EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS
EQUALITY OFFICER'S DECISION NO: DEC-E/2016/159
PARTIES
Aneta Tadyszak
(Represented by Hoban Boino Solicitors)
v
Sooner Than Later Solutions Limited
(Represented by Tiernan Lowey B.L. instructed by DAS Group)
FILE NO’s: et/152676-ee-15 & et/156688-ee-15
DATE OF ISSUE: 20th of December, 2016
1. Dispute
This dispute involves a claim by the complainant against the respondent that she was discriminated against on the grounds of gender and family status in terms of section 6(2) and contrary to section 8 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 in relation to her conditions of employment and other. There are also claims of discriminatory dismissal and of victimisation.
2. Background
2.1 The complainant referred complaints against the above respondent under the Employment Equality Acts 1998 to 2015, to the Commission on the 13th of January 2015 and on the 27th of May 2015.
2.2 In accordance with his powers under section 75 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2015 the Director delegated the cases on the 22nd of February, 2016 to me, Orla Jones Adjudication/Equality Officer, for investigation, hearing and decision and for the exercise of other relevant functions of the Director under Part VII of those Acts. This is the date I commenced my investigation. Written submissions were received from both parties. As required by section 79(1) of the Acts and, as part of my investigation, I proceeded to a hearing on the 23rd of September, 2016. Final correspondence in respect of this matter took place on the 11th of October, 2016.
2.3 This decision is issued by me following the establishment of the Workplace Relations Commission on 1 October 2015, as an Adjudication Officer who was an Equality Officer prior to 1 October 2015, in accordance with section 83 (3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.
3. Summary of complainant’s case
3.1 It is submitted that the complainant
· was employed by the respondent, as a General Operative on a casual part-time basis since February 2005,
· notified the respondent of her pregnancy on the 8th February 2014
· last worked for the Respondent on the 14th February 2014
· was not offered any further work by the respondent following notification of her pregnancy
· wrote to the Respondent by letter dated 4th March 2015 tendering her resignation
4. Summary of respondent’s case
4.1 It is submitted that
· the complainant was employed by the respondent, since about the 14th February 2005 as a machine assistant on a casual/part-time basis,
· the Complainant’s duties involved hand-packing and assisting in the packing of printed matter,
· the Complainant’s contract of employment was in the nature of an ‘if and when’ contract and clearly referred to the fact that “the employment is based on the level of work available and your availability.”
· every Wednesday the Complainant attended at the Respondent’s office to obtain proof from her employer of her working status for claiming social welfare benefits,
· the Complainant was not provided with work during the relevant period was as a result of factors wholly unconnected with her being pregnant as alleged,
· by email dated 27th April 2015, the Complainant wrote to the Respondent claiming to have previously written by letter dated 4th March 2015 tendering her resignation and attached the said letter to the email,
· by letter dated 28th April 2015, the Respondent wrote to the Complainant requesting that she reconsider her position and to remain on its panel of casual/part-time staff,
· by letter dated 26th May 2015, the Complainant wrote to the Respondent making a number of allegations of discrimination,
· by letter dated 8th June 2015, the Respondent wrote to the Complainant rejecting the allegations and setting out its position, the Respondent reluctantly accepted the Complainant’s resignation but stated that should she change her mind its door is always open to her.
5. Conclusions of the Equality Officer
5.1 The issue for decision by me now is whether or not the respondent discriminated against the complainant on grounds of gender and family status, in terms of section 6 and contrary to section 8 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 in relation to her conditions of employment and other and whether she was subjected to a discriminatory dismissal and/or a dismissal for opposing discrimination. In reaching my Decision I have taken into account all of the submissions, oral and written, made to me in the course of my investigation as well as the evidence at the Hearing.
