ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00032089
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Jennifer Parker | Mount Anville Secondary School |
| Complainant | Respondent |
Anonymised Parties | {text} | {text} |
Representatives | Conor McDonald ASTI | Barra Faughnan B.L. instructed by Mason, Hayes & Curran LLP |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00042381-001 | 09/02/2021 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 30 and 31 of the Maternity Protection Act 1994 | CA-00042381-002 | 09/02/2021 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 01/04/2022 & 15/01/2024
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Conor Stokes
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and/or Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015, following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
Background:
This matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 and S.I. No. 359/2020 which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings. At the initial hearing of this matter, the respondent raised objections to the complainant’s representative, a Trade Union Representative, possibly giving evidence regarding interactions with the respondent. The matter was argued orally and as the respondent was particularly concerned with this matter, the hearing was adjourned, and written submissions were sought on this point. At the reconvened hearing (following a number of postponements of the hearing to facilitate both parties) the matter was not pursued by the respondent’s new representative. The complainant, her representative and two witnesses for the respondent undertook to give their evidence under affirmation. Cross examination was facilitated. The finalising of this decision was delayed, in part, due to a family bereavement and in part by the impact of Covid 19. At the completion of the hearing, I took the time to review all the oral evidence together with the written submissions made by the parties. The respective positions of the parties are noted, and a broad outline of the evidence and cross examination is provided. I am not required to provide a line-by-line assessment of the evidence and submissions that I have rejected or deemed superfluous to the main findings. I am guided by the reasoning in Faulkner v. The Minister for Industry and Commerce [1997] E.L.R. 107 where it was held that a “…minute analysis or reasons are not required to be given by administrative tribunals...the duty on administrative tribunals to give reasons in their decisions is not a particularly onerous one. Only broad reasons need be given…”. At the close of the hearing, one of the parties returned to the issue of anonymity for the parties in this hearing. It was put forward that the decision should be anonymised due to the ongoing working relationship between the parties. While I can appreciate the tenor of the suggestion, I am not satisfied that the principle of open justice should be set aside solely on the basis of an ongoing working relationship between the parties. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The complainant submitted two complaints for consideration by the WRC. CA-00042381-001 Employment Equality The first complaint was taken under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 and asserts that the complainant was discriminated against by reason of her gender in relation to conditions of employment. The complainant outlined that she was the only accounting teacher in the respondent school, having left a job as a Chartered Accountant. As an accounting teacher she provided all the accounting classes to students. She submitted that the security of her position has changed significantly as a result of going on maternity leave. While on maternity leave, she submitted that an additional accounting teacher was brought in to teach accounting. When she returned from maternity leave in August 2020, she was not given all the accounting classes, some of them were given to the other accounting teacher. CA-00042381-002 Maternity Protection Act 1994 The second complaint put forward by complainant was that she was not allowed return to work following the expiration of her maternity leave. Summary of Relevant Evidence: The complainant gave evidence as to how her job changed when she came back from maternity leave. She told the principal that she was pregnant and the Principal made a comment to the effect that she may not want to return. She stated that when she returned from maternity leave an additional teacher was teaching accounting classes and that she no longer had the same level of responsible that she had prior to going on her maternity leave. She stated that she feels that this is a reduction in her status and that it had an emotional toll on her. She stated that the other teacher was also being asked to take additional classes which she would normally have been offered, these were on a grinds basis and would have given her an additional income of €92. She stated that none of this would not have arisen had she not gone from maternity leave. She stated that she was disappointed. Under cross examination the complainant was asked whether her contract mentioned specific duties, and more specifically whether it indicated that she would be the only accounting teacher or would she always have all the accounting classes. She confirmed that it did not but that there were precedents within the school. It was put to her that the allocation of classes rested with the principle. The witness stated that her right on return from maternity leave superseded the principles statutory duty. She noted that every teacher was entitled to consistency. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The respondent initially raised an issue with a union representative giving evidence and made a written submission to that effect following objections on the first day of hearing. Those objections were not pursued on the second day of hearing and as such do not form part of this decision. The respondent denied any claim of discriminatory treatment in relation to the complainant and noted that the complainant remains fully employed as a secondary school teacher, continuing to teach the majority of her classes in her specialist subject, accounting. The respondent submitted that any issues arising from the complainant not being allocated all the accounting class groups arises directly and only by virtue of the efficient and effective scheduling of a school of almost 700 students. The respondent submitted that there is no causal connection between the complainant having gone on maternity leave and that treatment complained of, and that the complaints are manifestly and