EQUAL STATUS ACTS 2000-2012
DECISION NO. DEC-S2016-078
PARTIES
Ms A
(Represented by her parents)
v
Work Start West Cork Ltd
(T/A Employability West Cork)
Represented by Ms. Rachel O Flynn. B.L.
Instructed by Eamon Murray and Co. Solicitors.
File Reference: ET-150873-ES-14
Date of Issue: 01/12/2016
The Dispute
1.1 The case concerns a complaint by Ms. A, a twenty-five-year-old adult with an Intellectual disability against Work Start, West Cork ltd. Her claim is that she was discriminated against on the grounds of disability in terms of 3(1)(a) (c) of the Equal Status Acts ,2000 to 2015 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Acts’] and denied reasonable accommodation under Section 4(1) of the Acts. I have relied on the provisions of Section 20(b) of the Equal Status Acts to allow for the parent in this case to be identified as the complainant.
1.2 The Complainant referred a complaint under the Acts to the Director of the Equality Tribunal on 20, November,2014. On 13 July, 2016, in accordance with his powers under Section 75 of the Acts, the Director delegated the case to me, Patsy Doyle, an Adjudication / Equality Officer, for investigation, hearing and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions of the Director under Part VII of the Acts, on which date my investigation commenced. Submissions had been sought and received from the Parties. As required by Section 25 of the Acts and as part of my investigation, I proceeded to hold a hearing on 19 July 2016, where both parties were represented.
1.3 This decision is issued by me following the establishment of the Workplace Relations Commission on 1st October 2015, as an Adjudication Officer who was an Equality Officer prior to 1st October 2015, in accordance with Section 83(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.
2 Summary of Complainants Submission:
2.1 On November 20,2014, Ms As’ parents, lodged a complaint with the then Equality Tribunal, now Workplace Relations Commission. The complaint was prefaced by the statement that the complainant has an Intellectual Disability and had requested representation of her parent. The complaint referred to ongoing discrimination through their daughters continued exclusion from the service of Employability West Cork. (EWC) The complaint referred to details submitted on the ES1 form on October 1, 2014, which was recorded as unanswered.
The complaint stated that the respondent had received an email from Ms As’ family on September 17, 2014, which also went unanswered. The company was asked to provide an assurance that Ms A was not prevented in her interaction with EWC as had previously been imposed.
There were other questions posed on confidentiality and data protection. The complainant contends that “by failing to reply to her questions, and to remove the barrier, EWC discriminated against her on that date “.
2.2 The complainant lodged a statement on behalf of their daughter on April 29,2015 with the then Equality Tribunal. This can be summarised as:
The complainant was described as an adult with a mild learning disability. She had worked for the past four years on a part time basis in a local grocery shop. The respondent was described as an Employment Agency in the meaning of the Employment Equality Act aimed at providing a Supported Employment Service to persons with disabilities, to facilitate such persons in obtaining employment in the open labour market.
Over the course of 2011-2012, the complainant was linked to the respondent service. She was guided by a job coach, Mr C, there was regular contact between the complainant, her parents and Mr C. This ceased in 2012 when the complainant commenced work on a Community Employment Scheme.
The complainant’s father was directly employed by the Department of Social Protection, He held a liaison and monitoring role with the respondent service, this involved his completion of annual reviews of the service during his work.
The Complainant submitted that on 26 November, 2012, the Co-coordinator /Manager of the respondent service, Ms M approached the complainants father at his work office and informed him that Mr C “ would no longer meet with him and that he could not be an advocate for the complainant as had previously been the case “ It was submitted on behalf of the complainant that this “ effectively excluded the complainant from re-engaging with the service “ The family was puzzled as the complainant was not engaged with the service at the time .
It was submitted on behalf of the complainant,” that in refusing an individual the right to an advocate to represent them to a service, the organisation refused the service to the individual. It is reasonable accommodation to allow a person who requires an advocate, the right to have the advocate of choice present at a meeting. In the absence of a reason for refusing an individual the right to advocate on behalf of an adult with a disability, the organisation is discriminating against the person who requires the reasonable accommodation.”
It was further submitted that requests to meet with the respondent had been refused. Letters sent to the company on behalf of the complainant were forwarded to other public bodies without the complainant’s consent. The respondent did not respond to the ES1 form lodged by the complainant.