5.2 The Respondent submits that it has received two complaint forms. The first is stamped as received by the Equality Tribunal on the 13th January 2015 and contains claims of gender discrimination only. In this complaint form the Complainant claims that the Respondent discriminated against her unlawfully in her conditions of employment and ‘other’ and in victimising her. The victimisation claim was not pursued at the hearing. In this claim form, the Complainant identifies the 4th August 2014 as the most recent date of discrimination. This is also the date on which the Complainant gave birth to her daughter. The complainant in this regard has raised allegations of discrimination in relation to the respondent’s failure to offer her work during her pregnancy, of which she notified the respondent on the 8th of February, 2014 and following which she gave birth to her child on the 4th of August 2014. I am satisfied that this claim falls within the timeframe specified in the Acts and I will firstly address this complaint of gender discrimination.
5.3 Discriminatory treatment
5.3.1 Section 85A of the Employment Equality Acts sets out the burden of proof which applies in a claim of discrimination. It requires the complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination. If she succeeds in doing so, then, and only then, is it for the respondent to prove the contrary. The Labour Court elaborated on the interpretation of section 85A in Melbury v. Valpeters EDA/0917 where it stated that section 85A: "places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule".
5.3.2 Section 6(1) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2008 provides that discrimination shall be taken to occur where “a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2)…..” Sections 6(2)(a) and (c) of the Acts define the discriminatory grounds of gender, and family status as follows – “as between any 2 persons, ...
(a) that one is a woman and the other is a man,..
(c) that one has a family and the other does not "...
5.4 Gender-Pregnancy and the special protected period
5.4.1 The entire period of pregnancy and maternity leave constitutes a special, protected period as outlined in the Court of Justice of the European Union Decisions in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd[1] Brown v Rentokil Ltd[2] and Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum[3]. In Brown v Rentokill Ltd, the Court of Justice explains why pregnancy is a special protected period:
Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 recognises the legitimacy, in terms of the principle of equal treatment, first, of protecting a woman's biological condition during and after pregnancy and, second, of protecting the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth.
It was precisely in view of the harmful effects which the risk of dismissal may have on the physical and mental state of women who are pregnant, women who have recently given birth or women who are breastfeeding, including the particularly serious risk that pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their pregnancy, that the Community legislature, pursuant to Article 10 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive adopted within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) (OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1), which was to be transposed into the laws of the Member States no later than two years after its adoption, provided for special protection to be given to women, by prohibiting dismissal during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave. [4]
5.4.2 The Labour Court has found that ‘only the most exceptional circumstances not connected with the condition of pregnancy allow a woman to be dismissed while pregnant. It is equally well settled law that the dismissal of a pregnant woman (which can obviously only apply to a woman) raises a prima facie case of discrimination on the gender ground. Once such a case has been raised the burden of proof shifts and it is for the respondent employer to prove that that the discriminatory dismissal did not take place.’[5]
5.5 Conditions of employment and other - Failure to offer the complainant hours of work
5.5.1 The complainant advised the hearing that she notified the respondent of her pregnancy on the 8th of February 2014. The complainant told the hearing that she worked for the respondent up to the 14th of February, 2014 but that following this date she was only offered work on one occasion, after that date. The complainant advised the hearing that she was only offered two days work by the respondent in the six months preceding her complaint i.e. from 14th of July 2014 to the 13th of January 2015. The complainant submits that the failure of the respondent to offer her work during this time amounts to discrimination on grounds of gender. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant was not available for work for much of the period under consideration as she was on maternity leave from the 20th of July, 2014 to the 19th of January, 2015. The respondent submits that the relevant period for the purpose of the claim can only be the time period within which the complainant was available for work as she could not be called for work during her maternity leave. Thus the respondent submits that the relevant period for the purpose of this complaint dates from the 14th of July 2014 to the 20th of July, 2014. I am satisfied from the evidence adduced that the complainant was not available for work during her maternity leave and that the relevant period for the purpose of this complaint dates from the 14th of July to the 20th of July, 2014.
5.5.2 The complainant advised the hearing that she was not called to work during the relevant period due to her pregnancy. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant was not called to work during the period in question due to the fact that there was not work available. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant is employed by them on a casual part time basis and that the complainant’s contract of employment is in the nature of an ‘if and when’ contract and clearly refers to the fact that “the employment is based on the level of work available and your availability.”
