FULL RECOMMENDATION
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTS, 1946 TO 1990 SECTION 83, EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS, 1998 TO 2011 PARTIES : MOONLITE CLEANING SERVICES LIMITED. (REPRESENTED BY KATE KENNEDY, B.L., INSTRUCTED BY IAN J. FOLEY & COMPANY, SOLICITORS.) - AND - JOLANTA DRABIK (REPRESENTED BY DENISE WALDRON, B.L., INSTRUCTED BY CHARLES FOLEY, SOLIICITORS) DIVISION : Chairman: Ms Jenkinson Employer Member: Mr Murphy Worker Member: Mr McCarthy |
1. Appeal under Section 83 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2011.
BACKGROUND:
2. The Employer appealed the Decision of the Equality Officer to the Labour Court on the 9th January, 2014. A Labour Court hearing took place on the 24th April, 2014. The following is the Court's Determination:
DETERMINATION:
This is an appeal by Moonlite Cleaning Services Limited against the Decision of an Equality Officer in a complaint made by Ms Jolanta Drabik under the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2011 (hereafter the Acts). The parties are referred to in this Determination as they were at first instance. Hence, Ms Drabik is referred to as “the Complainant” and Moonlite Cleaning Services Limited is referred to as “the Respondent”.
The Complainant alleges that she was subjected to discriminatory treatment leading to her dismissal on grounds of her pregnancycontraryto Section 8of theActs.Furthermore, she claimed that she was victimised by the Respondent. The complaint was investigated by an Equality Officer of the Equality Tribunal. The Equality Officer found that the Respondent had discriminated against the Complainant regarding her conditions of employment on the ground of gender, that she was entitled to claim constructive discriminatory dismissal on the ground of gender and that the Respondent had victimised her within the meaning of Section 74(2) of the Acts. The Equality Officer awarded her compensation in the amount of €22,000 for the discriminatory treatment leading to her dismissal and €11,000 for the distress caused by victimisation.
The Respondent appealed against the finding and denied the alleged discrimination or victimisation.
The Complainant submitted her claim of discriminatory treatment to the Equality Tribunal on 19thJanuary 2011 and her claim of victimisation on 31stMarch 2013.
Background
The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a Cleaner on a part-time basis initially from May 2006. After a short break in service, when she went home to her family in Poland, she recommenced working with the Respondent in February 2007 again as a part-time Cleaner when her family also moved to Ireland.She was initially employed as a part time Cleaning Assistant and was promoted a part-time Supervisor in 2007 and a full-time Supervisor in January 2010.
On 18thOctober 2009 she informed the Respondent that she was pregnant.
Preliminary Issue
Ms Kate Kennedy, B.L., instructed Ian J. Foley & Co. Solicitors, on behalf of the Respondent, raised a preliminary issue concerning an objection to the Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine this appeal on the basis that the Complainant had named the incorrect Respondent in her complaint to the Equality Tribunal. The Equality Officer considered this issue and decided that as the Respondent was on notice of the complaint there was no breach of natural justice. She was guided in this decision by Hogan J. in an appeal to the High Court in the case ofEleanor O’Higgins and University College Dublin and the Labour Court[2013 No. 21 MCA], where he held:-
- “Even if the wrong party was, in fact, so named, no prejudice whatever was caused by reason of that error (if, indeed, error it be). …In these circumstances, for this Court to hold that the appeal was rendered void by reason of such a technical error would amount to a grossly disproportionate response and deprive the appellant of the substance of her constitutional right of access to the courts.”
Therefore, the Equality Officer decided that she was satisfied that the case was properly before her and she proceeded to investigate the substantive issue and dismissed the Respondent’s objection. However, the Equality Officer amended the Respondent from “Edward Zandi” to “Edward Zandi trading as Moonlite Cleaning Services Limited” which Ms Kennedy rightly submitted was not an entity recognised by law.
Having considered the issue raised the Court is satisfied that it is very clear from contents of the EE1 Form submitted to the Equality Tribunal that the Respondent is “Moonlite Cleaning Services Limited”. Therefore, the Court concurs with the reasoning and the Decision of the Equality Officer and as this is a de novo hearing the defect contained in the Equality Officer’s Decision where the Respondent is incorrectly cited can be amended by the Determination of this Court. Therefore, the Court dismisses the Respondent’s objection. The parties were informed of the Court’s Decision on this preliminary issue on the day of the appeal hearing and the Court proceeded to hear the substantive case.
