Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

Community Development Worker

A Community Organisation

Representatives

Ms Ellen Walsh BL instructed by Patricia Kiely Ormonde Solicitors

Mr Neal Horgan instructed by Monica Griffin McCoy Solicitors

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00063366-001

09/05/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00063366-002

09/05/2024

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00063366-003 WITHDRAWN

09/05/2024

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent, a community-based environmental organisation, on 20 February 2023 as a Climate Change Community Development Worker. The employment was subject to a six-month probationary period. In December 2023, her probation was assessed as unsuccessful, and her employment was terminated with immediate effect.

The Complainant alleges that her treatment during employment, and the decision to dismiss her, amounted to discrimination. She submitted that she was subject to gender-based associative discrimination within the meaning of s.6(1)(b) of the Acts. This included discrimination on being denied access to training opportunities and general discrimination regarding her terms and conditions of employment. She says the Respondent formed unfounded and gendered assumptions regarding her interactions with male stakeholders, and that these assumptions influenced the decision to dismiss her, leading to her further complaint of discriminatory dismissal.  

The Respondent denies the allegations. It contends that the dismissal was a bona fide probationary decision based on concerns regarding a number of performative and behavioural issues that included the Complainant’s lack of driving licence and inability to meet mobility needs; poor-quality reporting and repeated need for correction; excessive email communication; difficulties managing Time Off In Lieu (TOIL); and concerns about the alleged exceeding of  professional boundaries raised by external stakeholders.

The Respondent also raised preliminary issue regarding the six-month time limit for submission of claims where some of the alleged wrongdoings occurred outside this period. The Complainant argued that the discrimination should be considered as continual, right up to the time of dismissal. I dealt with this issue at the hearing and deemed that the allegations formed a continual pattern up to, and including alleged discriminatory dismissal, and therefore I would be treating the complaints as submitted within time. No further objection was raised.

The Complainant gave evidence that she commenced employment with the Respondent in February 2023 as a Climate Change Community Development Worker on a three-year fixed-term contract, subject to probation. She described the role as involving community engagement, climate-action workshops, liaison with external organisations, and the preparation of reports and funding applications.

She stated that no requirement relating to a full driving licence or access to a car was discussed with her at interview. She said she had been transparent from the outset that she did not hold a full licence and was awaiting a driving test date, explaining that she faced significant delays due to RSA backlogs and administrative issues outside her control. She firmly denied ever stating that she had a licence. While she accepted that mobility was useful, she said she was never informed it was essential, and she managed her travel through a combination of public transport and occasional lifts from colleagues.

She further gave evidence that an e-bike arrangement, which she believed would address any transport concerns, was approved by the Board but that payment was never processed. As a result, she said she was left without support despite relying on the Respondent’s assurances that this would resolve mobility issues.

With respect to her work, the Complainant stated that she performed her duties diligently. She rejected the Respondent’s assertion that her reporting was substandard, saying that climate-action terminology and organisational history were complex and that she sought clarification from colleagues where needed. She disputed allegations that her reports lacked basic formatting, for example an absence of full stops, stating that these criticisms were exaggerated or taken out of context.

She also addressed the allegation that she sent an excessive volume of emails. She said the frequency of her communications reflected the lack of a clear structure within the organisation and the absence of defined guidance regarding her work. According to her, emails were necessary to seek direction, particularly because the role was new and evolving.

 The Complainant said she was distressed to learn—shortly before her dismissal—those concerns had been raised about her being “overly familiar” with male stakeholders. She said no such concerns had ever been communicated to her during employment, nor had she been shown any written complaints. She described the allegations as false and rooted in gendered assumptions about her interactions with men. She expressly denied making suggestive remarks to men, touching a male colleague’s arm in a manner that could be considered inappropriate, or engaging in flirtatious conduct.

She confirmed that she had not made any internal complaint of harassment or discrimination during her employment. She explained that she believed the working environment had become stressful and that she lacked proper managerial support, but she did not consider that there was a meaningful process available to address these concerns.

The Complainant accepted that she did not apply for any training either externally provided or from within the organisation.

When asked why she believed she was dismissed, the Complainant stated it was because she asked, “too many questions” and was difficult to manage.

