Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Boudewijn  De Swart

CHC Ireland Dac

Representatives

  Self Represented

 McCann FitzGerald LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00068643-001

15/01/2025

The Complainant was employed from March 20th 2020 to December 20th 2024 as a Service Engineer. The contract for servicing the air Search and Rescue was put to tender and in June 2023 the Complainant, along with other staff, were informed the Respondent had lost the tender and that Bristow had won the contract. The Complainant was hired by Bristow and remains employed by Bristow and Bristow accepted and recognized the service of the Complainant with the Respondent in the terms of employment offered to the Complainant. The Respondent and Bristow were involved in High Court proceedings regarding the contract transfer for the service and, it appears, did not agree terms of TUPE.  The Complainant claimed he is entitled to redundancy from the Respondent.

In June of 2023 the Complainant, together with other colleagues in the CHC Ireland DAC Shannon base were informed that CHC were not successful in securing the next contract for Search And Rescue services for the Irish state.

They were subsequently informed by CHC that they would be offered employment by the new incoming Search And Rescue operator, Bristow and therefore would not be entitled to redundancy and that anyone who chose not to take this employment would effectively have resigned.

CHC has since closed the Shannon Airport base, given no instructions to staff other than that they no longer work for them and are no longer paying the staff.

 The Complainant has completed form RP77 to CHC on December 20th last but have to date received no reply.

The Complainant was employed by CHC Ireland DAC, which was the helicopter search and rescue operator for the Irish Coast Guard, from 20th March 2020 until 31st November 2024. His role was performing heavy maintenance on its fleet of Sikorsky S92 aircraft in its Hangar 4 base in Shannon Airport during the hours of 09:00 and 17:00, Monday to Friday. After not being awarded the latest contract with the Irish Coast Guard, CHC advised the Complainant his employment would transfer to the new operator, Bristow and that this would happen under the Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE). CHC have ended his employment with them. The Complainant has since commenced employment under a contract offered by Bristow that recognises his service since he commenced employment with the Respondent.

The role of performing heavy maintenance for Bristow has moved to Weston airport, and the complainant stated his role and shift pattern will change.

The Complainant has made a claim for a redundancy payment pursuant to the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967-2022 against the Respondent on the basis that he was dismissed from his role with the Respondent by reason of redundancy on 30 November 2025.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant’s complainants claim for a redundancy payment is misconceived in circumstance where, as part of a safe and seamless transition of search and rescue services based in Shannon airport from the Respondent to BIL, staff transitioned on a coordinated basis from the Respondent to Bristow Ireland Limited (“BIL”). The Complainant reported to work with BIL on 1 December 2024 along with his colleagues in Shannon as part of a coordinated transition plan. The Complainant’s employment in BIL is ongoing. 

As such, in circumstances where there was no dismissal of the Complainant, nor any redundancy situation, the Complainant’s complaint should not be upheld.

The Respondent is a designated activity company which held the contract for the operation of the search and rescue helicopter service (“SAR”) for the Irish Coast Guard. These services are currently provided from bases in Sligo, Waterford, Dublin. The services are critical in their purpose, namely the preservation of life at sea and inland. 

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 20 April 2020 as a mechanic/fitter pursuant to a written contract of employment. The Complainant was subsequently promoted to licensed engineer on 21 December 2021. As an engineer, the Complainant performed an important role carrying out that service. 

The contract for the operation of the State’s SAR service is with the Department of Transport (and has recently been extended).  Following a two-year period of engagement with potential bidders, the Department of Transport issued a final request for tenders for the provision of the SAR service to the Irish Coast Guard on 20 January 2023. The Plaintiff tendered for the said contract and was notified by the Department of Transport on 31 May 2023 that it had not been successful. The Respondent was notified that the said services would instead be provided by BIL, a competitor of the Respondent 

Two sets of High Court proceedings were issued arising from this tender process. The first set of proceedings concerned the procurement process itself and were resolved in April 2025. The second set of High Court proceedings were issued in July 2024 and concerned staff issues that were arising in the context of the transition of staff from the Respondent to BIL. Following a mediation process, the Respondent and BIL agreed a framework for the safe and seamless transition of staff with effect from the date on which responsibility for each search and rescue base would transfer. A copy of the communication to staff explaining the outcome of the mediation process was provided.

This framework was outlined in a FAQ that was issued to staff on 25 October 2024 ahead of the expected transition of the Shannon base on 1 November 2024, which was subsequently postponed to 7 December 2024. In summary, BIL agreed to offer employment to all employees of the Respondent in their same primary roles (e.g. pilot, technical crew, engineer, support staff, etc), with dates of commencement which were no earlier than the date their base transferred to BIL (save for certain cases where the Respondent and BIL agreed for an earlier release of the employee from the Respondent’s employment). BIL also confirmed that continuity of service with CHC would be honoured and that the terms of employment that would be offered to the Respondent’s employees would be no less favourable than their existing terms, or those negotiated by way of any collective agreement. Collective Agreements have been agreed between Bristow and the engineer’s union Unite in anticipation of the transition. Staff were informed in the FAQ that they would be released by the Respondent at 23:59 on the night before the base transfer in order to enable them to safely and seamlessly take up their new employment with Bristow at 00:00 on the base transition date.