Summary of the Complainant’s Case
Ms Denise Waldron, B.L., instructed by Charles Foley, Solicitors, on behalf of the Complainant, stated that the Complainant informed Mr Edward Zandi, the Managing Director of the Respondent, that she was pregnant on 19thOctober 2010 when she was approximately 10 weeks’ pregnant. The Complainant was shocked by the response of Mr Zandi who indicated that he was going to put her on a 3 day week. As a consequence, she asked for her annual leave to commence immediately to ensure a full 5 day week payment for the next fortnight. She was then rostered for three days per week until 19thDecember 2010 when the Hotel closed for the Christmas period. The Hotel reopened on 27thDecember 2010 and she discovered that she had no hours on the roster at all. When she enquired about this she was told by Mr Zandi that she was on Health and Safety Leave. This she submitted was done without any prior consultation which meant the Complainant's weekly income was significantly reduced. She said that the Respondent advised the Complainant to secure all the necessary documentation on Health & Safety Leave from the Department of Social Protection which she did in early January 2011. The Forms were completed and the benefit was backdated to 17thJanuary 2011. At the same time the Complainant was presented with a contract of employment for a fixed-term period from 1st January 2011 until 31stDecember 2011. It identified her as a “part-time Cleaning Assistant” and her rate of pay was reduced. She refused to sign the contract as it was materially different to the contract she was on.
Ms Waldron told the Court that the Complainant did not request a reduction in her working hours from a five-day week to a three-day week after she returned from annual leave as submitted by the Respondent. In fact, it was Mr Zandi who advised the Complainant that he was putting her on a three day week and advised her to seek social welfare benefit to supplement her income during that period.
Ms Waldron submitted that the Complainant was victimised within the meaning of
Section 74(2) of the Actswhen inMarch2011,Mr Zandicalled a meetingwith allstaff
(except the Complainant's husband) atwhich he advisedstaffthatthe Complainantwas bringing a claimagainst himand hercolleagues and he encouragedstafftomake
complaints againsther.
The Complainant resigned herpositionbyletter dated the20thSeptember2011 due to the difficultiesthathadarisen between theparties.
Ms Waldron contended that the entire period of pregnancyand maternityleave
constitutes special protective periodas outlined in the Courtsof Justice in the EuropeanUnion Decision in Webb -v-EMO AirCargo (UK) Limited,Brown-v- Rentokill
LimiedandDekker -v-Stichting Vormingscentrum.Shesubmitted thatthe Labour
Court has found that onlythe most exceptional circumstancesnot connectedwith the conditionof pregnancyallowa woman to be dismissedwhile pregnant.It is equallywellsettled law that the dismissalof a pregnant woman raisesa prime facie caseof
discriminationonthe genderground.Ms Waldron submitted that once such acase hasbeen raised the burdenof proofshifts and it isfor the Respondentemployerto prove
that the discriminatorydismissal did nottake place.
Ms Waldron stated that dismissal asdefined bySection2 of the Actsincludes
constructivedismissal i.e.where because ofthe conduct of her employer the
circumstances was suchthat it would be reasonablefor theComplainant to terminate
her employment orcontract of employment. She submitted that the actionsofMr Zandidamaged the relationshipoftrust and confidence between the Respondent and the Complainant.Therefore,she isentitled to claimconstructive discriminatorydismissal
onthe ground ofgender.
Summary of the Respondent’s Position
Ms Kennedy stated that the Complainant wasinitially employed as a part-time Cleaning Assistant and was promoted to a part-time Supervisor in 2007 and a full-time Supervisor in 2010. The parties herein had an excellent working relationship. She saidMr Zandirelied heavily on the Complainant in the running of his business and she provided excellent support in her role as Supervisor.
