Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Evan  Tyrrell

Royal Electrical Ltd

Representatives

Sarah Tyrrell

Hugh Hegarty Peninsula Business Services Ireland

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 24 of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000

CA-00070770-001

12/04/2025

The Complainant was employed as an apprentice electrician from the 22nd May 2024 to the 6th of April 2025. His date of birth is the 11th of August 2002. However, even though the Complainant’s apprenticeship was not formally registered until January 2025 the Complainant was paid at the reduced apprentice rate from the commencement of his employment.  It was contended that until the Complainant’s apprenticeship was registered, he should have been paid the appropriate rate of pay pursuant to the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 (as amended) (hereafter referred to as “the NMWA”).

The complaint concerns non-payment of the statutory minimum wage to the Complainant during his employment period from 22 May 2024 until January 2025.

Despite employment during this period, the Complainant was not formally registered as an apprentice with SOLAS until January 2025. Under the National Minimum Wage Act 2000, in the absence of formal apprenticeship registration, the Complainant must be paid at least the statutory minimum wage applicable to his age.

Requests for a detailed breakdown of hours and pay rates were made in accordance with WRC requirements but not provided by the employer.

The Complainant’s representative delivered a further submission as follows:

1. Continuing Contravention

The employer’s failure to pay [The Complainant] the national minimum wage began in May 2024 and continued without interruption until January 2025, when he was finally registered with SOLAS and paid correctly.

This was a continuing contravention of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000. Accordingly, under Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, the six-month time limit runs from the end of the contravention (January 2025). [The Complainant]’s complaint, submitted in April 2025, was therefore made within time. This approach has been supported in WRC decisions including ADJ-00017336 (2019) and ADJ-00029985 (2021), where ongoing underpayment was held to constitute a continuing breach.

[ADJUDICATION OFFICER; S NOTE: There was no record matching the above citations on the WRC Data Base]

2. Reasonable Cause for Delay

If any portion of the claim is found to predate the six-month period, Evan had reasonable cause for not filing sooner. He was a 21-year-old apprentice dependent on his employer to continue his training and reasonably feared dismissal if he challenged his pay while still employed. This type of fear has been recognised by the WRC as valid justification for delay, for example in ADJ-00019144 (2018). Moreover, [The Complainant] had no experience of employment rights or the workings of the Workplace Relations Commission. He trusted that his employer was acting correctly and was repeatedly reassured that his registration was “being sorted” and that he would be “backdated” once it went through. Those assurances led him to believe he would be treated fairly and that there was no need to take formal action at that time.

3. Employer’s Admission and Conduct

The Respondent has now admitted that [the Complainant] should have been paid at least the national minimum wage and even offered to backdate his pay, before ultimately terminating his employment without doing so. This admission reinforces the validity of Evan’s claim.

4. Request

For these reasons, we respectfully request that the Adjudicator find:

The complaint was submitted within the statutory time limit, or alternatively, that there was reasonable cause for any delay; and

That [The Complainant] is entitled to arrears for the full period of underpayment from May 2024 to January 2025, in accordance with the National Minimum Wage Act 2000.

The initial submission of the Respondent made two essential points as follows:

It is the respondents positing that the claim was made to the Workplace Relations Commission on or about the 12th April 2025. Therefor the relevant period for the complaint begins on the 12th October 2024.

It is accepted by the respondent that the claimant should have been paid the national minimum wage, despite the circumstances surrounding the complaint.

The claimant has outlined in correspondence with WRC that they believe the amount due is €6,760.62. It is submitted by the respondent that this calculation is incorrect in and of itself; However, the relevant period for calculation is from the 12th October and the respondent submits the amount owed to the claimant in the relevant period is €2022.93 as can be seen in the attached week 41 being the week of the 7th - 13th October 2024.

Following the hearing the parties were invited to make further submissions and the Respondent contended as follows:

1. This is a supplementary submission in relation to the matter heard before the Adjudicator on 10th October 2025 a claim taken by Evan Tyrell hereinafter referred to as the “claimant” against their employer Royal Electric Limited hereinafter referred to as the “respondent” under the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000.

2. This submission is directly making reference to the ADJ-00029443 at the Adjudicator request to address the issue of time limits and section 26 of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 as amended, and specific reference to subsection 26(1)(a)(i) and the wording therein, specifically “respect of the period to which the dispute relates, and…”

3. For ease of reference the relevant legislation has been included below, despite the fact that the original submission already included the excerpt below.