In cross-examination, it was put to the Complainant that she did state at interview that she possessed a full driving licence and had access to a car. She firmly denied this, reiterating that she had always been clear about her licensing status. It was also put to her that mobility was an essential aspect of the role and that colleagues were inconvenienced by having to provide her with transport. She disagreed, stating that she planned her travel responsibly, given the environmental nature of her work. She relied heavily on public transport and did not believe her colleagues were unduly burdened.

Counsel challenged the Complainant on the quality of her reporting work. He suggested that her reports lacked structure and contained basic errors, including a lack of full stops.  He put it to the Complainant that this required substantial rewriting by management. She rejected this, stating that she received little meaningful feedback and that the examples given were trivial in nature.

The Complainant was also questioned on the allegation that she sent an excessive number of emails and messages across different communication platforms. Counsel put it to her that her communications were overwhelming and disruptive. The Complainant denied this, stating that the emails were work-related.

Regarding her alleged behaviour with male participants, It was put to the Complainant that she had been “overly familiar” with male stakeholders and that she had made inappropriate or suggestive comments. She rejected these allegations unequivocally, stating that she was never informed of such concerns during her employment. She believed they were fabricated or based on stereotypical assumptions about young women. She similarly denied having been accused of flirting with a significantly older man.

Counsel asked the Complainant if she had raised any issues of harassment or discrimination with the Respondent while employed. In response, she confirmed that she had made no complaint, either formally or informally, of harassment or discrimination at any time.

It was put to the Complainant that the reason she herself gave for being dismissed—namely, that she “asked too many questions”—did not correspond with the allegations of harassment or gender discrimination advanced in her written submissions. The Complainant maintained that although, she did say that in evidence, believed the real issue was the Respondent’s reliance on gendered assumptions about her interactions with men.

Legal Argument.

The Complainant submits that her treatment during employment, and her dismissal during probation, amounted to associative gender discrimination contrary to section 6(1)(b) of the Acts. She argues that the Respondent formed and relied upon unfounded, gendered assumptions about her interactions with male stakeholders, and that these assumptions materially influenced its perception of her professionalism and suitability for the role.

In particular, she points to allegations made by the Respondent concerning “over-familiarity” with men, “suggestive remarks,” and inappropriate contact—allegations she firmly denies, and which were never raised with her during employment. She submits that these claims were based not on fact but on gender stereotypes about young women engaging with male colleagues or participants. Because these concerns related exclusively to her interactions with men, she contends that they fall within section 6(1)(b), which protects employees from discrimination arising from their association with persons of a particular gender.

The Complainant further submits that the allegations of crossing professional boundaries were invoked by the Respondent as one of the reasons for her dismissal. Their use, despite the absence of documentation, witnesses, or prior warning, supports the inference that they were a discriminatory factor in the decision. She contends that her dismissal letter contained no reasons, that the Respondent’s explanations have shifted over time, and that such inconsistencies strengthen the inference of discriminatory treatment.

Relying on the burden-of-proof principles in Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters [2010] ELR 64, the Complainant argues that she has established sufficient primary facts to shift the burden to the Respondent under section 85A of the Acts.

She further contends that the allegations themselves amounted to gender-related harassment under section 14A of the Acts, as they were unwanted, humiliating, and undermined her dignity at work.

Ms A gave evidence that she is the Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the Respondent organisation and that she oversaw the recruitment, induction, supervision and eventual dismissal of the Complainant. She explained that the Complainant’s post formed part of a newly developed climate-action programme and was the first appointment of its kind within the organisation.

The witness stated that a structured interview process was used, with each member of the panel posing the same set of questions to all candidates. According to her evidence, this included a question concerning whether the candidate held a full driving licence and had access to a car, which she regarded as essential for the role due to the need for frequent travel between dispersed community locations. The witness said that the Complainant responded affirmatively to this question. She further noted that a previous preferred candidate was not chosen because they admitted truthfully that they did not possess a car, which the witness said demonstrated the importance of the requirement.

The witness stated that shortly before the Complainant commenced work, it became apparent that she did not hold a full driving licence. As a result, the witness said she amended the contract by adding a handwritten note to the contract requiring the Complainant to obtain a licence by 30 April. She stated that the Complainant accepted this condition but never actually acquired a licence.

The witness described having provided the Complainant with the staff handbook and organisational policies upon commencement. She outlined her expectations in relation to conduct and communication. She acknowledged that the climate-action role was emerging and that the Complainant needed time to familiarise herself with the relevant terminology and context.

