Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Philip  Beattie

The Brabazon Trust [Name changed on Consent from Protestant Aid]

Representatives

Self-Represented

Emma Richmond Whitney Moore Law Firm/ Emma Davey BL

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00067634-001

25/11/2024

The Complainant started working in some form or other for the Respondent on 01/08/2021, the nature of the original relationship is disputed in terms of contracts for and of service.

The employment ended on the 31/05/2024 according to the Complainant and this date is disputed by the Respondent. The Commission received the Complainant

 complaint on the 25/11/2024.

The matter was originally part- heard in February 2025 where the Respondent asked for the matter to be adjourned to allow time for submissions. An issue was also raised at this point on the matter of case being statute-barred. I decided at that hearing that it was reasonable to allow for the Respondent make preparation and equally for the Complainant to set his position on the delay and/or set out his reasonable cause for the delay in submitting his complaint.

As the Complainant was unrepresented and to assist the process, I went into some detail to explain the concept of reasonable cause to the Complainant and the hurdle he would have to overcome if there was a delay found.

The matter was relisted, and the parties were able to make substantive submissions to me.

The Respondent made several preliminary submissions to be considered and having heard the Complainant responses, the hearing was adjourned to allow for consideration of those matters given that they went to the heart of my jurisdiction to hear the matter. The parties were advised that these would be considered, and I would decide if I retained jurisdiction, in which case there would be a new date for a hearing or if the challenge was well founded a decision would issue. Having heard from both parties in detail and there being nor further submissions the hearing was closed with the matters of reasonable cause to be considered.

In written submissions, the Complainant case is that there were employed as a Part-time Bookkeeper by the Respondent from August 2021.

In October 2021 he was canvassed to work for the Brabazon Trust and started in a Reception role on the 21st of October and after a few weeks it was decided he would do both roles concurrently.

He was later approached to manage the books at St Mark’s Nursing Home which was part of the Protestant Aid umbrella and a role with challenges. There were issues outstanding that he brought to the attention of the Respondent in relation to two specific cheques totalling a significant amount of money; it is this which he makes out that led to a campaign of bullying by the Respondent management and ultimately his selection for Redundancy.

Following the raising of the issue of the cheques issue he was told he was being given a written warning in relation to a petty cash matter; this was challenged withdrawn

The Complainant sets out that they raised a bullying complaint on the 12th of October 2022.

On the 15th of December 2022 he received correspondence from the Chairman and discovered he was the only staff member not in receipt of 4% pay increase. On inquiry he was told it was related to the nature of his contract.

The Complainant further sets out that from January to May 2023 they suffered from exclusion from the organisation and on the 1st of May 2023 the Complainant was subject to changes to work conditions and undermining; additionally, he sets out that a new staff member was instructed to not confer with him.

On the 15th of August 2023 the Complainant sets out that they were coerced to sign a new fixed term contract despite an earlier assurance of his receiving a full-time permanent contract and his was the only contract to not be permanent.

From September 2023 to May 2024 the Complainant sets out that having proposed a system to monitor expenses for residents daily spending he found himself subject to excessive monitoring and was told that he was incompetent. He raised issues to other operational matters, and at this point his workload was deliberately increased.

During the Christmas week in 2023 he sets out he was deliberately underpaid having gotten the lowest bonus of all the staff, amongst other issues.

The Complainant was accused of bullying by the Head Chef which was the subject of investigation. The matter was not found to have substance; he found this degrading.

The Complainant sets out that his service exceeds the time set out by the contract of employment and as far as he is concerned that the service under a contract for services is not distinguishable form his contract for services.

The Complainant asks his case to be well founded that he was unfairly dismissed through Redundancy and was selected because of the events in the preceding years.

The Respondent denies in full the argument of the Complainant and set out preliminary issues to be dealt with in advance of the substantive case.

Preliminary issue 1: Failure to bring the complaint in time.

1.      The employment ended, not on the 31st of May, but on the 11th of May.

2.      There was an appeal process that concluded on the 20th of May 2024 which upheld the decision on redundancy. This date of the 11th of May brings the claim outside of the statutory time limit and it is the Respondent case that there is no reasonable cause for extending the period. The Respondent cites Mary Sheehy v Most Reverend James Moriarty [UD1264/2008] and several other cases in this regard.