5.5.3 The respondent advised the hearing that that the Respondent’s staffing needs had been steadily decreasing in the period prior to that covered by the complaint with the advent of technological developments within the workplace which had the effect of replacing staff with machinery. The respondent also stated that the department that the complainant had worked in was producing very few orders. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant like many others had only been employed on a casual part time basis and that it was not unusual for her to go for long periods without being called into work. The respondent in support of this produced rosters for the period up to 14th of February, 2014 (the last date the complainant worked) which indicate that the complainant had only worked one day since the 1st of January, 2014.
The rosters also indicate that the complainant had only worked two days in the preceding month of December, 2013 thus supporting the respondent’s statement that the availability of hours had decreased prior to the complainant’s pregnancy, which was notified to the respondent on the 8th of February, 2014. It would thus appear that given previous working patterns and the fact that the complainant had only worked one or two days per month in the period before her pregnancy it is unlikely that the complainant would have been called to work during the seven day period covered by the complaint.
5.5.4 I am satisfied from the totality of the evidence adduced that the respondent’s failure to offer the complainant work during the relevant period was due to factors unconnected with the complainant’s pregnancy. I am thus satisfied that the complainant was not discriminated against on grounds of gender in relation to this matter.
5.6 2nd complaint form Preliminary issue time limits
5.6.1 The respondent submits that the second complaint form dated the 27th May 2015 identifies the 4th March 2014 as the most recent date of the discrimination. Given the date of receipt it is submitted that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in this claim extends only to matters that are justiciable before it on or before a period of six months of the said date (i.e. from 28th November 2014). In the second complaint form, the complainant claims that respondent discriminated against her on the grounds of gender and family status within the meaning s.6(2)(a) and (c) and contrary to sections 6 and 8 of the Acts. Specifically, the complainant also claims to have been dismissed by the respondent for discriminatory reasons and for opposing discrimination.
5.6.2 The Respondent denies that it discriminated against the Complainant in the terms set out in the said complaint forms, the Complainant’s subsequent statement to the Tribunal, or at all. The Complainant’s complaint forms state that she informed the Respondent of her pregnancy on the 8th February 2014 and that she last worked for the Respondent on the 14th February 2014. These facts are admitted. However, it is submitted that the absence of work for the Complainant at this time was wholly unconnected with the Complainant’s pregnancy, the Complainant’s being on maternity leave or any such ground relating to the Complainant’s pregnancy or taking of maternity leave. Notwithstanding the Respondent’s strong denials in relation to any alleged instances of discrimination, it is further submitted that the Complainant has failed to meet the statutory time limits required to bring such claims pursuant to the Employment Equality Acts.
5.6.3 Section 77(5) of the Employment Equality Act requires that a claim for redress in respect of discrimination be referred within six months from the date of the most recent occurrence. This limitation period may be extended to 12 months where reasonable cause is shown.
5.6.4 The complainant at the hearing submitted that the discrimination in relation to this matter was ongoing. The complainant in the alternative to a finding of ongoing discrimination applied for an extension of the time limits to a period of 12 months. The complainant when questioned as to reasonable cause submitted that the delay in submitting her claim was due to a fear of being victimised if she were to make a complaint. The respondent in reply to this stated that a ‘fear of victimisation’ has in the past been found by the Labour Court not to constitute reasonable cause for granting an extension of time limits. The respondent also added that no evidence had been produced by the complainant to support the assertion that she was prevented from making a claim within the six months due to a fear of victimisation for making such a claim. It is clear to me that the complainant had already previously submitted a claim of discrimination against the respondent on the 13th of January, 2015, this does not support the assertion that her claim of the 27th of May 2015 was submitted outside of the six months due to a ‘fear of victimisation’. Accordingly, in the circumstances I am not satisfied that an extension of the time limits to 12 months is warranted.
5.6.5 The complainant in this case has submitted that the alleged discrimination is ongoing. It is possible for a complainant to bring into their complaint more historic incidents of discrimination where they can establish that they are part of a wider discriminatory regime or where there is sufficient connection between the incidents or acts. The complainant must, firstly however, establish that a discriminatory act occurred within the limitation period (see the decision of the Labour Court in Cork County VEC v. Hurley EDA 24/2011). In this regard I have decided that my investigation should focus, in the first instance, on alleged acts of discriminatory treatment which occurred between the 28th November 2014 and the 27th of May, 2015 i.e. in the 6 months preceding the complaint. In addition during this time period the complainant submits that she resigned from her employment by letter dated the 4th of March 2015.