On perceived problems with reporting duties, the witness stated that the Complainant’s written reports were often late and required substantial editing. She said she spent “a disproportionate amount of time” revising these reports, which impeded her broader managerial duties. She relayed that one remarkable element of the Complainant’s reports was the absence of full stops.

The witness also expressed concern regarding what she described as the Complainant’s “excessive” email communication. She said that the number and frequency of messages, sometimes outside normal working hours, made it difficult to maintain workflow and that she advised the Complainant to moderate her communications.

The witness further stated that she received informal comments from external stakeholders—particularly male participants—indicating discomfort with what they perceived to be the Complainant’s “over-familiar” behaviour at certain events. She accepted that these comments were not documented and had not been the subject of formal complaint but stated that they nonetheless contributed to her assessment of the Complainant’s professionalism.

Regarding the Complainant’s transport difficulties, the witness confirmed that she had supported an e-bike arrangement as an interim measure. However, she accepted that although the Board approved the proposal, the payment to the provider was not processed owing to an administrative oversight.

The witness stated that the Complainant’s dismissal was based on several concerns. These were regarding the quality of her work, particularly reporting; concerns about communication style, including high email volumes; not making efforts to acquire a driving licence, not abiding by TOIL rules and concerns about professional boundaries. She accepted that no written reasons were included in the dismissal letter, attributing this to the organisation’s limited administrative capacity.

In cross-examination, the witness was challenged on the absence of documentation supporting her account. She was asked why the driving-licence requirement did not appear as a standard contractual term and instead appeared only as a handwritten amendment. She replied that the requirement had been clearly communicated verbally at interview and that the contractual note reflected the understanding reached.

Counsel put to the witness that the Complainant denied ever saying she had a driving licence. The witness rejected this and maintained that the Complainant had confirmed having one.

The witness was questioned about the lack of recorded performance concerns. She accepted that she did not issue written warnings or probation reviews. She stated that the organisation operated without formal HR structures and that documentation was not routinely generated.

Regarding allegations that the Complainant had crossed professional boundaries the witness was asked to identify the external stakeholders who allegedly and to give further detail about the nature of the complaints. The witness stated that the concerns had been raised informally and confidentially and that she did not feel it appropriate to identify the individuals involved. It was put to her that the absence of witnesses or written records rendered the allegations unreliable, but the witness maintained that the concerns were genuine. Counsel put to the witness that if these concerns were significant, they would have been recorded in writing or included in the dismissal letter. The witness accepted that the dismissal letter did not contain reasons but stated that the matters were discussed verbally.

It was put to the witness that the Complainant required guidance because the role lacked structure, and that the email volume reflected a need for direction rather than misconduct. The witness disagreed and stated that she had provided clear expectations and had advised the Complainant to moderate her communication.

The witness was questioned about the failure to complete payment for the approved e-bike arrangement. She accepted that this administrative oversight contributed to the Complainant’s transport difficulties. Counsel suggested this undermined the Respondent’s position that mobility issues were entirely the Complainant’s responsibility; the witness maintained that the absence of a driving licence remained a difficulty.

A text message was exhibited by the Complainant referring to a ““Mr Hogg” at a meeting. Counsel put it to the witness that this signified a hostile attitude towards males. The witness stated that this was not the case but instead was referring to a certain gentleman who was “hogging the meeting” and was not in a discriminatory context as suggested by Counsel.

Finally, the witness was asked about inconsistencies between her oral evidence and the absence of documentary records regarding the reasons for dismissal. It was put to her that the reasons shifted between performance and professional boundary concerns. The witness denied this and stated that the dismissal was based on an overall assessment of the Complainant’s suitability. She rejected the suggestion that assumptions about the Complainant’s interactions with male stakeholders were gendered or discriminatory in nature.

Ms B gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent. The witness explained that she and the Complainant worked closely together and that the Complainant typically used public transport when travelling for work. She stated that she occasionally provided lifts to the Complainant, and while she did not object to doing so, it sometimes required adjustments to her own schedule.

The witness described the working environment as at times stressful, noting the pressures inherent in developing a new programme. She referred to a particular incident in which the manager raised her voice, although she did not view this as a matter warranting complaint and attributed it to the pressures of the day.