3.      The Respondent also set out the cognisable period referring to elements of the Complainant submissions that related to issues prior to the 12th of November 2023, that these are outside of the remit of the Adjudicator.

Preliminary Issue 2: Wrong Respondent named

It is the Respondent case that the Complainant has named the wrong Respondent in Protestant Aid. He had been employed with that body on an independent contractor basis from august 2021 to July 2022. This body has an address at St John’s House, 202A Merrion Road, Dublin 4. 

On cessation with Protestant Aid he was offered a post with Brabazon Trust from July 2022 to January 2023 which the Respondent submits is a separate legal entity. However, the Respondent is not objecting to the necessary name change for this process and the Respondent name has been changed on consent.

It is acknowledged that the Complainant service extended beyond the fixed term ending of that contract until the 11th of May 2024.

Preliminary Issue 3: Failure of the Complainant to Particularise his Complaints.

Having been asked by the Commission to make a submission of the issue, the Complainant has failed to make clear his complaints, and it is the Respondent position this is prejudicial to them and puts them in a position where the case they are to answer is not clear.

Substantive Claim

In response to the Complainant position that he was unfairly dismissed and then alleges he was subject to a bullying campaign by the Respondent.

The Complainant Employment Status

Originally employed by another associated organisation (Protestant Aid) as an Accounts Technician on a contract for services and later by the Respondent (Brabazon Trust) on a contract of services in mid-2022. This was a change in the legal relationship and the Complainant received the opportunity to avail of legal advice in this and the facts of this were clearly presented to him at the time of signing. The Complainant was fully aware that he had been under a contractor for services and was progressing to a contract of services and previously had not been an employee of the Respondent prior to that. In July 2022 the Complainant took up the new contract and signed the same in the following August.

Redundancy

The Redundancy was on foot of an organisational review, and this was brought to the attention of the Complainant in March of 2024 and again in April 2024. On the 12th of April this termination by way of redundancy was formally notified to the Complainant where the Respondent set that they would, despite his service under his contract of service making him ineligible, pay him an equivalent redundancy payment, an ex-gratia payment and holiday pay, in addition to his notice

The Respondent sets out that the redundancy arose from a restructuring and has no connection to the issues raised by the Complainant. It addressed a need for the automation of processes and a move to technological efficiencies where the payroll was operating two months in arrears.

Appeal

The matter of the redundancy was appealed, and serious allegations were made and addressed. The Complainant set out that having revealed inconsistences and inaccuracies in the accounts previously he had been targeted for dismissal. There was a considerable amount of activity in the appeal process but ultimately the appeal was not upheld.

The first hearing of this matter was adjourned by application of the Respondent to allow them time to prepare submissions. They had expected to get a date for mediation as both they and the Complainant had been agreeable to the same, but no date was given, and they were taken by surprise of the hearing date. However, they did not wish to take time to mediate separately from the Commission at that point.

An issue arose at this hearing as to the date of the Complainant’s date of complaint to the Commission. The date of termination claimed by the Complainant on the WRC complaint form was the 31st of May 2024. It has since emerged that the Complainant had confused this date as it represents the date their appeal against their dismissal was finalised and not the actual date of termination.  The termination date of the 11th of May is referred to in the submissions of both parties and cannot therefore be anything other than the correct date of termination.

The Respondent points to the documentation that shows the date of dismissal is 11th of May 2024 which makes the cause of action dating from then until the 11th of November, leaving the Complainant two weeks late in his complaint. Having examined the submissions I am satisfied that the Complainant is outside the 6-month statutory limit for bringing his complaint.

At the first hearing, to ensure the fairest possible outcome, I broadly defined to the Complainant the grounds for reasonable cause and the hurdle he was required to overcome to allow me to extend the 6 months to 12 months; should it be necessary. The hearing was resumed on the 20th of June 2025 where the Respondent submitted their issues and challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction and the Complainant was afforded an opportunity to address the time issue. The Complainant has again set out that as far as there were concerned, they were not out of time.

Preliminary Issue 2: Wrong Respondent named

1.      This was satisfied at the hearing with the Respondent consenting to the change of name and this reflected in the heading of this decision.

Preliminary issue 1: Failure to bring the complaint in time.