Ms Kennedy stated that when in late October 2011 the Complainant advised the Respondent of her pregnancy she requested to take her remaining two weeks’ annual leave at that stage and the Respondent was happy to accede to this request. She said thatMr Zandiwas aware that the Complainant had had difficult pregnancies previously and was happy to accommodate her in any waypossible and informed her of this.
Ms Kennedy stated that when the Complainant returned to work in early November 2011 after her annual leave, she requested a three-dayweek rather than five days. She advisedMr Zandithat she intended to apply for a social welfare payment to supplement her income during this period.Mr Zandiagreed to her request and she subsequently advised him that she wished to apply for Health & Safety Benefit. AsMr Zandiwas unfamiliar with the scheme the Complainant said that she would make enquiries about it. She subsequently furnishedMr Zandiwith an information booklet and he agreed to pay her for the requisite three weeks of her leave.Ms Kennedy stated that the Complainant agreed to this and completed the necessary paperwork.
The Complainant contactedMr Zandiin early January 2011 on receipt of a letter from the Department of Social Protection relating to her application for Health & Safety Benefit.The letter advised the Complainant that a decision on her application could not be made until her employer confirmed whether or not she had been issued with a new contract past the 31stof December 2010. The letter further advised that her employer should be asked to confirm the dates of her new contract in the event that a new contract had been issued. The Complainant was issued with a new contract of employment effective from 1stJanuary 2011 to 31stDecember 2011 which specified that she was a part-time Cleaning Assistant.
Ms Kennedy stated that when the Complainant took issue with the fact that her contract stated that she was a part-time Cleaning Assistant, rather than a full-time Supervisor she refused to sign the contract. The Respondent assured the Complainant that an error had been made and that he would clarify any issues on her return to work after maternityleave. Ms Kennedy said that this error arose in circumstances where new contracts were being issued to all staff members in January2011withthe same commencement and cessation dates as the Complainant.
Following the referral of the complaint to theEqualityTribunalMr Zandiwas hopeful that matters could be resolved amicablyand he opted for mediation, however, the Complainant declined this option.
Ms Kennedy denied the allegation of victimisation. She said that astaff meeting did take placein March 2011 at which staff informedMr Zandithat the Complainant had informed them that she had made various complaints about him.However, at no stage did the Respondent invite the Complainant's co-workers to make complaints against her as alleged.
Ms Kennedy stated that the Complainant advised the Respondent in July 2011 that she would be finishing her maternityleave on the 8thOctober 2011 but she would be
applying for Carer'sAllowance as her babyrequired specialhealth care. She requestedMr Zandicalculate her holidayentitlements which she intended to takeat the end of her maternityleave and also requested the Respondent complete her Carer's Allowance Application Form byconfirming her PRSI entitlements. The Complainant resigned her position byletter dated 20thSeptember 2011 stating that her Solicitors
advised that she would not be returning to work once her maternityleave terminated in the lightof the difficulties that had arisen between the parties and her fear that her hours would be reduced on her return.
Ms. Kennedy refuted the allegation of victimisation and held that as the allegation was solely based on hearsay evidence the complaint could not be substantiated.
Witness Testimony
Evidence was given by Ms Jolanta Drabik, the Complainant herself, and on behalf of the Respondent by Mr Zandi. Their evidence can be summarised as follows:-
Evidence of Ms Jolanta Drabik:
The witness outlined the history of her employment with the Respondent. She characterised the working relationship between Mr Zandi and herself as excellent prior to the announcement of her pregnancy. She said that having moved from Poland she worked hard on improving her English and completed a Diploma in Supervisory Management in GMIT and that Mr Zandi had been very supportive and accommodated her in ensuring her days off coincided with her course requirements.
She said that when she told Mr Zandi that she was pregnant in October 2010 he asked her how long was she going to work for him before taking maternity leave and she replied that she intended to work up to near the due date. She said that she had no health problems and she asked him if he needed a medical certificate. He replied that he did not and informed her that she would work three days per week. When she queried this he told her that she could not work in the Hotel with a big belly. The witness said that she was shocked at this and reminded Mr Zandi that another pregnant worker had worked for as long as she wished to and made her own decision when to take her maternity leave. The witness said that Mr Zandi then mentioned that that employee was young in her early 20’s. The witness said that she was 38 at the time.