4. The National Minimum Wage Act states at section 24: [Text quoted]

6. Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 states a subsection 6 and 7: [Text of provisions Quoted]

7. The Adjudicator referred to ADJ-00029443where in relation to the issue in question of time limits the adjudicator in that case held as follows: Regarding the time limit issue raised by the Respondent as agreed at the hearing, there is no provision within the Act of 2015 which limits the complainant under the Minimum Wage Act to cognisable periods of a six months extending to twelve in certain circumstances. The Minimum Wage Act was unique from its inception. The only reference period for the Adjudication Officer (formerly the Rights Commissioner) described in the body of the original legislation is that of the period of the dispute as provided for in Section 26(1)(a)(i). And as that period is not defined, it can be as long as the period of employment-as it is in this Complaint. Nonetheless, as pointed out to the parties at the hearing, there is a discretion as to how much will be awarded by the Adjudication Officer ‘in all the circumstances.’ It is not unreasonable to suggest that any Adjudication Officer will apply the latter phrase judiciously.

8. In response to the above the respondent submits the above is in the first place a determine of the WRC and the Adjudicator in the above case in a decision that is only binding on the parties involved in the specific case ADJ-00029443, that is to say the decision of the WRC has not set a binding legal precedent that must be followed in future claims.

8. Further the respondent submits that it interpretation of the Adjudicator in ADJ-00029443is entirely incorrect and it must also be noted that it was no challenged inthe hearing or via appeal to the Labour Court.

9. It is the respondents position reference to the “period to which the dispute relates” must be read in conjunction with the relevant sections of the Workplace Relations Act specifically Section 41 section 6 and Section 7 subsection (d) which sets out the time limit for complaints to be made within 6 months beginning on the date of contravention and in the case of the section 7 within 6 months beginning on the date to which the employee obtains a statement in respect of hourly pay or the date of expiration of the time within which that statement was required to be provided by the employer in accordance with that section.

10. It is the case that the two Acts must be read in conjunction with each other, and therefore the time for which the dispute relates must be limited to the 6 months prior to the claim being lodged or 6 months prior to the obtaining of the statement in respect of hourly wage or the expiry there of.

11. The MWA at section 24 states: The Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission shall not entertain a dispute in relation to an employee’s entitlements under this Act and, accordingly, shall not refer the dispute to an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015]— (emphasis added)

(a) unless the employee—

(i) has obtained under section 23 a statement of his or her average hourly rate of pay in respect of the relevant pay reference period, or

(ii) having requested the statement, has not been provided with it within the time limited by that section for the employer to supply the information, and a period of 6 months (or such longer period, not exceeding 12 months, as the rights commissioner may allow) has not elapsed since that statement was obtained or time elapsed, as the case may be,

12. Therefore, we submit that the proper interpretation of the Act must mean that the period for which the dispute relates can only be the 6 months prior to the lodging of the complaint, with an allowable extension to 12 months with reasonable excuse.

13. We Submit it is clear that the 6 months as set out in section 24 of the MWA is the period for which the dispute relates as referenced in section 26, as this is the time frame as set out in section 24 of the MWA. Albeit extendable with reasonable cause to 12 months.

14. It must be born in mind that all employment rights legislation have strict limits in relation to lodging of complaints to ensure that both parties a treated fairly and in the case of employment rights legislation, the limit as set out in all but one piece of legislation is 6 months, and it is disputed that there was any other intention of the legislature to set this piece of legislation apart. In ADJ-00029443the Adjudicator justified the rational as

“there is no provision within the Act of 2015 which limits the complainant under the Minimum Wage Act to cognisable periods of a six months extending to twelve in certain circumstances. The Minimum Wage Act was unique from its inception. The only reference period for the Adjudication Officer (formerly the Rights Commissioner) described in the body of the original legislation is that of the period of the dispute as provided for in Section 26(1)(a)(i). And as that period is not defined, it can be as long as the period of employment-as it is in this…” however, the opposite is also true. The Act does not specifically state that the consignable period is six months does not apply and is support of this position we ask the Adjudicator to have cognisance of other Employment Legislation. The Payment of Wages Act does not specifically limit loss under section 6 to six months; However, itis the case law that is the practice. Specifically, the POWA allows for at section 6: A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, in relation to a complaint of a  contravention of section 4C or 5 as respects a deduction made by an employer from the wages or tips or gratuities of an employee or the receipt from an employee by an employer of a payment, that the complaint is, in whole or in part, well founded as respects the deduction or payment shall include a direction to the employer to pay to the employee compensation of suchamount (if any) as he considers reasonable in the circumstancesnot exceeding—