The complainant is currently unemployed and it was submitted that she would benefit from the respondent service to assist her in securing work, however, she needs an advocate and the respondent has prohibited her Father acting as her advocate. It was submitted that the respondent refused to engage with the complainant’s advocates and the Tribunal was requested to intervene to stop the “ongoing and persistent “discrimination on disability grounds. The parents on behalf of the complainant wrote to the WRC on April 4, 2016 seeking an adjournment to allow for external parties to consider requests by them for representation, given their daughters disability and limited means. This was allowed.
2.3 The complainant’s parents confirmed at the hearing on the 19 July, that they represented her for the purposes of the hearing and submitted an extensive submission in support of the complaint and in rebuttal of the respondent’s submission. The complainant was not in attendance for the hearing. The submission was read out and supplemented by collateral from the complainant’s father.
They submitted that the respondent was not a registered charity and was instead a registered company and service provider fully funded by the Department of Social Protection(DSP) governed by a Board of Directors. All referrals are via the DSP. The service was described in an extract from a 2011 FAS document as
“The service is open to people with different types of disability and varying degrees of disability who are job ready and need the support of a job coach to get a job in the labour market “
It is open to people in the age brackets of 18-65 years.
2.4 The complainant accepted that she was not engaged with the respondent service on 26 November 2012. The complainant’s father recalled learning that Mr C had returned to work post sick leave and had informed Ms M and Mr P that he did not wish to meet with him under any circumstances. The complainant’s father was aggrieved that this development was placed on him without warning given that he was responsible for the programme and had known Mr C for eight years.
He sought to raise the potential of his daughter requiring to meet with Mr C in his company as her advocate? Ms M told him that Mr C would not meet with the complainant’s father and she would have to try and find a way around it. Ms M offered to come to the town of residence herself and reaffirmed that Mr C was not well.
The next day ,the complainants father contacted Ms M from his mobile and was informed that any meeting with a Job coach would have to be staffed by either Ms M or a Director of the respondent service .He was incredulous as “ there was no way that this type of condition could have been agreed or imposed on any DSP staff “He undertook to raise the matter with his manager ,He had been aware that Mr C had applied for a Manager position with the respondent as it could have been presumed that he had influence , the complainants Father excused himself from the process ..
The complainant referred to a letter written by the respondent to the DSP on November 20, 2012 which referred to a proposed change in the inter agency communication structures. They disputed the relevance of the letter to the case.
The complainant submitted that the events of November 2012 arose directly because of a complaint lodged by Mr C against him and he recorded his upset at both this turn of events and the lengths at which he had to resort to obtain collateral information via Data Protection. The complainant also referred to a complaint lodged with the Ombudsman regarding “whether DSP refused to accept and examine your complaint concerning the actions of ESWC in denying you services by not dealing with you directly as an advocate for your daughter “This concluded in August 2015 in a finding of no maladministration on behalf of DSP.
On May 13, 2015, the complainants Father wrote to the Co-ordinator of the respondent service in his capacity of “parent and advocate “for his daughter. He indicated that the complainant would shortly require to reengage with the respondent. He requested that the respondent write to his daughter to inform her, in a way that she will understand, how she was to engage with the respondent? The next day, Ms M, on behalf of the respondent wrote back stating that she would be delighted for the complainant to re-join the service and indicated that she would write to suggest a meeting where the complainants father was “welcome to attend “. Later that day, the complainants father submitted the following email.
“…. Please also advise of my status re the only job coach in X and the nature of the complaint against me. It is normal practice for the client to engage with a job coach on an ongoing basis as the complainant’s advocate, I need clarification on this matter prior to any meeting “This was not responded to.
2.5 The complainant made a data protection request from the Respondent Insurer during August 2015. Here, the complainants father learned that he was identified in certain documents in their possession and extracts were provided in the form of
1.Issues referred by the respondent to an independent HR practitioner
2 A heavily redacted report purportedly scripted by Mr C
3 Letters exchanged between Mr P and the complainants father May 21 and May 22, 2013. The outcome confirmed that there was no complaint lodged by Mr C against the complainant’s father
And concluded with the stated intention of the complainant’s father to refer the case to the Equality Tribunal. During September 2014, the complainants father wrote to an Area Manager DSP seeking a referral of the case to the Access Officer considering the complainants anticipated completion of her Community Employment scheme on 17 October 2014.
