2025 and shows a net payment of €1,783.57, based on gross pay of €1,823.60. This comprises pay for 80 hours’ work, eight hours’ public holiday pay and 29.5 hours’ holiday pay. The complainant said that she received this payslip, but that the wages were not transferred to her bank account. At the hearing, she produced a copy of her bank statement up to the end of March 2025, and there is no evidence that the payment was transferred. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
CA-00071092-008: Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 In his evidence at the hearing, Mr Clare referred to the incident on March 19th 2025, when the supervisor in the museum reported that the complainant had left a fire door open and a heater plugged in. The complainant had finished her shift at 4.00pm, and the supervisor remained on the site until 7.00pm. Mr Clare said that, because there had been previous issues with the complainant’s conduct, he didn’t think a disciplinary meeting was required. Mr Clare said that the site that the complainant started out working at was complex. After the incidents in February 2025, when a gate was left open over a weekend, she was issued with a final written warning and a decision was made to transfer her to a smaller site. Mr Clare said that he thought the complainant would find the museum easier to work in, but when she left the fire door open, he felt that there were no improvements and he decided to dismiss her due to “several protocol failures.” In response to questions under cross-examination from Mr Jones, Mr Clare said that an email was sent to the complainant to inform her about the purpose of the meetings on February 21st and March 5th. At the meeting on February 21st, Mr Clare said that his main concern was the fact that the complainant accessed the gym on the client’s site in south Dublin without permission. He agreed with Mr Jones that the locking of the customers into the museum was brief and incidental and was quickly resolved when the complainant informed her supervisor. Mr Clare said that the disciplinary procedure was explained to the complainant, although he couldn’t say at what meeting this explanation was given. The complainant didn’t ask for an interpreter to assist her at the meetings and none was offered. After her probation was extended, Mr Clare said that the complainant was “briefed” by her supervisor. CA-00071092-001: Complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 At the hearing, Mr Hegarty said that the respondent accepts that the complainant wasn’t paid while she was suspended from work in February 2025. He said that the reason for this is that the complainant didn’t fill out a timesheet for the hours she was absent on suspension. The amount owed is €543.20. Regarding the March payment, Mr Hegarty referred to the payslip dated March 27th which was issued to the complainant. He said that the money was transferred to the complainant’s bank account in the normal way. |
Findings and Conclusions:
CA-00071092-008: Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977
The Relevant Law The basis of our approach to dismissal is at s.6(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 – 2015 (“the Act”) which provides that: “Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal, unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.” Section 6(4)(b) of the Act provides that, “…the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act not to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from …the conduct of the employee.” From this, we understand that the burden of proof rests with the respondent to establish the substantial grounds justifying the dismissal of the complainant. In the letter of dismissal dated March 25th 2025, the respondent’s risk manager, Mr Clare explained that she was dismissed for leaving an electric heater powered on and the fire doors open in the museum where she was assigned to work as a security officer. In tandem with the reasonableness of the decision to dismiss an employee, the Act also requires an employer to have regard to fair procedures. Section 6(7) addresses this issue: (7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so - (a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal, and (b) to the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in section 14(1) of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice referred to in paragraph (d) (inserted by the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act, 1993) of section 7(2) of this Act. Section 14(1) refers to the obligation on an employer to provide an employee with a written copy of the procedure that will be used “before and for the purpose of dismissing the employee.” While a comprehensive statement of her terms and conditions of employment was included in the respondent’s documents at the hearing, the statement doesn’t contain a disciplinary procedure and there is no evidence that the complainant received a copy of the respondent’s disciplinary procedure. Findings The balance between the reasonableness of the decision to dismiss an employee and the reasonableness of the procedure is not an even one. In my task to decide on this matter, I must consider all the circumstances, including the risk associated with the complainant’s conduct and her apparent failure to appreciate the seriousness of the security breaches of which she was accused. Before the hearing ended on November 28th 2025, I explained to the parties that it was my view that the respondent had reasonable cause to dismiss the complainant. It seems to me that the job of a security officer wasn’t suitable for her and it was inevitable that she was going to be dismissed sooner rather than later. While I have reached this conclusion, I also find that, on procedural grounds, her dismissal was unfair. There is no evidence that the complainant received written notice of the investigation meeting on February 21st or the disciplinary meeting on March 5th. She is from Mexico and English is not her first language and, for this reason, apart from an obligation to advise her of her right to be represented, it was imperative that she was in fact represented. The balance of authority was entirely in favour of the respondent at the disciplinary meetings and the complainant had no means to mount a defence of her conduct. The note of the meeting of February 21st shows that she answered “yes” or “no” to most of the questions she was asked. At the meeting on March 20th at which she was dismissed, there is no evidence that she knew that she was being called to a meeting at which her dismissal was contemplated. The letter of dismissal, issued on March 25th, makes no mention of her right to appeal. Conclusion It is my view that, most employers finding themselves in similar circumstances to the respondent would have dismissed the complainant. I find however, that the manner of her dismissal and the failure of the respondent to follow proper procedures makes her dismissal unfair. |
Findings and Conclusions:
CA-00071092-008: Complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991
At the hearing, the respondent conceded that the complainant is owed €543.20 for the period when she was suspended pending an investigation into her conduct in February 2025. No evidence was submitted by the respondent during or after the hearing that shows that the complainant received the net pay of €1,783.57, indicated on her final payslip dated March 27th 2025. |
Decision:
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
CA-00071092-008: Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 I decide that this complaint is well founded. Regarding redress, I have taken account of the complainant’s evidence that she lost confidence in her ability to work as a security officer, despite the jobs that were available in that industry. Before she worked in security, she worked as a cleaner, but she said that she didn’t want to go back to that line of work. After her dismissal at the end of March 2025, she said that she worked briefly in a coffee shop. She said that she then decided that she should try to improve her career prospects and, in September 2024, she started a course as a personal trainer. I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €4,000, equivalent to just over six weeks’ gross pay. I have decided on this amount in an attempt to balance the respondent’s treatment of the complainant, including their failure to give her notice of her dismissal, with her decision not to take up full-time employment after she was dismissed. This award is in the form of loss of earnings and is subject to the normal deductions of tax, PRSI and USC. CA-00071092-001: Complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 I decide that this complaint is well founded and I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €1,783.57 net, in respect of wages not paid in March 2025 and €543.20 gross (subject to deductions) in respect of wages for the period during which she was suspended in February 2025. |
Dated: 17th of December 2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Catherine Byrne
Key Words:
Dismissal procedures, pay during suspension |