(a) the net amount of the wages, or tip or gratuity as the case may be(after the making of any lawful deduction therefrom) that—

(i) in case the complaint related to a deduction, would have been paid to the employee in respect of the week immediately preceding the date of the deduction if the deduction had not been made, or

(ii) in case the complaint related to a payment, were paid to the employee in respect of the week immediately preceding the date of payment,

15. It is clear that the limit placed on the Payment of Wages Act has been enforced through the case law and the limit placed on that Act has been determined by the reference period of the 6 months in the lodging of the complaint, as outlined in the Workplace Relations Act. It must be the case that where the legislation is unclear such as in both the Minimum Wage Act and the Payment of Wages Act the overriding principle must be that it was the intention of the Act to limit the timeframe and in principle the cause of action to the relevant 6-month period.

In this case, it was admitted that the NMWA was contravened by the Respondent during the period from the commencement of the Complainant’s employment on the 22nd of May 2024 up to 9th of January 2025. However, the Respondent asserted that the Complainant’s claim, which was initiated on the 12th of April 2025 was only capable of capturing underpayments made within the 6-month period immediately preceding that date and that any further underpayments were statute barred pursuant tot Section 46 subsection (6) of the Workplace Relations At 2025 (“The WRA”) unless an extension of time were granted pursuant to Section 46 subsection (8). In that regard the Respondent submitted that the Complainant had not adduced reasonable grounds to justify such an extension as required by Section 46 subsection (8) of the WRA. 

Limitation Periods in Respect of Claims Pursuant to the NMWA

Legislative Framework

An important feature of this particular legislation is the making by or on behalf of an employee of a ‘Section 23 Request’ for information regarding his or her hourly rate of pay. Section 23 (where relevant) provides:

“Employee entitled to statement of average hourly rate of pay for pay reference period

(1)    [Subject to subsection (2)  - not relevant], an employee may request from his or her employer a written statement of the employee's average hourly rate of pay for any pay reference period (other than the employee's current pay reference period) falling within the 12-month period immediately preceding the request…”

This provision allows an employee to query his or her rate of pay for up to 12 months prior to the date of the request. Accordingly an employee has no entitlement to seek information under this section regarding hourly rates paid prior to this period.

Section 24 of the Act (where relevant) provides:

“24. Disputes about entitlement to minimum hourly rate of pay

(1) For the purposes of this section, a dispute between an employee and his or her employer as to the employee's entitlements under this Act exists where the employee and his or her employer cannot agree on the appropriate entitlement of the employee to pay in accordance with this Act resulting in an alleged underpayment to the employee.

(2) The Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission shall not entertain a dispute in relation to an employee's entitlements under this Act and, accordingly, shall not refer the dispute to an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015—

(a) unless the employee—

(i) has obtained under section 23 a statement of his or her average hourly rate of pay in respect of the relevant pay reference period, or

(ii) having requested the statement, has not been provided with it within the time limited by that section for the employer to supply the information,

and a period of 6 months (or such longer period, not exceeding 12 months, as the adjudication officer may allow) has not elapsed since that statement was obtained or time elapsed, as the case may be…”

This provision imposes a requirement that an employee make a request for a Section 23 Statement and a claim under this Act cannot proceed unless this is done. Where it is done, a limitation period starts to run such that a dispute cannot be referred for adjudication beyond a period of six months from the date or receipt of the response or the elapse of four week from when the request is made. Importantly this provision makes no reference to the date of contravention of the Act and the limitation period it imposes is linked to the Section 23 request not to the date of the alleged underpayment. 

The National Minimum Wage Act 2000 (as amended) falls under the Schedule 5 of Workplace Relation Act 2015 (hereafter referred to as “the WRA”). As regards limitation periods these are set out in Section 41 Subsections (6) (7) and (8) which [where relevant to the present claim] provides respectively as follows:

(6) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

(7) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a dispute referred to him or her under this section if—

“(d) in the case of a dispute relating to the entitlement of an employee under the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 , it has been referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on-

(i) the date on which the employee obtains a statement of his or her average hourly rate of pay in respect of the relevant pay reference period in accordance with section 23 of that Act,

(ii) in circumstances where that statement is not provided having been requested by the employee to be provided to him or her, the day after the date of expiration of the time within which that statement was required to be provided by the employer in accordance with that section,”

(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.