The complainants concluded their submission by way of closing remarks:
A family with a member with a disability is a vulnerable family and relies more heavily on support from the state and wider community than another family would. A person with an intellectual disability is an invisible citizen who totally depends on their family and support structure to have their voice heard ……
We would ask the Tribunal to take account of the bigger picture and the human aspect of the case …. We believe a grave wrong has been done to her, not just because she has a disability but because of who her Father is also ….
Advocate General Opinion Maduro was quoted “
:One way of undermining the dignity and autonomy of people who belong to a certain group is to target not them but third persons who closely associated with them and do not themselves belong to the group “
It was submitted that the respondent exercised leverage over the complainants Father which they could not have to any other staff member of DSP. It was further submitted that the discrimination complained of arose from the complainant’s fathers voice “being silenced.
The complainant contended that the 2012 staffing difficulties experienced by the respondent served to disadvantage the complainant by removing her access to a job coach. She has been reduced to one hour a week’s work. To gain more hours, she would require the support of Employability service in her home town, now rendered impossible from November 2012 to date. The complainant informed the hearing that they had discussed the case with a Mr J at DSP, who suggested that another town be considered as a meeting place. The complainant told the hearing that the case had had lasting consequences for the complainant and her family. Her father has left his job; the family home is on the market with a plan to relocate the family in the direction of accessible disability services, separate to this case.
3 Submission on behalf of the Respondent:
3.1The respondent denied the claims of discrimination and refusal of reasonable accommodation. The respondent accepted that the complainant has a disability within the meaning of the Act. However, the respondent denied that it was a service provider or an employment agency. It described the profile as that of a charity trading as a limited company.
The Respondent described the role and function of ESSWC in relation to the complainant.
In 2009, the complainants father sought support in obtaining work experience for the complainant. At that time, the complainant was under 18 and in active education, thus ruling her outside the strict criteria for service. However, some work experience placements were sourced for the complainant by ESWC. The respondent submitted that the complainants father had a dual role in his interactions with ESWC. Firstly, as an employee of DSP, with responsibility for directly overseeing and liaising with the respondent and secondly as the complainant’s father in the context of service use.
During 2011, the complainant had 11 appointments with a Job Coach, Mr C during the period 14 July 2011 to 20 October 2011. This involved a tripartite liaison between the complainant, Mr C and the complainant’s parents.
The respondent submitted that the recognised referral process to ESWC was via DSP and the respondent had not received a referral from DSP, encompassing the complainants desire for service use during the years 2012, 2013,2014,2015 or 2016. The respondent denied that they had ever refused to engage with the complainant’s father as the complainant’s advocate.
The respondent drew the attention of the hearing to a letter dated 20 November 2012.This involved a communication between the respondent and DSP and contained a suggested protocol between EWC and its funders, DSP and the Board of Directors. The aim of the protocol was to “facilitate better communication and co-operation in the provision of this supported service “It was to cover
Financial Management
Meetings
Rules for Monitoring
The respondent submitted that this was an operational issue between agents of EWC and DSP and had no bearing on the complainant.
The respondent referred to the November 26, 2012 meeting and explained that Ms M no longer worked at the service. It was the respondents position that what was discussed at that meeting between Ms M and the complainants father concerned was the revised protocol and somehow this became misconstrued on behalf of the complainant’s father, where, he believed that he was subject to some type of complaint in addition to his daughter being excluded from accessing the respondent service.
3.2 The respondent received an email from the complainant’s father on 9 May,2013. This sought information as a matter of urgency, on the full details of the complaint at the centre of November 26th meeting and how this was notified to his employer, DSP. It was accompanied by a data protection information request.
On 13 May, 2013, The complainants father emailed Ms M indicating that his daughter was “shortly to require to re-engage” with EWC and sought a letter of instruction on engagement. An email of response followed the next day from Ms M
“I will write to (the complainant) this week to suggest that I meet with her and explain the process for re-joining the service. You are, of course welcome to attend this meeting also as her advocate “. This letter followed on 15 May, offering suggested times and location for a meeting on May 22, 2013.