Regarding the allegations that the Complainant behaved inappropriately or was “over-familiar” with male stakeholders, the witness said she was not a witness to any such conduct, but she did relay interactions with the Complainant where the Complainant put on lipstick before a meeting saying things like  “you never know my luck” and an occasional remark about the eligibility of stakeholders’ sons.  She confirmed that she did not make any report or complaint of that nature and was unaware of any formal concerns being raised within the organisation. She emphasised that she was not involved in the Complainant’s supervision or performance reviews and could only speak to matters she directly observed.

The witness also confirmed that she had received training support for her own professional development and understood that similar supports were available to other colleagues. She had no knowledge of the Complainant being denied training.

In cross-examination, the witness was questioned about allegations of inappropriate conduct by the Complainant towards male stakeholders. The witness stated that she had never witnessed any such behaviour and had never reported concerns of that nature to management. 

The witness was asked whether she observed any discriminatory treatment of the Complainant. She stated that she could only speak to matters she directly witnessed and that she had not seen anything she would characterise as discriminatory.

Legal Argument:

The Respondent denies that the Complainant was subjected to discrimination or harassment on the gender ground, whether directly or by association, within the meaning of the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015 (“the Acts”). It maintains that the Complainant’s dismissal was a bona fide probationary decision based solely on performance, conduct and suitability, and that no facts have been presented which could support an inference of discriminatory motivation.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant has not discharged the initial burden under section 85A of the Acts. It relies on the Labour Court’s decision in Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters [2010] ELR 64, where the Court held that a complainant must establish primary facts of “sufficient significance” before the burden shifts. The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not done so. There is no evidence that the Complainant was treated less favourably by reason of gender or by reason of her association with men. The Respondent argues that there was no comparator nor was comparative treatment identified. The Respondent submits the Complainant did not attribute any specific act or remark by the Respondent to gender. The Respondent asserts the evidence presented relates exclusively to performance and communication style rather than discriminatory conduct.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s probationary dismissal is fully explained by legitimate concerns regarding her performance and suitability for the role. It argues that probation permits employers a broad discretion to assess whether an employee is meeting expectations.

The Respondent identifies four areas of concern which, taken together, informed the decision:

(1) Mobility and Driving Requirement

The Respondent maintains that the post required a full driving licence and access to a car, that this was clearly communicated at interview, and that the Complainant indicated she met this requirement. Her inability to travel independently, it says, placed constraints on operational flexibility and required colleagues to adapt their schedules.

(2) Reporting Quality

The Respondent states that the Complainant’s written reports were persistently late and required extensive revision. It submits that the standard of reporting fell significantly short of what was required for the role and necessitated disproportionate managerial input.

(3) Excessive Communication

The Respondent asserts that the Complainant generated an unusually high volume of emails, often in rapid succession, which disrupted workflow and impeded the witness’s ability to manage the wider organisation. It maintains that guidance on moderating communication was given but not followed.

(4) Professional Boundaries

The Respondent accepts that concerns raised by external stakeholders regarding the Complainant’s conduct were informal but submits that these nevertheless formed part of its overall assessment of her suitability for a sensitive, public-facing role. The Respondent argues that these matters were entirely unrelated to gender and provide a comprehensive, non-discriminatory explanation for the dismissal.  

The Respondent strongly rejects the allegation that the Complainant was dismissed because of her association with men. It submits that: the concerns regarding professional boundaries related to conduct, not gender.  There is no evidence that the Complainant’s interactions with men were treated differently from interactions with women. No factual basis was established to suggest the Respondent relied on gendered stereotypes and the Complainant has not identified any causal link between her association with male stakeholders and the treatment complained of. The Respondent argues that section 6(1)(b) of the Acts is not engaged on the facts of this case and that the Complainant’s theory of associative discrimination rests on speculation rather than evidence.

The Respondent further submits that the Complainant’s claim of harassment under section 14A is unsustainable. It argues that no “unwanted conduct” related to gender was identified nor did the Complainant give evidence of any gender-related comment or behaviour by management. The Respondent further argued that the issues complained of (including performance feedback) do not amount to harassment within the statutory meaning; and critically, the Complainant made no internal complaint of discrimination or harassment at any point, despite the existence of procedures for doing so. In the Respondent’s view, the harassment claim is unsubstantiated and legally deficient.

