ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00058581
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Cosette Secareanu | About Time Limited |
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties | {text} | {text} |
Representatives | Self-Represented | Gareth Kyne MSS Ireland Limited |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00071214-001 | 30/04/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 24/10/2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Donal Moore
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
The hearing was attended by the Complainant, an interpreter (Ms Servan) the Respondents (Martin Kerlin and Patricia O’Neill) and their Representative Mr Kyne.
The meeting was delayed in commencing due to a request from the Respondent on the delay of a witness and a further delay on the late attendance of the interpreter.
The Complainant, the interpreter both took an oath to be truthful with the Commission and the two Respondent witnesses affirmed to be truthful with the Commission.
The parties were put under notice of the decision in the Zalewski case, that their evidence would be heard under oath or affirmation, and of the penalty for perjury. Additionally, the parties were informed that they would be afforded an opportunity to cross examine witnesses and the hearing was to be held in public; the parties offered me neither objection nor reason to have the hearing held in private. Neither party found cause to cross examine.
I have taken the time to carefully review all the evidence both written and oral. I have noted the respective position of the parties. I am not required to provide a line for line rebuttal of the evidence and submissions that I have rejected or deemed superfluous to the main findings. I am guided by the reasoning in Faulkner v. The Minister for Industry and Commerce [1997] E.L.R. 107 where it was held “…minute analysis or reasons are not required to be given by administrative tribunals...the duty on administrative tribunals to give reasons in their decisions is not a particularly onerous one. Only broad reasons need be given…”.
I heard all the evidence and invited the parties to summarise their case which they duly did, and the hearing was properly closed.
After closing, the Complainant attempted to offer further evidence and argument, and they were informed that this was no longer appropriate. Subsequently, in the days following the hearing, the Complainant attempted to submit further documentation, and this was refused.
Background:
The Complainant began work 18/11/2025 and the employment is ongoing, and they are employed as HR Recruiter and Office Administrator On €484.74 weekly gross. They submitted their complaint 30/04/2025 and this brings them within statute. The Complainant has alleged that the Respondent has discriminated against her in terms of pay and some working conditions on the grounds of Family Status. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The complainant has submitted a formal complaint concerning alleged unequal pay by the Respondent. Key Issues Raised:
· Despite performing HR recruitment duties, the complainant was paid at the Office Administrator rate. · She claims other employees in similar or equivalent roles received higher hourly rates. · Specific examples of pay discrepancies among colleagues were cited.
· In 2024, the complainant requested a salary review, which was declined. ·�� She followed up with emails to management outlining her concerns. · The company maintained its position and did not adjust her salary.
· The complainant was informed she had not followed internal procedures, though she asserts no relevant guidance exists in the company handbook or contract. · She notes that the final rejection of her salary complaint came after the appeal window for her previous WRC case had closed.
The complainant submitted · Employment contracts (original and updated) · WRC adjudication decision from the previous harassment case · Email correspondence with management regarding salary concerns The Complainant alleges that she has been unfairly and unequally paid for work performed primarily as a HR Recruiter and seeks redress through the WRC for what she considers a breach of employment equality and fair remuneration practices. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent provides cleaning services and has faced significant financial challenges in recent years, necessitating strict cost controls to maintain operations. Nature of Complaint: The respondent disputes the claim made by the Complainant which suggests she is paid less than four colleagues due to her family status. The company argues that this is a mischaracterisation of a standard pay dispute as an equality issue. Key Points Raised by the Respondent:
· The Complainant indicated uncertainty about whether family status was the reason for the alleged unequal pay. · The respondent asserts that the complaint is a straightforward pay issue, not one grounded in discrimination under the Employment Equality Acts.
· The company notes that pay differences for similar roles are common and may result from various legitimate factors not related to the nine protected grounds under equality legislation.
· The Complainant previously brought a case under the Industrial Relations Act, which resulted in a recommendation to update her job title to HR Recruiter and Office Administrator. Her duties remained unchanged.
· In July 2023, the Complainant received a €0.70 per hour pay increase. · In July 2024 and again in April 2025, she requested further increases, which were declined due to the company’s financial constraints.