On May 20th, the respondent received an email from the complainant’s father which was critical of the respondent approach, but accepted that there was no difficulty or bar to him acting as the complainant’s advocate. Nothing further followed the complainant’s fathers request for a postponement of this meeting. There was no DSP referral or direct contact from the complainant or her advocates in seeking to access the service.
On May 22, 2013The respondent advised the complainants father on, that no complaint had been made against him and received by the respondent. The respondent clarified via the Chairperson of the EWC Board that:
“the purpose of the communication between yourself and Ms M, Job Co coordinator on 26 November, 2012 was to communicate our request regarding further interactions between EWC and DSP going forward and in line with normal practice across Employability services”.
3.3 During the Summer of 2014, Mr G took over from Ms M at EWC. On 17 September 2014, the complainants parents wrote to the respondent by email ,alleging that the complainants father had been advised on 26 November 2012 that the respondents job coach would no longer meet with the complainants father alone and the respondents co coordinator would have to travel to Skibbereen to meet if the complainant wished to engage with the service .This was denied by the respondent in an email dated 24 September 2014 sent to the complainants father ,which advised that the complainant was not a client at that time .It went on to state that :
“IfMs A or any other client is referred to Employability Service West Cork through the formal referral channels of the DSP, you can be absolutely assured that they will receive the utmost professional service. ESWC will openly engage with any official advocate of persons with a disability and no policy exists to exclude from the service any person acting as an advocate to the referred client of the service….”.
The respondent contended that the complainant had not featured in the dynamic involving governance decisions between ESWC and its funder DSP and that the complainants father had misconstrued that dynamic as applying to her. They contended that there had never been a restriction on the complainant’s advocate or choice of advocate as borne out in the correspondence of Mr P and Ms M in 2013.
3.4 The respondent drew the attention of the hearing to the response to the ES1 dated 13 October, 2014 scripted by Mr G
“ …… In response to your correspondence regarding the Equal Status Acts, I wish to make it eminently clear that Work Start, West Cork, trading as Employability Service West Cork (ESWC) will not discriminate against any individual referred to the organisation through the established formal referral channels of the Department of Social Protection…….”
The respondent contended that the respondent would openly engage with any official advocate of a person with a disability and that the complainant was always welcome at their service in the company of her advocate. They qualified this by stating that the service had not received such a referral up until the day of the hearing.
3.5 In Legal submissions, the respondent identified the burden of proof set down in Teresa Mitchell V Southern Health Board [2001] ELR 201 and based on the need to establish
1 That the complainant comes within a protected category pursuant to the Act
2 That there was specific treatment of the Complainant by the respondent.
3 The treatment of the complainant was less favourable than the treatment that was or would have been afforded to another person in similar circumstances.
3.6 The respondent accepted that the complainant was covered by a disability, however they contended that the complainant was neither a user of the service in 2012, nor was a referral received via DSP between the years 2012-2016. They argued that had a referral been received then the respondent service would have opened to her as indicated throughout 2013 and 2014.The respondent advised the hearing that the circumstances of the case in relation to the complainants father had been misconstrued and they submitted that the assurances sought by the complainants advocate in the main pertained to matters which arose in the context of his discharging his professional and employment duties as an employee of DSP and not to the circumstances to which the complainant might engage with the respondent .
4. Findings and Conclusions of the Equality/Adjudication Officer
4.1 As the Equality Officer/Adjudication Officer, I must first consider whether the existence of a prima facie case has been established by the Complainant?
Section 38A of the Equal Status Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies in a claim of discrimination. It requires the complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts upon which she can rely in asserting that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to her. It is only where such a prima facie case has been established that the onus shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of discrimination raised.
In making my decision, I have considered all the evidence, both written and oral, made to me by the parties to the case.
4.2 It is common case that both parties agree that the complainant, Ms. A is living with an Intellectual disability. I am satisfied that the complainant is therefore properly encompassed by the terms of section 2 of the Acts in that regard.
Section 2 (1) – “disability” means—
………
(d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently from a person without the condition or malfunction,
The respondent disputes that the respondent service can be properly regarded as a service provider in accordance with the Acts. The complainant contends that the respondent amounts to an Employment Agency.