The Respondent accepts that limited administrative capacity meant that written reasons for dismissal were not provided, and that documentation was not as extensive as it might have been. However, it submits that procedural imperfections do not, of themselves, establish discriminatory intent. It argues that the Labour Court has consistently distinguished between imperfect procedure and unlawful discrimination and maintains that the Complainant has not shown that any procedural weakness was linked to gender.  

The Respondent’s position is that the Complainant has failed to establish any facts from which discrimination or harassment could reasonably be inferred. It submits that it has articulated legitimate, consistent and non-discriminatory grounds for the dismissal, and that the claim must therefore fail.

Applicable Law:

The Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (“the Acts”) at section 6

6.Discrimination for the purposes of this Act

(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the “discriminatory grounds”) which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) a person who is associated with another person—

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination.

This complaint is advanced exclusively on the gender ground and as an allegation of associative discrimination under section 6(1)(b) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015 (“the Acts”). That provision prohibits less favourable treatment where the reason for the treatment is the gender of a person with whom the employee is associated. To succeed, the Complainant must demonstrate facts capable of supporting an inference that the Respondent’s actions were influenced, even in part, by assumptions, perceptions or concerns connected to the gender of the men with whom she interacted.

Under section 85A of the Acts, the initial burden rests on the Complainant to establish primary facts giving rise to such an inference. Only if this threshold is crossed does the burden shift to the Respondent. The Labour Court’s guidance in Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters [2010] ELR 64 makes it clear that suspicion or assertion alone is insufficient; the facts relied on must be of a nature and significance capable of supporting an inference of discriminatory motivation.

14A.Harassment and Sexual Harassment

For the purposes of this Act, where—

(a) an employee (in this section referred to as “the victim”) is harassed or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is employed (in this section referred to as “the workplace”) or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who is—

(i) employed at that place or by the same employer,

(ii) the victim's employer, or

(iii) a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to prevent it, or

(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a)—

(i) such harassment has occurred, and

(ii) either—

(I) the victim is treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or

(II) it could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated, the harassment or sexual harassment constitutes discrimination by the victim's employer in relation to the victim's conditions of employment.

(2) If harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable—

(a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and

(b) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies, to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the victim's employment and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred, to reverse its effects.

(3) A person's rejection of, or submission to, harassment or sexual harassment may not be used by an employer as a basis for a decision affecting that person.

(4) The reference in subsection (1)(a)(iii) to a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's employer includes a reference to any other person with whom the employer might reasonably expect the victim to come into contact in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment.

(5) In this section “employee” includes an individual who is—

(a) seeking or using any service provided by an employment agency, and

(b) participating in any course or facility referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 12(1),

and accordingly, any reference to the individual's employer includes a reference to the employment agency providing the service or, as the case may be, the person offering or providing the course or facility.

(6) Where subsection (5) applies in relation to a victim, subsection (1) shall have effect as if for “in relation to the victim's conditions of employment” there were substituted “contrary to section 11”, or, as the case may be, section 12.

(7) (a)

In this section—

(i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and

(ii) references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature,

(b) being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person's dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.

(c) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.

Harassment under section 14A requires evidence of unwanted conduct related to a discriminatory ground that violates a person’s dignity or creates a hostile, degrading or humiliating environment.  

The Respondent is a small organisation operating multiple programmes across dispersed communities. I accept that mobility was a genuine operational concern for the employer, and that the question of a full driving licence featured in the Respondent’s understanding of the role. While the Complainant denied ever stating that she held such a licence, I preferred the evidence of Ms A on this issue.  I am satisfied, therefore that the Respondent genuinely viewed mobility as an important aspect of the position and that transport issues did arise during the interview and during the Complainant’s probation. A significant issue was that the candidate placed first by the interview panel had stated during the interview that they did not have a car or a driving licence, as Ms A credibly testified, and therefore had to decline the position.

It is clear from both sides that the climate-action role was a newly developed evolving concept that the Complainant required time to familiarise herself with. The manager gave evidence of dissatisfaction with the structure and presentation of some of the Complainant’s reports, while the Complainant maintained that she lacked guidance. Although documentary examples were limited, I accept that Ms A’s experienced genuine frustration regarding reporting and communication.