The witness said that as she had two weeks’ annual leave remaining to be taken before the end of the year she decided to avail of that leave rather than incur a reduction in her pay. She was paid €400 nett as a full-time Supervisor.
When she returned from annual leave the witness said that she was rostered to work three days per week and her pay was reduced by half. She said that Mr Zandi told her that she should claim Social Welfare Benefits for the remainder of the week. She worked three days per week up to the Christmas Hotel closure on 19thDecember 2010.
The witness said that on 27thDecember 2010 she received a telephone call from a colleague who told her the roster was up for the coming week and that she was not rostered for any hours, the roster indicated that she was on “leave of absence” and in the right-hand column it stated that she was on “maternity leave”. She said that she spoke to Mr Zandi about this and he told her that as she was on maternity leave she was not on the roster. She explained to him that if she availed of her maternity leave at that stage that she would have none left when the baby arrived. The due date of delivery was 17thMay 2011. The witness said that Mr Zandi told her he was putting her on Health & Safety Leave and, when she asked him why, he said we spoke about it, which the witness said was not correct. However, she said that based on her fear of having no income and with the responsibility of three children and monthly rent to pay that she would enquire about Health & Safety Leave which included a Social Welfare Benefit. She proceeded to get information and obtained the necessary Forms and information pack which she then gave to Mr Zandi, who completed the Forms and she also completed her Section and her Doctor completed the necessary part. She commenced on Health & Safety Benefit which meant that her weekly income was significantly reduced.
The witness said that shortly afterwards she was shocked to receive a contract from Mr Zandi stating that she was now a part-time Cleaning Assistant which she considered to be a demotion, her rate of pay was reduced, her hours of work were reduced and she was on a fixed-term contract for one year. The witness said that she spoke to Mr Zandi about the changes outlined in the contract and he replied that he could do what he wanted. She said that she was shocked by all that was happening, having worked for Mr Zandi for over four years, so she decided to refer her claim to the Equality Tribunal.
She said that her baby was born prematurely on 10thApril 2014 and was diagnosed with a serious medical condition. He spent fourteen months in Hospital and continues to require constant care.
Evidence of Mr. Edward Zandi:-
In his evidence to the Court Mr Zandi denied the allegations relied upon by the Complainant in advancing her case.He told the Court that the Complainant’s work performance was entirely satisfactory and he also characterised the working relationship between them as excellent.
He said that he was aware that her previous three pregnancies had been difficult and he had no difficulty in allowing her request for two weeks’ annual leave which needed to be cleared by the end of the year in any event. He said that she requested to work three days per week and that she intended to seek Social Welfare Benefits to supplement her three-day week. He said that as she was pregnant he had no difficulty granting her request for a three-day working week. He said that after the Christmas closedown period she provided him with information on Health & Safety Leave. He told the Court that he knew nothing about this Leave and had never put any of his employees on it before. He said that he thought the Complainant had figured it all out and that he had filled out whatever needed to be done. He said that he was aware of the requirement to pay the first 21 days of Benefit before the Social Welfare Benefit commenced.
Mr. Zandi said that every year he provided all staff with new contracts of employment, which was due to the uncertainty regarding his contracts with Clients. In completing the contract for the Complainant he said that he made a number of mistakes, however, he said that he told her they were mistakes and that they could be rectified at the end of her maternity leave. He said that he wanted her to return to work when her maternity leave was completed. Mr Zandi denied that he referred to her big belly or that he could do whatever he wanted to when it came to renewing her contract of employment.
He said that he had hoped to sort the matter out and had wanted to participate in the Equality Tribunal’s mediation process, however, that was not possible due to the Complainant’s refusal to participate.
Issues arising
The issues arising for decision in this case are, firstly, whether or not the Complainant was discriminated against on the gender ground by reason of pregnancy in relation to her conditions of employment when her hours of work were initially reduced, then not rostered at all, then being placed on Health & Safety Leave and finally being given a new contract with terms and conditions of employment inferior to that which she previously held.
The next issue for the Court to consider is whether the issue of the allegation of constructive dismissal is properly before the Court or not.
And finally the Court must consider whether or not the Complainant was victimised by the Respondent for having submitted a complaint under the Acts to the Equality Tribunal in January 2011.