This is the most important issue to be dealt with given it’s potential to bar the Complainant from furthering his case and it is clear from the documentation that the employment ended not on the 31st of May, as set out in the complaint form, but on the 11th of May. The Complainant set out that this was not his last day given that he had appealed the redundancy and there was an appeal process which upheld the Respondent decision on redundancy. This clearly brings the claim outside of the statutory time limit and it is the Respondent case that there is no reasonable cause for extending the period. The Respondent cites Mary Sheehy v Most Reverend James Moriarty [UD1264/2008] and several other cases in this regard.

The Respondent also set out the cognisable period referring to elements of the Complainant submissions that related to issues prior to the 12th of November 2023, that these are outside of the remit of the Adjudicator.

The Complainant further asserted that his understanding is that the time starts on the conclusion of his appeal against the Redundancy and this is the not the case in the absence of any misrepresentation of the Respondent of which I have seen none.

In dealing with the important statute bar on bringing cases beyond the 6 month provision there is a good deal of case law on this and I refer to the case of A Caretaker v An Education Provider (ADJ-00019732) where notice of a dismissal was made to the Complainant and he subsequently appealed the decision and argued that he be allowed lodge a complaint in the following six months of his appeal notice and not the notice of termination. A decision issued rejecting this argument. This decision was noted again Doyle v Primeline Vne Limited (ADJ-00031474) in circumstances where the Complainant inserted the incorrect date on the complaint form that, on the face of it, looked to be within time. However, in a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator reference was made to s6 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 where:

“(6) Subject to subsection (8), an Adjudication Officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of six months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates …

And s8

(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than six months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause”.

In Doyle, it was rejected by the Complainant that they were out of time based on their appeal not being finalised and that the statutory limit should be extended or did not otherwise apply. In Doyle the complainant was advised of his termination date, and the fact of the appeal did not extend the decision date. In any event, an appeal can and often do extend for significant periods of time for any number of reasons and it would be illogical to determine that they extend the statutory time limits by default.

In offering the Complainant time to make a case for reasonable cause his position was that he had made his complaint earlier and had not realised it was properly submitted. However, when asked, he could provide no evidence of this in terms of screenshots he could not offer anything to me to support his assertion. It is not possible for me to allow an extension on that basis where there is no evidence of a malfunction and where the Complainant must be responsible for their own application.

The Complainant asserted that his understanding is that the time starts on the conclusion of his appeal against the Redundancy and this is the not the case in the absence of any misrepresentation of the Respondent of which I have seen none. As set in  Minister for Finance v CPSU, PSEU and IMPACT [2006] IEHC  145, lacking knowledge is not a sufficient reason for not filing a claim in time. In any event, filing a claim would not have excluded the possibility of resolving the matter with the Respondent while awaiting a hearing, as is often the case, a hearing date can accelerate the parties desire to reach a resolution.  The Complainant in this case presents as an educated and intelligent person and it is not appropriate for him to rely on ignorance, even if such a reliance were to be open to him.

Further to the above the Complainant put forward that as far as he was concerned, he was not out of time and if my decision was that he was, he would appeal this to the Labour Court. When pressed for his reasonable cause to allow the Adjudicator to make a decision as to extend the date, the Complainant offered no reasonable cause that would explain and excuse his delay, only to assert that as far as he was concerned that he was not outside the statutory timeframe based on the date of his appeal being finalised.  In this the Complainant has given me no cause to extend the time limits for complaint and I must find that I have no jurisdiction in the matter.

It follows that the complaint was lodged outside of the six months provided by the Unfair Dismissals Act. Section 8(2)(b) provides that an adjudication officer be “satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) [submitting the complaint within six months] was prevented due to reasonable cause.” 

While I have sympathy for the circumstances set out by the Complainant in terms of the processes to be followed and his misunderstanding of the law this did not prevent the claim being lodged within the six-month period.

I find that the complainant has not established reasonable cause, and I do not, therefore, have jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the complainant has shown reasonable cause that prevented the complaint pursuant to the Unfair Dismissals Act being lodged within six months of the date of dismissal and I do not, therefore, have jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

The complaint is not well founded.

Out of time, statute barred, jurisdiction, appeal process extension, reasonable cause.