The question of alleged “professional boundaries” was poorly articulated in the evidence. Ms A stated that she had received informal comments from male stakeholders expressing discomfort, yet no documentation, notes or witnesses were produced to support these assertions. The co-worker, Ms A, who worked near the Complainant, did not witness and did not report any such behaviour. These concerns were never put formally to the Complainant during her employment, nor were they identified in the dismissal letter, which contained no reasons. On this evidence, I find that concerns of this nature were loosely held and untested, and it is not possible to conclude that any specific incident occurred as described.

There is no evidence that the Complainant was ever denied training for reasons connected to gender or association with men. Training opportunities were provided to other staff, and the co-worker understood that similar supports were available across the organisation. There is no evidence that the Complainant sought training and was refused.

Regarding terms and conditions of employment, no comparator was identified, and no evidence was presented to show differential contractual treatment. The issues experienced by the Complainant—workload, role clarity and communication challenges—stemmed from the organisation’s limited structure rather than from any discriminatory factor.

It is also relevant that the Complainant made no internal complaint of harassment or discrimination during her employment. While the absence of such a complaint is not decisive, it does indicate that there was no clearly identifiable course of conduct perceived at the time as relating to gender or association with men.

The Respondent’s process in managing probation was informal and procedurally weak. No written warnings were issued, no structured probationary assessments were produced, and the dismissal letter gave no reasons. These shortcomings reflect a lack of HR capacity, but they do not, on the evidence before me, point to discriminatory intent. The manager’s stated reasons for dismissal focused on performance, communication and suitability for the role, and I accept that these concerns—right or wrong—were genuinely held.

Dismissal:

The Complainant’s central argument is that her dismissal was influenced by gendered assumptions relating to her interactions with men. While there was reference in the evidence to vague concerns about “boundaries,” the Respondent did not present credible evidence connecting these concerns to gender. No formal complaints were made, and   no witnesses were identified. There is no evidence that similar conduct by a male employee would have been treated differently, nor that the manager’s judgment of suitability was grounded in stereotypes about women. A key difficulty in establishing alleged discrimination “on the grounds of gender… associated with the male gender” under section 6(1)(b) of the Acts arises from the universality of the specific protected characteristic cited in this case. Because of this universality, a complainant must show not merely that the treatment concerned related to gender in some general sense, but that the reason for the impugned treatment was the complainant’s specific association with a person of the male gender. That causal link is inherently challenging to demonstrate in normal day to day activities and whilst the Complainant made assertions to that effect, no primary facts were shown that her dismissal was attributed to her association with males.

The Complainant therefore has not established primary facts capable of supporting an inference that her dismissal occurred because of the gender of the men with whom she interacted. The performance-related reasons advanced by the Respondent—while imperfectly documented—are, on the face of it, neutral and sufficiently credible to preclude an inference of discrimination.

Harassment:

The Complainant did not identify any specific remark or behaviour by the Respondent that was explicitly gender related. Her position was that the allegations about her interactions with men were inherently gendered and humiliating. However, in the absence of any evidence that the Respondent expressed these concerns in gendered terms, or that they manifested in unwanted conduct directed at her on that basis, the legal test for harassment is not met. The concerns described were indistinct   and never communicated to her in a manner that could satisfy the statutory threshold.

Access to Training:

There is no evidence that the Complainant was denied training or that others were preferred to her on a gender-related basis Ms B gave evidence that training supports were available to her when she requested them. The Complainant gave evidence that she did not request training. No primary facts have been established to allow an inference of discrimination.

Terms and Conditions of Employment:

The Complainant’s contractual terms were standard for the role, and no evidence was presented of less favourable treatment linked to gender or association. The challenges encountered during her employment related to workplace structure and managerial style, neither of which fall within the scope of discriminatory terms and conditions.

Having considered all the evidence, I am satisfied that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of associative discrimination under section 6(1)(b) of the Acts in any dimension of her complaint. The evidence presented does not support the conclusion that her dismissal, the alleged harassment, or any aspect of her employment conditions was influenced by the gender of persons with whom she was associated. The shortcomings in communication and procedure on the Respondent’s part, although evident and inconsistent with fair process, do not of themselves give rise to an inference of discriminatory motivation in this case.

CA-00063366-001: For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of associated discrimination on the gender ground regarding her complaints of harassment, access to training and conditions of employment. Therefore, I decide she was not discriminated against by the Respondent.

CA-00063366-02: For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case that she was discriminatorily dismissed on the grounds of associated discrimination on gender grounds.

Section 6(1)(b) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. Discrimination by Association on Gender Grounds.