5.6.6 If I consider these alleged incidents to amount to unlawful treatment of the complainant contrary to the Acts, I will then consider the evidence adduced on the other (earlier) incidents complained of to determine if any of them were sufficiently connected to the incident within the six month period so as to make them part of a continuous act of discrimination. However, should I find the alleged incident(s) within the six months preceding the referral of the complaint not to be well founded, the earlier alleged incidents would be statute barred.
5.6.7 It is clear from the above, that in order to consider the earlier alleged incidents of discrimination, I must firstly decide whether the most recent alleged incident of discrimination is proven. In addition, I must be satisfied that the complainant has established a link between the incidents and that they can be considered as separate manifestations of the same disposition to discriminate.
5.7 Discrimination on grounds of gender and family status
5.7.1 The complainant advised the hearing that she notified the respondent of her pregnancy on the 8th of February 2014. The complainant told the hearing that she worked for the respondent up to the 14th of February, 2014 but that following this date she was only offered work on one occasion after that date. The complainant advised the hearing that she was not offered any work by the respondent in the six months preceding her complaint i.e. from 28th November 2014 to the 27th of May, 2015. However the complainant also submits that she resigned from her employment with the respondent by letter dated the 4th of March, 2015. The complainant submits that the failure of the respondent to offer her work amounts to discrimination on grounds of gender and family status. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant was not available for work for much of the period under consideration as she was on maternity leave from the 20th of July, 2014 to the 19th of January, 2015. The respondent submits that the relevant period for the purpose of the claim can only be the time period within which the complainant was available for work as she could not be called for work during her maternity leave. Thus the respondent submits that the relevant period for the purpose of this complaint dates from the 20th of January 2015 to the 27th of May, 2015. I am satisfied from the evidence adduced that the complainant was not available for work during her maternity leave and that the relevant period for the purpose of this complaint dates from the 20th of January, 2015 to the 27th of May, 2015. The complainant has also submitted that she resigned from her employment with the respondent by letter dated the 4th of March, 2015. The respondent advised the hearing that it did receive the letter dated 4th of March, 2015 but not until the 27th of April, 2015. The respondent also advised the hearing that it wrote back to the complainant seeking her to reconsider her resignation on the 28th of April 2015 before finally accepting her decision to resign as advised to them again by letter dated 26th of May, 2015 from the complainant.
5.7.2 The complainant advised the hearing that she was not called to work during the relevant period due to her pregnancy. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant was not called to work during the period in question due to the fact that there was no work available. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant is employed by them on a casual part time basis and that the complainant’s contract of employment is in the nature of an ‘if and when’ contract and clearly refers to the fact that “the employment is based on the level of work available and your availability.”
5.7.3 The respondent advised the hearing that that the Respondent’s staffing needs had been steadily decreasing in the period prior to that covered by the complaint with the advent of technological developments within the workplace which had the effect of replacing staff with machinery. The respondent also stated that the department that the complainant had worked in was producing very few orders. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant like many others had only been employed on a casual part time basis and that it was not unusual for her to go for long periods without being called into work. The respondent in support of this produced rosters for the period up to 14th of February, 2014 (the last date the complainant worked) which indicate that the complainant had only worked one day since the 1st of January, 2014.
The rosters also indicate that the complainant had only worked two days in the preceding month of December, 2013 thus supporting the respondent’s statement that the availability of hours had decreased prior to the complainant’s pregnancy which was notified to the respondent on the 14th of February, 2014.
5.7.4 The complainant advised the hearing that she had written to the respondent in January 2015 advising them that her maternity leave was shortly coming to an end and asking whether there would be any work available for her. The complainant in this correspondence states that she was not considered for work before her maternity leave and does not know what to expect now. The complainant told the hearing that she did not receive any reply to this letter. The respondent advised the hearing that it had not received this letter but that it had always intended to offer the complainant work once work became available.