· The company is operating at a loss and cannot implement across-the-board salary increases. · It maintains that the Complainant is paid a reasonable rate for her work. Pay Decision Rationale: The company states that the decision to deny the Complainant a pay increase was based solely on financial and business considerations, not on any personal or protected characteristic. Comparator Employees: Four employees— (M, L, O and V) are referenced in the complaint. The respondent asserts that:
Role and Responsibilities of the Complainant:
Comparator Role Details:
Comparator Roles and Pay Structure:
The Complainant Role:
Respondent Legal and Procedural Arguments:
Conclusion:
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Findings and Conclusions:
The Complainant in this matter is clearly a long serving employee of the Respondent and has a great deal of education, including legal education in another jurisdiction. She set out her case in simple terms that she is at a disadvantage in term of pay in comparison to her colleagues in that her colleagues are of a different family status, specifically that they are dual income households, which gives them a better bargaining position. The Complainant narrative set out the various status and education and experience of the named comparators but furnished little probative evidence. Under the Act, It is for the Complainant to set out the disadvantage that she suffered in comparison to another person because of their differing characteristics. In this instance she has referred the matter because of her Family Status in comparison to her colleague, although she admits on her complaint that she is unsure if this is the correct ground. I am prohibited from giving the parties legal advice, but in an abundance of fair procedures, I allowed a great deal of latitude to the Complainant in the hearing of the case. The Complainant attempted to make further submissions after the hearing was properly closed and this was not allowed, having allowed them time to make out and summarise their and being clear that the summary would bring the matter to a close. The Complainant again attempted to introduce further documentation and /or arguments in the days after the hearings. This was not agreed and not accepted, and such were not part of my decision in this matter. The Applicable Law Discrimination Sections 6(1) and 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 sets out, as it is applied to this case, that discrimination shall be taken to occur where a person is treated less favourably than another person on one of the nine grounds: in this case family status. Prima Facie and the Burden of Proof The burden of proof in this matter initially rests with the Complainant. The Act sets out that where facts are established by the Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination to the Complainant it is then for the respondent to prove the contrary. It is for the Complainant party to make out a prima facie case, that is to show facts that suggest discrimination has occurred. The prima facie test is not an onerous test. It requires some facts that tend to show the possibility of discrimination. The principle in discrimination litigation is that the Claimant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, whereupon the onus shifts to the Respondent, who must prove that no discrimination has occurred. In Mitchell v Southern Health Board, DEEO11 the Labour Court held that a ‘claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which to rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination.’ The Respondent maintains the complaint is a standard pay dispute, not an equality claim and there is not sufficient evidence presented to support a claim of discrimination based on the ground set out, or any other ground. Conclusion I have considered the submissions and evidence of both parties to the complaint and in parsing the issue I enquired into the nature of the family status basis of discrimination and from the evidence given the Complainant feels that her sole status in terms of family meant that she was paid less, largely on the basis of having only one household income which weakened her bargaining position. The Complainant also set out in the hearing and in her paperwork that she was not sure that this was the correct ground. I cannot find this to be discriminatory in terms of her comparators. If evidence were adduced to show that they were paid more than she because they were married or otherwise committed there could be grounds to consider discrimination, but as it stands the Complainant has not produced a valid comparator for the purposes of the Act. There is clearly a difference in remuneration, but the Respondent sets out in detail the roles and responsibilities of the named comparators that would legally satisfy me that there are not different because of any of the grounds within the Act but based on the roles and responsibilities held by the named comparators. The Respondent sets out that the Comparators named are not comparable to the Complainant. I must agree with the Respondent on this matter and while the comparators may not be as highly educated or experienced as the Complainant set out in comparison with herself, this is not in itself discriminatory within the meaning of the Act. I can only conclude from all that I have heard that there are no sufficient comparator and no prima facie case made of anything resembling an equality ground. No evidence has been presented to support a claim of discrimination based on any of the grounds within the meaning of the Act. To say that there is no discrimination is not to deny that the Complainant finds the employment difficult or otherwise unpalatable, unfair or unappreciative of their skills, education and experience. However, the legal position is that the treatment complained of must be unfair because of the ground (family status) complained of. The Complainant has not met this burden and for that reason the complaint is not well founded. The Respondent sets out that the complaint is a standard pay dispute, not an equality claim and in this I am agreement. |
Decision:
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Complainant did not establish a prime facie case that they were discriminated against by the Respondent and for that reason the complaint is not well founded. |
Dated: 5th of December 2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Dónal Moore
Key Words:
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