Subsection 6 refers to the date of contravention which in the case of the NMWA might suggest that the time limit must run from the date when the employee is underpaid but this is not the case. Subsection (6) is of general application insofar as it is modified by Subsection (7) in respect of the any of the specific types of claim type of claim referred to in the nine paragraphs (a) to (i) of subsection (7) including paragraph (d) quoted above which deals specifically with disputes under the NMWA. That provision, similarly to Section 24 of the NMWA, makes no reference to the date of underpayment or the date of contravention but again as with Section 24 the time period Is tied in with the Section 23 request and the period for presenting a claim begins when the statement (meaning a  response to the Section 23 request) is received or when the time for providing it (four weeks) expires. That time period is six months, and it is this this period, i.e. the time from when the request is replied to, or ignored for four weeks, which can be extended for reasonable cause pursuant to Subsection (8). The actual date of the contravention of the Act in the sense of an underpayment or even the last in a series of underpayments is not the date from which the time limit runs.

All of the above said it should also be borne in mind that the date of underpayment is still relevant with regard to the Section 23 request itself. The wording of Section 23 as discussed above only allows a request in respect of a maximum period of 12 months preceding the date that it is made.

Applicable Cognisable Period

As to whether, regardless of limitation periods, the entire period of any employment can be considered, the provisions of Section 26 of the NMWA are relevant.

Section 26 deals with the powers of Adjudication Officers hearing claims under the NMWA and it provides as follows:

“26.Decision of adjudication officer under section 41 of Workplace Relations Act 2015

(1) A decision of an adjudication officer in relation to a dispute in respect of the entitlements of an employee under this Act referred to the adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015may contain—

(a) a direction to the employer to pay to the employee—

(i) an award of arrears, being the difference between any amount paid or allowed by the employer to the employee for pay and the minimum amount the employee was entitled to be paid or allowed in accordance with this Act in respect of the period to which the dispute relates, and

(ii) reasonable expenses of the employee in connection with the dispute

(b) a requirement that the employer rectify, within a specified time (not being later than 42 days after the date the decision is communicated to the employer) or in a specified manner, any matter, including the payment of any amount, in respect of which the employer is in contravention of this Act, or

(c) both such direction and such requirement, as the adjudication officer considers appropriate.,”

              [Emphasis added]

I identified a decision of which I was aware, and I invited submissions from the parties as to its applicability to the present case.  That decision is Murphy v Focus Ireland ADJ-00029443 where the Adjudication Officer made the following statement:

“Regarding the time limit issue raised by the Respondent as agreed at the hearing, there is no provision within the Act of 2015 which limits the complainant under the Minimum Wage Act to cognisable periods of a six months extending to twelve in certain circumstances. The Minimum Wage Act was unique from its inception. The only reference period for the Adjudication Officer (formerly the Rights Commissioner) described in the body of the original legislation is that of the period of the dispute as provided for in Section 26(1)(a)(i). And as that period is not defined, it can be as long as the period of employment-as it is in this Complaint. Nonetheless, as pointed out to the parties at the hearing, there is a discretion as to how much will be awarded by the Adjudication Officer ‘in all the circumstances.’ It is not unreasonable to suggest that any Adjudication Officer will apply the latter phrase judiciously.”

A reading of that decision reveals that it is lengthy and deals with a number of claims going back a number of years as well as the issue of the status of the employment relationship. The award in relation to the NMWA claim was modest (€918.75). Whilst the Respondent in the present case contended that this decision was incorrect, I would prefer to see it as turning on its individual facts. However if the case is authority for the proposition that an adjudication officer can look at the entire period of employment in making an award pursuant to Section 26 (1) (a) (i), such an interpretation would appear to run contrary to the legislative intent to limit Section 23 requests to a maximum 12-month period immediately preceding the request. However it should also be noted that wider powers are conferred by Section 26 (1) (b) which permits an adjudication officer to make orders beyond the 12-month period preceding the date of the request as that provision speaks to “any matter, including the payment of any amount, in respect of which the employer is in contravention of this Act “ and the power in that provision is not limited, as it is in subsection (1) (a) (i), to “the period to which the dispute relates”. Section 26 (1) (c) permits an adjudication officer to make directions pursuant to both subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b).