5.7.5 The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant had called into their office on a weekly basis during the period in question to get a form signed stating that there was no work available for her in order that she could continue to claim a Social Welfare benefit. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant had never during any of these visits asked about work or made any request as to whether work could be offered to her on some other basis and never made any inquiries about the non-availability of work, other than to get the form signed to claim Social Welfare. The complainant advised the hearing that she had on a number of occasions when attending the respondent’s premises asked Mr. J about whether there was work available for her. The respondent advised the hearing that no such query had been raised by the complainant and it emerged at the hearing that Mr. J was no longer employed by the respondent during the period referred to by the complainant.
5.7.6 The respondent went on to state that the complainant did not raise any issue in relation to the non availability of work until she realised that she did not have enough PRSI contributions to entitle her to Maternity Benefit and it was upon realising this that she raised allegations of discrimination. The complainant in her complaint form to the Tribunal referred to the fact that she had not accumulated enough PRSI contributions to entitle her to Maternity Benefit. The complainant in response to this at the hearing stated that she had become concerned when she discovered she did not have enough PRSI to claim maternity benefit but that she was also concerned that there had been discrimination.
5.7.7 The respondent advised the hearing that some hours had been available during the relevant period and that these had been offered to the longest serving staff first as it was company policy to offer hours to those who had been employed longer. The complainant told the hearing that she was aware of individuals who had been offered work during the period in question and who had commenced employment after the complainant. The respondent advised the hearing that the individuals in question had been offered work during the period as it was night work and they were ‘night workers’. The respondent added that the complainant was not a ‘night worker’ and that she had in the past been very specific about her availability for working certain hours.
5.7.8 The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant had stipulated to her line manager after the birth of her first child that she could not work the usual 12-hour shift which runs from 8am to 8pm but that she could only work from 9am to 5.30pm owing to childcare requirements. The respondent advised the hearing that it had sought at all times to accommodate this request, but that it was not always possible to accommodate her, both before and after the notification of her second pregnancy, given the nature of the respondents work. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant had also indicated that she required more notice than other members of staff – at least 24 hours’ notice – to come to work and had been unavailable on short notice on previous occasions. The respondent stated that casual workers were often required at short notice and for shifts other than those for which the complainant was available and that it had in such circumstances offered work to others and not to the complainant. The complainant at the hearing did not dispute this and agreed that she did require longer notice than was sometimes given by the respondent and that she had requested shorter shifts.
5.7.9 The respondent advised the hearing that it is a family friendly employer and has a long established record of treating all staff that are pregnant and/or on maternity leave in accordance with its obligations under statute. The respondent at the hearing cited examples of employees who had worked with them before during and after their pregnancies and who had been accommodated with family friendly arrangements where possible. One of the named employees Ms. N gave evidence of this at the hearing. The respondent also cited the fact that this was the complainant’s second pregnancy while in the respondent’s employment and stated that she had continued to work after her last pregnancy and was offered work whenever work was available.
5.7.10 I have examined the complainants claim that the failure to offer her work amounted to discrimination on grounds of gender and I am satisfied from the totality of the evidence adduced that the failure to offer the complainant work was due to circumstances unconnected to her gender and that the complainant was not discriminated against on grounds of gender in relation to this matter.
5.8 Family Status Ground
5.8.1 The evidence adduced by the complainant clearly related to matters relating to pregnancy and thus supported her claim on the grounds of gender.
5.8.2 The complainant adduced no evidence in support of her claim on the family status ground and provided no evidence of a comparator with a different family status. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination on the ground of family status and I find that she was not discriminated against by the respondent in relation to these matters.