factually unfounded. The respondent submitted that the complainant was not less favourably treated when she returned from her maternity leave, she was employed as an accounting teacher before she went on maternity leave and was still employed as an accounting teacher when she returned from leave. In that regard the respondent noted the cases of Gardiner v Mercer Human Resources Consulting DEC-E2006-007, Lane v MBNA DEC-E2008-051 and O’Flaherty v Univenture Ireland Limited DEC-E-2010-094 to illustrate where then Equality Officers had found a clear and stark contrast between roles previously occupied by complainants and the role to which they returned to. The respondent submitted that, in contrast, the complainant returned from maternity leave and has been given all but one of the classes she taught previously. It was pointed out that there is simply no basis to suggest that she has been discriminated against at all Summary of Relevant Evidence: The respondents first witness was the school principal who had the responsibility, amongst other things, for setting the timetable. She noted that this was a statutory responsibility. The witness noted that if there is only one qualified teacher of a subject, then that teacher is assigned all classes to do with that subject. The witness noted that when the complainant told her that she was pregnant she congratulated her, and they made friendly conversation, but she also confirmed that she did mention the issue of job share as a possibility for the complainant upon her return. The witness noted that when the complainant announced her pregnancy there was only one accounting teacher in the school. However, the whole timetable had to change when a new teacher was allocated from the redeployment panel. The witness stated that she now had two teachers of accounting and, although she did not accept that the complainant's job changed due to that fact, she confirmed that she had to take another member of staff into account. The witness noted that as regards the issue of grinds, three students had returned to the school and the grinds were given the teacher who had been teaching them most recently. Under cross examination the witness spoke about the revision classes, she said that it seemed to be the logical thing to do to give them to the teacher who had taught the students when they last attended the school. The witness confirmed that the physics teacher came into the school to teach science, a niche group with a requirement for only one teacher. The witness also confirmed that she had meetings with the complainant and, following discussions with her, she assigned an additional class to the teacher. Under cross examination the witness confirmed that there was absolutely no reduction in the status of the complainant, noting that “she was, and still is, a valued member of staff”. |
Findings and Conclusions:
CA-00042381-001 Employment Equality The complainant put forward the argument that before she went on maternity leave, she was the accounting teacher, there was no other. Upon her return she was only teaching half the classes and that this amounts to diminution of her role. The respondent in turn submitted that there was no reduction in her role, although she was teaching fewer accounting classes, she was still principally an accounting teacher. Having considered all the written and oral submissions in relation to this matter, I am satisfied that prior to her maternity leave, the complainant was an accounting teacher. On her return from maternity leave she was still an accounting teacher. The complainant suggested that none of the changes would have happened except for the fact that she went on maternity leave however the school was subject to a redeployment quota and received a teacher with qualifications in accounting. The principal’s statutory duty is to timetable the teachers available to her, having regard to their specialities and to the needs of the students of the school. The issue of a redeployed teacher with accounting qualifications was in the hands of the Department of Education who have a duty to redeploy teaching staff where necessary. The Employment Equality Act defines discrimination as less favourable treatment. Section 6 of the Act outline Discrimination for the purposes of the Act and Section 6(1) states as follows: 6.—(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where— (a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which— (i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned, The complainant was an accounting teacher before going on her maternity leave and was an accounting teacher when she returned from maternity leave, and I do not consider that this amounts to less favourable treatment. Section 85A of the Act deals with the burden of proof and states as follows: 85A.—(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary. To my mind, the complainant has not established facts from which it may be inferred that she was discriminated against. Accordingly, I find that the complainant was not subjected to discriminatory treatment in accordance with the Act. CA-00042381-002 Maternity Protection Act 1994 As to the second complaint that the complainant was not permitted to return to her job when she returned from maternity leave. The complainant had taught grinds classes before going on maternity leave, she stated that she was not allowed return to giving grinds classes. The school Principal gave evidence that she gave the grinds to the other teacher on the basis that the other teacher had been the students most recent teacher and it seemed to be the logical thing to do. The issue of grinds does not appear to be covered in the complainant’s contract of employment and I consider that a failure to offer three grinds to the complainant does not amount to prohibiting her from returning to work on the expiration of her maternity leave. I find that the principle of an entitlement to return to work was not breached. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
CA-00042381-001 Employment Equality Having regard to all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this matter, my decision is that the complainant was not discriminated against. CA-00042381-002 Maternity Protection Act 1994 Having regard to all the written and oral evidence presented in relation to this matter, my decision is that the principle of an entitlement to return to work outlined under the Act was not breached. |
Dated: 28th April 2025
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Conor Stokes
Key Words:
Employment Equality – facts not established from which discrimination may be inferred – Maternity Protection Act – entitlement to return to work not breached. |