Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Marina  Tanasiev

Coffee Creations Ltd trading as Esquires Coffee

Representatives

Marius Marosan

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00064652-001

08/07/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00064652-002

08/07/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00064652-003

08/07/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00064652-004

08/07/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00064652-005

08/07/2024

The Complainant worked for the Respondent’s café in the Square Shopping Centre in Tallaght as a barista from February 2023 until her sudden dismissal in January 2024.

Shortly before her dismissal she had told her manager she was pregnant.

In July 2024 she submitted complaints to the WRC related to her dismissal as well as an alleged lack of Sunday premium payments and failure to provide written statement of conditions of employment.

The Complainant’s representative Mr Marosan made oral and written submissions on her behalf.

The Complainant gave evidence under oath. I have referred to this evidence, where relevant, in the findings section of this decision.

The Respondent did not attend the hearing. They were notified of the hearing by way of email sent on the 23rd of September 2025. I can see from the WRC file that the Respondent consented to notification by way of email on the 13th of June 2025. In the circumstances I am satisfied they were on notice of the hearing.  

CA-00064652-005Employment Equality Act (“EEA”)

The Complainant’s evidence was that they began working for the Respondent on the 1st of February 2023 as a barista. Roughly four months into the role she was promoted to supervisor. She worked full time over 5 days each week, usually with Monday and Tuesday off. She was rostered 8am-6pm but often worked over those hours as she was doing supervisor duties.

In mid-November 2023 she discovered she was pregnant. While she did not tell her employer at the time there was unrelated engagement between her and management relating to her Christmas holidays and medical treatment she would need to seek abroad. It was discussed that she might go part-time temporarily.

They agreed that she would take the 1st – 10th of January 2024 and her husband booked tickets to Italy. A few days later her manager started to ask her to cancel the holiday which she refused to do.

The Complainant was certified as sick for a few days before Christmas due to her having a cold or flu, she offered to come in if necessary as she knew it was a busy time, but she wasn’t asked.

On the 31st of December the Complainant told her manager that she was pregnant. Her manager told her not to tell anyone and that it would not be good for her.

While the Complainant was on annual leave she could see she wasn’t being rostered on her return. Her manager told her to come in and talk to her the day she was due back in work.

On the 10th of January 2024 the Complainant returned from annual leave and was told she by her manager that she was dismissed as they no longer had hours for her. The café was busy so the Complainant knew this was not the reason. She asked her manager for a reason but was given none. She was later told that she would be given a reason in writing later but this never came.

The Complainant submitted an EE1 form on the 20th of February by registered post setting out that she was dismissed due to being pregnant. The Respondent did not reply. She lodged this complaint in July 2024.

She tried to get work but it was difficult as she was showing as pregnant. In March she got a part-time job working from home in which she earns about €163 less than she would as if she was working for the Respondent full time. She went on Maternity Leave and continues working at that job.

Sections 6 and 8 of the EEA prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of gender. For the purposes of the complaint before me, the most relevant parts are:

“6(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—(i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

[…]

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

[…]

(a)    that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”), […]

(2A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsections (1) and (2), discrimination on the gender ground shall be taken to occur where, on a ground related to her pregnancy or maternity leave, a woman employee is treated, contrary to any statutory requirement, less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated.

8. (1) In relation to—(a) access to employment, (b) conditions of employment, (c) training or experience for or in relation to employment, (d) promotion or re-grading, or (e) classification of posts, an employer shall not discriminate against an employee […

Section 85A of the EEA provides for the allocation of the probative burden between a complainant and a respondent as follows:

“85A.–(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

In Southern Health Board v. Mitchell [2001] ELR 201 (the “Mitchell Case”), the Labour Court held:

“The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them.  This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. 

It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

The Complainant’s unchallenged evidence was that she told her manager she was pregnant, her manager indicated that this could be a problem for her and then she was dismissed without reason ten days later when she was supposed to return from leave. She submits that this was discrimination on the basis of her gender, as per Section 6.2A.