5.9 Discriminatory dismissal and dismissal for opposing discrimination.
5.9.1 The complainant has submitted that following her notification of her pregnancy to the respondent she was no longer offered work by the respondent. The complainant submits that following the failure to be offered work by the respondent she resigned her position on the 4th of March, 2015 as she felt forced to do so. The complainant in this regard is submitting that she was subjected to a constructive discriminatory dismissal. The complainant advised the hearing that she notified the respondent of her pregnancy on the 8th of February 2014. The complainant told the hearing that she worked for the respondent up to the 14th of February, 2014 but that following this date she was only offered work on one occasion after that date. The complainant submits that the failure of the respondent to offer her work amounts to discrimination on grounds of gender and family status. The complainant advised the hearing that she was not offered any work by the respondent in the six months preceding her complaint and that she eventually resigned her position on the 4th of March, 2015 as she was not being offered any work by the respondent.
5.9.2 The complainant told the hearing that she had sent her letter of resignation to the respondent on the 10th of March, 2015 but that she resent it again on the 27th of April, 2015 as she was not sure the respondent had received her letter the first time she sent it. The respondent advised the hearing that it had only received the complainant’s letter of resignation by email on the 27th of April, 2015. The respondent advised the hearing that it had upon receipt of the email, written to the complainant on the 28th of April, 2015 asking her to reconsider her resignation and to remain on the respondent’s list of casual staff. The respondent advised the hearing that they had in this letter also advised the complainant that work had not been available in the preceding months due to a lack of orders. Finally the respondent also advised the complainant that it was open to her to apply for redundancy due to the lack of availability of hours.
5.9.3 Section 2 of the Act defines dismissal as follows:
‘‘dismissal’’ includes the termination of a contract of employment by
the employee (whether prior notice of termination was or was not
given to the employer) in circumstances in which, because of the
conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been
entitled to terminate the contract without giving such notice, or it
was or would have been reasonable for the employee to do so, and
‘‘dismissed’’ shall be construed accordingly;
5.9.4 It is clear from the evidence that the complainant resigned so I will consider the matter as a claim for discriminatory constructive dismissal. I note that the complainant was has submitted that she was forced to resign due to the fact that she was not being offered hours of work by the respondent. I note that the complainant asserts that this failure to offer her hours of work was due to her gender and or family status. I have concluded earlier in my decision that the failure of the respondent to offer the complainant hours of work was due to factors unconnected to her pregnancy and or family status and am therefore satisfied that the respondent has provided reasons supported by evidence which explain its failure to offer the complainant hours of work during the period in question.
5.9.5 I note that the complainant submitted a letter of resignation dated the 4th of March 2015 which the respondent acknowledges receiving on the 27th of April, 2015. I also note that the respondent once they received this letter from the complainant asked her to re consider her decision and to remain on the respondents list of casual workers. In addition it is accepted that the respondent also suggested to the complainant that it was open to her at this point to apply for a redundancy payment on the basis that there were no hours of work available. The complainant declined these offers and reiterated her intention to resign by letter dated 26th of May 2015.
5.9.6 I am satisfied from the totality of the evidence adduced in relation to this matter that the failure of the respondent to offer the complainant hours of work in circumstances which were unconnected to her gender and/or family status cannot constitute conduct by the respondent which would entitle the complainant to resign and claim constructive discriminatory dismissal. I am thus satisfied that the complainant was not subjected to a constructive discriminatory dismissal or a dismissal for opposing discrimination, by the respondent, on grounds of gender and/or on grounds of family status.
6. DECISION OF THE EQUALITY OFFICER
6.1 I have completed my investigation of this complaint and in accordance with section 79(6) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2015 I issue the following decision. I find –
(i) that the complainant was not discriminated against by the respondent on grounds of gender in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 -2015 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in respect of her conditions of employment and other
(ii) that that the complainant was not discriminated against by the respondent on grounds of family status in terms of section 6(2) of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 -2015 and contrary to section 8 of those Acts in respect of her conditions of employment and other
(iii) that the complainant was not subjected to a discriminatory dismissal or to a dismissal for opposing discrimination on grounds of gender and/or family status
____________________
Orla Jones
Adjudicator/Equality Officer
20th of December, 2016
Footnotes
[1] [1994] ECR 1-3567
[2] [1998] ECR 1-04185
[3] [1990] ECR 1-3941
[4] ibid
[5] Intrium Justitia v Kerrie McGarvey Determination No. EDA095