Section 2 of the Acts provides a definition of “Service “:
“means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes-
…..
(d) A professional or trade service
I am satisfied that the respondent is a service provider and not an employment agency.
-
(1) (a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—
(i) exists,
(ii) existed but no longer exists,
(iii) may exist in the future, or
(iv) is imputed to the person concerned
4.3 Section 5(1) of the Equal Status Acts provides that:
A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public.
“Prohibited conduct “is described in Section 2 of The Act as discrimination against a person in contravention of this Act
4.4 In examining the evidence adduced in this case, I was struck by the extreme sensitivity of the issue at the heart of the complaint. I have endeavored to deal with the issues raised with some empathy in the context of my investigation by anonymising the complainant.
4.5 Section 3(a) of the Act provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where:
(1) (a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—
(i) exists,
(ii) existed but no longer exists,
(iii) may exist in the future, or
(iv) is imputed to the person concerned
I have considered the time lines relied on by the parties to the case. I am mindful that it was accepted by the parties that Ms. A was engaged in a Community Employment scheme until October 2012. I am also mindful that the complainant was accepted as being a discretionary recipient of job coaching by Mr. C during 2011 in preparation for the jobs market. I find that she was also accommodated by the respondent in accessing work experience during 2009. I recall the distress of Ms. As’ mother at the hearing where she contended that she had not been appraised of her daughter’s progress reports during 2009. This clearly troubled her.These reports were incorporated in the respondents submission .
I am struck by the insistence of the respondent that the sole access point for their service was via Fas, now retitled Department of Social Protection (DSP). I accept that the 2011 job coaching for the complainant was not prefaced by a Fas/DSP referral. Instead, it would seem, from the evidence and submissions that Mr. C provided preparatory coaching on a supportive but discretionary basis to Ms. A. Both her father and Mr. C were central to this process. I find that this action, while well intended by everyone involved, caused a level of confusion, casualisation and blurring in professional boundaries within a professional service that goes to the root of this case.
Ms. M was not available to the hearing, but I have placed some weight on the contextual document of the suggested protocol between ESWC and DSP dated November 20, 2012, which concluded in approved signatories from both entities on or before 29 November 2012. At face value, I must accept that this was a proposed Rubicon between the two organisations, which was not directed at the complainant. It was clear from the documents submitted by the complainant that a parallel communication exercise was underway between DSP and EWC during Summer 2012.
The resultant letter was sent by SEWC to a senior manager at DSP, yet I accept that Ms. As father first learned of the proposed changes via an ESWC representative rather than his contracted employer. This can only have added to the confusion as he perceived and understood that the changes were directly attributable to a reported interpersonal difficulty between he and Mr. C.
However, I must examine the facts to establish whether prohibited conduct occurred in the case of the complainant as alleged?
4.6 The letter of the 20th November 2012 was not directed at the complainant. I accept that the complainant addressed the residual interpretation of the meeting of November 26th directly with Ms. M. He believed that he was about to be curtailed from engaging with his daughters Job coach and was aggrieved. He indicated that he intended to raise the issue with DSP directly.Ms. As Father submitted that DSP had been of limited benefit in the case as they suggested that an alternative town could be looked at for service . I asked the complainant at the hearing whether his employer provided guidelines to govern staff handling a family claim for service in such circumstances? and I was told that no such guidelines existed. I understand that the complainant felt displaced in his liaison role with EWC, however, both parents confirmed that Ms. A had not been referred to EWC via DSP within the material time of the complaint.
I considered this further via the documentation sourced via data protection and freedom of information acts. I placed some weight on two letters that were submitted dated May 21, 2013 and May 22, 2013.
May 21 2013
This was a letter to the Chairperson of EWC, Mr. P. Ms. As’ father set the context as writing in a personal, parental and advocate role on behalf of his daughter, who was described as a client of ESWC.He asked that the matter of an alleged complaint against him be investigated. he concluded the letter by stating:
“Until this matter is resolved, Ms. A will be unable to avail of the service without me as her advocate”
He submitted that this amounted to discrimination based on disability and indicated his intention to raise the matter with the Equality Authority in the event of a non-response.