While there are significant questions of law arising in this case these are essentially questions of fact and degree to be determined on the evidence. The Court has carefully evaluated all of the testimony proffered in the case and has taken account of the demeanour of the witnesses in giving their evidence. The Court has also taken account of the many documents put into evidence.
Findings of the Court
The Applicable Law
It abundantly clear from a line of authorities starting with the decision inC-177/88, Dekker v Stichting Vormingcentrum voor Junge Volwassenen [1990] ECR 1-3841and from the legislative provisions of the European Union that women are to be afforded special protection from adverse treatment from the commencement of their pregnancy until the end of their maternity leave. The entitlement to that protection is to be regarded as a fundamental and inviolable right within the legal order of the Union which the Courts and Tribunals of the Union must vindicate within the limits of their jurisdiction.
InDekkerthe Court of Justice of the European Union has made it clear that since pregnancy is a uniquely female condition any adverse treatment of a woman on grounds of pregnancy is direct discrimination on the ground of her sex. Thus, the law of the European Union recognises the reality that to treat a woman less favourably because she is pregnant is to discriminate against her because she is a woman. That can never be justified.
SinceDekkerthe protection afforded to pregnant women in employment has been strengthened considerably in the case law of the CJEU and in the legislative provisions of the European Union. Equality on the ground of gender is now expressly guaranteed by Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The Charter is now incorporated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Lisbon Treaty) and has the same legal standing as all preceding and current Treaties. It can thus be properly regarded as part of the primary legislation of the European Union.
The jurisprudential principle that discrimination on the ground of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex is now codified in Directive 2006/54/EC on the Principle of Equal Treatment of Men and Women (the Recast Directive). This Directive provides at Article 2. 2 (c) that any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or maternity leave within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC constitutes unlawful discrimination for the purpose of that Directive.
Directive 92/85/EEC (the Pregnancy Directive) provides a comprehensive legal framework in which special protection is afforded to the safety, health and welfare of pregnant women in employment.
Section 85A of the Act now provides for the allocation of the probative burden as between the Complainant and the Respondent in cases coming with its ambit. This Section provides, in effect, that the Complainant bears the initial burden of proving facts from which discrimination may be inferred. If those facts are established, and if they are regarded by the Court as of sufficient significance to raise an inference of discrimination, the onus passes to the Respondent to show that the principle of equal treatment was not infringed in relation to the Complainant.
Where the probative burden shifts the Respondent must show a complete dissonance between the discriminatory ground relied upon and the impugned conduct or omission. Thus, inWong v Igen Limited[2005] IRLR 258 (a decision of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales), Gibson LJ pointed out that where the Respondent fails to show that the discriminatory ground was anything other than a trivial influence in the impugned decision the complaint will be made out.
As was pointed out by this Court in Determination EDA0821,Kieran McCarthy v Cork City Council, at the initial stage the complainant is merely seeking to establish aprima faciecase. Hence, it is not necessary to establish that the conclusion of discrimination is the only, or indeed the most likely, explanation which can be drawn from the facts proved. It is sufficient that the presumption is within the range of inferences which can reasonably be drawn from those facts.
Claim of Constructive Dismissal – Discriminatory Dismissal
The Complainant submitted her claim of discriminatory treatment to the Equality Tribunal on 19thJanuary 2011 and her claim of victimisation on 31stMarch 2011. The alleged constructive dismissal took place on 20thSeptember 2011 when she resigned her position by letter on that date.
Since the occurrence to which that complaint relates post-dated the referral to the Equality Tribunal it could not have been contemplated by that referral. In these circumstances that aspect of the Complainant’s complaint must be disallowed as being outside the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
Victimisation Claim
The gist of the Complainant’s claim of victimisation is that she was told by fellow colleagues that Mr Zandi had called a meeting of all staff in March 2011 to inform them of the Complainant’s complaints under the Acts against both the Respondent and her colleagues and that he encouraged staff to make complaints against the Complainant.