Summary of Legislative Provisions in Relation to Time Limits and Cognisable Period

A The employee must make a Section 23 Request.

B That Request cannot seek hourly pay details beyond the 12-month period immediately preceding its delivery

C. The claim must be initiated within 6 months of the statement from the employer in response to the request or within four weeks of its delivery if no response is received.

D The period of six months from the date of the statement or the expiry of four weeks from its delivery can be extended where reasonable cause is shown. 

Where the claim satisfies the above criteria an award can be made for the payment of any shortfall falling within the period covered by the Section 23 Request and/or the employer can be ordered to rectify “any matter, including the payment of any amount, in respect of which the employer is in contravention of this Act,”

Application of Law to Facts

In the present case I find as follows:

1. The Complainant made a request by text on 11th April 2025 for details of his hourly rate of pay for the period from the 22nd of May 2024 to 9th of January 2025 and the Respondent’s reply to this text clearly indicates that it was received by the Respondent. In the text the Complainant was in effect seeking his hourly rate of pay in respect of multiple pay reference periods. The Respondent made no submissions as to the status of this communication and did not allege a failure to comply with the requirement to make a request under Section 23. The communication was somewhat informal which is unsurprising given the age of the Complainant and the fact that he was not legally advised. I find nonetheless that the communication meets the requirements of Section 23.
2. The Complainant’s Section 23 Request sought hourly pay information for a period which did not exceed 12 months from the date of its delivery.
3. The within claim was received by the WRC on the 12th of April 2025 clearly within the 6-month period from the date of delivery of the Section 23 Request. The information of file shows that a response was received but it is unclear what form it took and when it was received but it is possible that the claim was initiated before a response was received and it was certainly initiated before the four-week period (prescribed in Section 23 for a response had elapsed. This raises the question as to whether the Complainant’s claim could be defeated because he issued it too soon rather than too late. A literal interpretation of Section 24 (2) would suggest that this is so, insofar as the provisions states that the Director (or her delegate, an Adjudication Officer) “shall not entertain a dispute in relation to an employee's entitlements under this Act…unless…the employee—(i) has obtained under section 23 a statement of his or her average hourly rate of pay in respect of the relevant pay reference period…”. There have been a number of decisions where a complainant has failed for want of making of a Section 23 Request but in this case, I find that such request was made. I am unaware of any cases where a claim under the NMWA has failed because it was initiated in effect too soon, in the sense that the employee did not wait for the response to the request before initiating the claim. In the present case it is clear that when the Complainant became concerned when his employment was terminated, that he would not receive a backdated reimbursement in respect of the underpayment of his wages, he took prompt action by firstly making his Section 23 Request and then almost immediately thereafter initiating the present claim. 

               Given the protective nature of the legislative framework in relation to the protection of employees against underpayment in relation to the national minimum wage, it is difficult to see how the legislature could have intended for a complainant to be non-suited merely because he initiated his claim too soon. Moreover, it is also the case that the provisions of Section 41 (7) (d) of the WRA only speak to the beginning of the period from the point of view of limiting claims initiated six months after this period has begun.

In my view the provisions of Section 24 should not be interpreted so literally as to defeat the Complainant’s claim as this was not in keeping with the intentions of the Oireachtas. For this reason, I find that the Complainant is within time and is entitled to proceed.

However, if the above interpretation is incorrect, I am also empowered by Section 26 (1) (b) to make orders in relation to “any matter, including the payment of any amount, in respect of which the employer is in contravention of this Act “. This is a stand-alone provision which is not cross referenced with any other provision including Section 24 ad is not expressly limited as it is in subsection (1) (a) (i) to “the period to which the dispute relates”. It is engaged where there is a contravention of the NMWA and the Respondent in this case has conceded that the Act was contravened. I also note thatSection 26 (1) (c) permits an adjudication officer to make directions pursuant to both subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b). Accordingly the orders made below will rely on both sections and it should be understood that if there is any impediment to the making of the order under Section 26 (1) (a) arsing from my  interpretation of Section 24 as outlined above, then the order should be deemed in the alternative to derive from the powers conferred on me by Section 26 subsection (1) (b).