The base to which the Complainant was assigned, the Shannon base, transitioned to BIL on 1  December 2024. And all of them commenced employment with BIL under the terms of the collective agreement  on their base transition date on 1 December 2024. The Respondent is a stranger to the Complainant’s contractual arrangements with BIL, but it nonetheless remains that he reported to work with Bristow on 1 December 2024, where he has remained in employment since. 

The Respondent’s position is straightforward. There was no dismissal by reason of redundancy, or otherwise, so the Complainant’s claim for a redundancy payment cannot succeed. 

A recent (25 March 2025) WRC decision, Cooling v Sodexho Ireland Ltd ADJ-00052384 is also instructive. In this case, the complainant sought a redundancy payment from her previous employer having voluntarily transitioned to a new employer. The Adjudication Officer held that the employee had not been “dismissed” by reason of redundancy and, therefore, she was not entitled to a redundancy payment. 

The evidence clearly demonstrates that Complainant transitioned to BIL along with his colleagues on 1 December 2024 in line with the mechanism explained to staff in the FAQ. As such, in circumstances where there was no dismissal of the Complainant by reason of redundancy, or otherwise, the Complainant’s claim for a redundancy payment should not be upheld.

Relevant Law

General right to redundancy payment.

7.—(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to—

(a)                the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to

carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or

(b)                the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to

carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or

(c)                 the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business

with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work

for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing

 before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or

(d)                the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which

the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or

(e)                the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which

the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained,

Dismissal by employer

9.—3 (a) An employee shall not be taken for the purposes of this Part as having been dismissed by his employer if—

(i) he is re-engaged by another employer (hereinafter referred to as the new employer) immediately on the termination of his previous employment,

(ii) the re-engagement takes place with the agreement of the employee, the previous employer and the new employer,

(iii) before the commencement of the period of employment with the new employer the employee receives a statement in writing on behalf of the previous employer and the new employer which—

(A) sets out the terms and conditions of the employee’s contract of employment with the new employer,

(B) specifies that the employee’s period of service with the previous employer will, for the purposes of this Act, be regarded by the new employer as service with the new employer,

I contains particulars of the service mentioned in clause (B), and

(D) the employee notifies in writing the new employer that the employee accepts the statement required by this subparagraph.

(b) Where in accordance with this subsection an employee is re-engaged by the new employer, the service of that employee with the previous employershall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be service with the new employer.

Findings

The Complainant submits that his employment was terminated by reason of redundancy on December 20th 2024. The Respondent contends that the Complainant was not dismissed, that his role was not subject to redundancy, as his employment transferred to another entity by way of a transfer of undertakings when Bristow took over the contract for the Irish Search and Rescue. That third party entity (Bristow) was not a party to these proceedings and there is no complaint under the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 before the Adjudicator and he notes the transfer was the subject of two High Court proceedings and the parties (CHC and Bristow) appear to have reached a mediated solution, one which the Adjudicator is not privy too. It is therefore, given this complicated legal situation, not within my brief to determine if TUPE applies to this case.

The Complainant’s situation is he has transferred to Bristow with no break of service and has his full service with CHC recognised by Bristow. This means that the liability for any future redundancy, should it arise, for the Complainants service with CHC has transferred to Bristow. This offer to recognise his service with CHC is contained in an offer of employment to the Complainant by Bristow. On a number of occasions prior to the change in contract CHC had advised the Complainant the transfer was subject to TUPE. There is no record of Bristow stating the transfer is subject to TUPE but on the key issue of recognising the Complainants past service for redundancy Bristow have accepted they are liable through the recognition of the Complainants past service with CHC.  At no stage during the Hearing did the Complainant suggest that he was willing to forgo this carry over of his service for the benefit of being paid redundancy by the Respondent.

The Complainant is seeking a redundancy payment under the Act in circumstances where he says his employment was terminated by the Respondent on December 20th 2024 and where he was advised by the Respondent that they have no liability for a redundancy payment due to the circumstances of them losing the contact to Bristow and the Complainant service with CHC being recognised by Bristow. This agreement that the service of the Complainant be taken up by Bristow appears to have been agreed in mediation between the two companies during the High Court proceedings and appears to have the concurrence of the Complainants Trade Union.

The central issue to be determined in the within appeal is whether the Complainant’s employment was terminated by the Respondent by reason of redundancy and if so, because of the circumstances of the case, does Section 9 (3) apply to the situation.  I am satisfied that the Complainants employment ended in line with clause 7 (2) (a)  when the Respondent lost the Search and Rescue contract but I am also satisfied, that Section 9 (3) (i), (ii) and (iii) applied to the Complainants situation (in general) and therefore he is not entitled to a redundancy payment.  With regard to the core issue of continuity of service this is guaranteed to the Complainant arising from an agreement reached between the Respondent and Bristow and was open to the Complainant to accept.

The purpose of the Transfer of Undertaking Regulations is to safeguard the rights and entitlements of employees where a business or part of the business in which they are employed transfers from one employer to another. TUPE was not an issue for determination and the Adjudicator makes no determination on the transfer of undertaking issue. However, what is clear is that the intent of the legislation regarding the protection of employee service regarding redundancy has been protected in the circumstances of this case, even if Section 9 .3 is not totally fully complied with in every detail. The Complainants right to redundancy is preserved in the new employment contract and he cannot be entitled to both a redundancy payment from CHC and also that this redundancy obligation also transfers to his new employment with Bristow.

Redundancy