I am satisfied on the basis of these facts that it can be presumed that she was discriminated against by the Respondent and as per Section 85A the burden is shifted to the Respondent to prove otherwise.

The Respondent has not attended the hearing nor provided any evidence.

In the circumstances I find that the Complainant was dismissed on the basis of her gender in breach of the EEA.

Section 82 subsection 1 provides that I can award the Complainant compensation for the effects of acts of discrimination. Subsection 4 of the of the EEA provides that: The maximum amount which may be ordered by the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission by way of compensation under subsection (1)(c) or (1)(f) shall be—

(a) in any case where the complainant was in receipt of remuneration at the date of the reference of the case, or if it was earlier, the date of dismissal, an amount equal to the greatest of—

(i) 104 times the amount of that remuneration, determined on a weekly basis

Mr Marosan has highlighted the decision in the Labour Court in Svetlana Grodzicka - v - Astra Leisure and Ultra Fresh Services Limited, EDA 2322 which awarded the full 104 weeks. The Court concluded:

" In assessing the level of compensation to be awarded, the Court has regard to the observations in the case o fCase 406/06 Paquay v. Societe d’architectes Hoet +MinneSPRL (2007) ECR 1-8511 that the requirements of redress should ‘guarantee real and effective judicial protection and have a real deterrent effect on the employer’.

The dismissal of a woman due to pregnancy or maternity leave is a breach of a fundamental right guaranteed directly by an EU Directive. As such, it must be regarded as among the most egregious breaches of employment law."

While I agree that an award should be dissuasive the EEA does also require it to be grounded in the effects of the discrimination.

In this case the Complainant suffered approximately 8 weeks unemployment, or €4000 in lost wages, before getting a job which paid her €163 less per week, due to her working less hours. This resulted in a further loss of approximately €3260 before she went on maternity leave. When she returned from maternity she remained with that employer and has not sought to leave that job for full time work. As the Complainant was on a low wage I am of the view that the award would need to expand beyond her direct loss arising from the discrimination in order to be dissuasive.

In the circumstances I am of the view that an award of approximately 30 weeks pay, €15,390, would be appropriate.

 CA-00064652-001 Terms of Employment Act (“TofE”)

The Complainant’s evidence is that when she started working for the company on the 1st of February 2023 she did not get a statement of core terms of employment within 5 days as required by Section 3.1A.

On the 17th of October the Complainant was given a contract of employment which was set out in a form with key details inserted in pen. This recorded her start date inaccurately as the 14th of February when she had actually started a week earlier. She was told to put that date in by management.

This contract contains the terms required by Section 3A however it sets out an inaccurate date for the start date of the contract. Section 3.1A(i) requires that the statement contain the date of commencement of the employee’s contract of employment. The complaint is well founded.

Section 7.2 of the act provides that an Adjudication Officer can order the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 4 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

In the circumstances I am of the view that an award of two weeks’ pay or €1026 is appropriate.

CA-00064652-002 Terms of Employment Act (“TofE”)

The Complainant received a contract of employment but it did not contain all the conditions required to be detailed in writing as per Section 3 of the TofE Act. The complaint is well founded.

Section 7.2 of the act provides that an Adjudication Officer can order the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 4 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

 In the circumstances I am of the view that an award of two weeks’ pay or €1026 is appropriate.

CA-00064652-003 Organisation of Working Time Act

The Complainant also brought a complaint related to non-payment of Sunday premium.

The complaints were filed on the 8th of July 2024  Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provides as Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

The Complainant did not work any Sunday within the 6 months preceding the lodging of her complaint. No breach of the act occurred within the 6 month period outlined above. No application was made under subsection 8 to extend the time limit. In the circumstances the complaint must fail.

CA-00064652-001

I find that the complaint is well founded and direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €1026.

CA-00064652-002

I find that the complaint is well founded and direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €1026.

CA-00064652-003

I find that the complaint is not well founded.

CA-00064652-004

The complaint was withdrawn by the Complainant.

CA-00064652-005

I find that the complaint is well founded and direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €15,390.