May 22, 2003
The next day, Mr. P, responded as chair of EWC Board, denying the presence of a complaint and recording a clarification on the revised protocol from November 2012. The letter offered direct access to the service via two phone numbers. I have no indication that a meeting followed this offer to engage from the respondent.
The complainant wanted me to rely on the documents he secured via the Data Protection Act which pointed to his name being referenced on documents secured from the respondent erstwhile Insurer. He drew my attention to a heavily redacted document dated September, 2012 which was presented as statement from Mr. C, where Ms. As father was described in a negative light. I find that I cannot rely on this document as I cannot link it to Ms. A or the alleged prohibited conduct.
4.7 I find that the complainant expressed an interest in returning to the service for the first time since October 2011 in May 2013 and this expression of interest was met with a warm welcome by the respondent. I could not establish any restrictions to her access to the service and I find that Ms. As Father had unresolved direct issues with his own employer and indirect issues with EWC which served to blur the boundaries for progress in this regard. Meetings to engage in realigning the complainant with the service were deferred by her family as evidenced in May 21 2013 letter.
4.8 I come now to the events which led to the complaint to the WRC. In early September, 2014 , the complainant submitted some requests to re-activate his daughters interaction with ESWC directly to DSP , this was followed by Ms. As advocates writing to the respondent on 17 September 2014 seeking an engagement with the respondent . Ms. A was approaching the end of her employment. I find the letter of response dated September 24, 2014 to be consistent in communicating a willingness to accept a referral for Ms. A . It is of note that this was the position formally adopted by the respondent at the hearing. The respondent was clearly keen to offer a service to the complainant. The respondent followed this up on October 13, 2014 by way of declaration:
“ In the event that Ms. A or any other client is referred to ESWC through the formal referral channels of the DSP , you can be absolutely assured that they will receive the utmost professional service .
ESWC will openly engage with any official advocate of persons with disability as appropriate and no policy exists to exclude from the service any person acting as an advocate to the referred client of the service. Any suggestion to the contrary is without foundation “
However, I am mindful that Ms. As Father genuinely understood that he was prohibited in his advocacy role, given his perception of a continuous exclusion up until Summer 2014. However, I must resolve this conflict in favour of the respondent. There is no evidence of either the exclusion of Ms. A or her chosen advocates from the service of the respondent.
On the ES1, it was acknowledged that Ms. A was not a client of the service. The then Equality Tribunal received the instant complaint on November 20 2014. The complainants Father clarified that he had submitted a complaint in his own right on November 15,2014. He also submitted that there were many parallel investigations underway, including a High Court action.
I must accept that there existed a considerable sub plot of perceived exclusion of Ms. A by her parents through a labyrinth of assertions surrounding the changes in governance of the respondent service in late 2012 and the communication exchanged between the parties on the topic of the sensitivity of the illness of Mr. C. However, none of this amounted to evidence of prohibited conduct against the complainant as required to be demonstrated under the Act.
I am conscious that the complainant told the hearing that Ms. A continues to be unemployed. I note the respondents open and continuing offer of service on
· Needs Assessment
· Job Sourcing
· Employment with support
· Aftercare and Mentoring.
to Ms. A to assist her with Job Support and Advice via the avenue of either contacting the Coordinator of the service and via her local DSP Office.
5 Reasonable Accommodation:
5.1 Section 4(1) of the Act outlines that:
For the purposes of this Act discrimination includes a refusal or failure by the provider of a service to do all that is reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability by providing special treatment or facilities, if without such special treatment or facilities it would be impossible or unduly difficult for the person to avail herself of the service
I find that the respondent is a service provider in accordance with 4(6)(b)
I have considered the complaint under this heading and find that the complainant had not made an application for service during the material time of the complaint, therefore she was not denied reasonable accommodation by the respondent.
6. Decision
6.1 In accordance with Section 25(4) of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 to 2012, I conclude my investigation and issue the following decision. I find that the complainant did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the disability ground in terms of Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(g) and the respondent did not fail to provide reasonable accommodation contrary to the provisions of the Equal Status Acts 2000 - 2012.
Accordingly, the complainant's case fails.
Patsy Doyle
Adjudicator/Equality Officer.
Dated : 01/12/2016