D.  There is no necessity to consider an extension of time pursuant tot Section 41 subsection (8) of the WRA. The claim is not time barred.

Order Made

In the light of the above findings, it must follow that the Complainant is well-founded and that the Complainant is entitled to recover the underpayment for the full relevant period of his employment, being from the commencement date of the employment on 22nd May 2024 to the 1st of January 2025. I shall direct the Respondent to pay this amount to the Complainant by way of arrears of remuneration.

in the light of the Respondent’s general admission that the NMWA was contravened during the relevant period I find that both paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 26 (1) are engaged. Accordingly, I exercise my power pursuant to Section 26 (1) (c) to make directions pursuant to both subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b).

At the hearing the parties agreed that the appropriate calculation of the underpayment for the period from the 22nd of May 2024 to the 1st of January 2025 is €5,084.13 and I direct the Respondent to pay this sum by way of arrears of remuneration subject to all lawful deductions but with the benefit of all lawful allowances.

Other Grounds Advanced

For the sake of completeness, I would record that although it is not the basis of this decision, I have also considered the issue as to whether the Respondent would be estopped from relying on a limitation period where a contravention of the Act was admitted. In this regard the Complainant’s representative submitted that the Complainant:

“…trusted that his employer was acting correctly and was repeatedly reassured that his registration was “being sorted” and that he would be “backdated” once it went through. Those assurances led him to believe he would be treated fairly and that there was no need to take formal action at that time.”

The Submission continued:

“Employer’s Admission and Conduct

The Respondent has now admitted that [the Complainant] should have been paid at least the national minimum wage and even offered to backdate his pay, before ultimately terminating his employment without doing so. This admission reinforces the validity of [the Complainant]’s claim. “ 

These assertions were not challenged by the Respondent.

The situation is of the kind which has been the subject of a number of judgements of the Superior Courts in the context of personal injury litigation. In Tsiu v. Campbell Caterning Limited T/A Aramak Ireland [2022] IEHC 391, the defendant had admitted liability in respect of the Plaintiff’s personal injury claim prior to the expiration of the statutory limitation period, but the Plaintiff had not instituted civil proceedings within that prescribed time limit. In holding that the Defendant was estopped in the circumstances from relying on the statute of limitations to defeat the Plaintiff’s claim, Heslin J. at paragraph 61 of his judgement, adopted the following formulation:

“In the Supreme Court’s decision in Doran v. Thompson & Sons Ltd [1978] IR 223, (which was cited at para. [18] of Mr. Justice Geoghegan’s decision in Murphy v. Grealish) [[2009] IR 366,] the Court stated inter alia: 10 “it would be dishonest or unconscionable for the defendant, having misled the plaintiff into a feeling of security on the issue of liability and, thereby, into a justifiable belief that the statute would not be used to defeat his claim, to escape liability by pleading the statute. The representation necessary to support this kind of estoppel need not be clear and unambiguous in the sense of being susceptible of only one interpretation. It is sufficient if, despite possible ambiguity or lack of certainty, on its true construction it bears that meaning…”

In the present case I have considered whether the circumstances fall within the parameters of the decisions of the Superior Courts as summarised above and whether it would, in all of the circumstances, be unconscionable for the Respondent to rely on any limitation periods in any statutory provision to  limit or restrict its liability of the Complainant in respect of an admitted breach of the Act. I find that on the basis of the Complainant’s submission as quoted above, which was not controverted by the Respondent that grounds also exist such as to raise an estoppel as against the Respondent from seeking to rely on any limitation period to defeat the Complainant’s claim to recover the full amount of the deductions made. Accordingly, I would clarify that if the order which I have made pursuant to Section 26 (1) (c) is incorrect for any reason, the claim would still have succeeded on the grounds of estoppel.   

CA-00070770-001 - The complaint is well-founded. The Respondent shall pay the sum of €5,084.13 in respect of arrears of remuneration arising from a contravention of the Act.

National Minimum Wage Act 2000 – Sections 23, 24, 26 (1) (a),  (1) (b), (1) (c) – Workplace Relations Act 2015 – Section 41 – Subsections (6), (7) (d), and (8) – Limitation Period – Cognisable Period - date of contravention – “Period to which the dispute relates”-  Murphy v Focus Ireland ADJ-00029443  - Estoppel-  Tsiu v. Campbell Caterning Limited T/A Aramak Ireland [2022] IEHC 391