It is for the Complainant to produce credible evidence from which the existence of such an allegation could be inferred. No witnesses were produced for the Court on this allegation and the Complainant offered no evidence from which the Court could draw such an inference. In that regard the Court could not accept hearsay evidence and therefore finds that there is no basis upon which to draw an inference of victimisation. Accordingly, the Court does not uphold her complaint under Section 74 of the Acts.
Claim of Discriminatory Treatment
There is a conflict in the evidence given by both Mr Zandi and the Complainant in respect of almost all the material facts of this case. It is not necessary for the Court to resolve all of those conflicts and it would be extremely difficult to do so given the divergence of the evidence adduced. However, there are a number of critical matters on which the Court must reach conclusions so as to establish the factual background against which the issues arising in the case must be decided. It is therefore necessary for the Court to carefully evaluate all of the evidence adduced so as to reach findings of fact on these critical points.
It is agreed between the parties that up to the time the Complainant informed Mr Zandi of her pregnancy in October 2011 there were no difficulties in the employment relationship between the parties and both parties had a high regard for each other to the point where the Complainant had been promoted to Supervisor level, given an increase in pay and increased hours of work. Mr Zandi regarded the Complainant as the most senior employee within the Company. Furthermore, Mr Zandi facilitated the Complainant when she sought to return to Ireland after a short period in Poland and gave her husband a job before he arrived.
It is not disputed that the Complainant immediately took annual leave following the announcement of her pregnancy. While this fact in itself does not merit an inference of discrimination, the fact that immediately on her return to work her hours were reduced and she was placed on a three-day week up until closing time at Christmas does raise an inference. Moreover, the Court finds it most significant that for the first week back after the Christmas period the roster was very clearly marked “LEAVE of Absence” and “maternity leave” beside the Complainant’s name. Mr Zandi in his evidence stated that he filled out the roster, he did write “LEAVE of Absence”, however, he said that he had no recollection of writing the words “maternity leave”. He accepted that the Complainant was replaced during this time by another employee who was appointed to the supervisory role (in addition to an existing second Supervisor). The Court is satisfied that the fact that she was not rostered at all and was considered to be on leave of absence without any such arrangement having been entered into and without the Complainant having any knowledge whatsoever of this development, coupled with the fact that she was singled out for such treatment, raises an inference of discrimination.
There was some conflict of evidence regarding who initiated both the reduction in working hours and the Health & Safety Leave. The Complainant told the Court that she had no difficulties carrying out her duties during her pregnancy, that she had a healthy pregnancy and that her baby was not due until 17thMay 2011 which was confirmed by her Doctor. It is difficult to see why she would avail of shorter working hours or of a Health & Safety Social Welfare Benefit when account is taken of her financial commitments. In this regard the concern she raised in the light of the changes made to her rostered hours with their consequent reduction in pay is understandable and it is therefore understandable in those circumstances that she would seek to ensure that she was in receipt of some income. Therefore, the fact that she signed the Health & Safety Benefit Form can be excused. The Court notes that that she did not claim Social Welfare Benefit during the period she was on a three-day week as she insisted that such a reduction in her working hours was not at her instigation but at Mr Zandi’s, who suggested that she should avail of Social Welfare Benefits as she had enough contributions paid.
The Complainant was presented with a new contract on 12thJanuary 2011 on vastly inferior terms than those which she previously had and this combined with the loss of her permanency for both herself and her husband who also worked for the Respondent led her to submit her claim to the Equality Tribunal. The Court notes that she completed the EEI Form within a couple of weeks of all of these occurrences.
The Court is satisfied that the deterioration in the Complainant’s terms and conditions of employment and the circumstances in which these occurred constitute facts from which discrimination may be inferred. It is thus for the Respondent to prove on the balance of probabilities that there has been no infringement of the principle of equal treatment. The Respondent has failed to discharge that onus. Accordingly, the Complainant is entitled to succeed and the Court finds that she was discriminated against by reason of her pregnancy which discrimination constituted direct discrimination contrary to section 8(b) of the Acts.
Having considered all of the evidence, the Court has reached the conclusion that the Complainant’s version of what occurred is substantially correct and should be preferred. The Court believes, as a matter of probability, that the exclusion of the Complainant from her duties and the deterioration in her working terms and conditions of employment were inextricably connected with her pregnancy and that she was thereby discriminated on the gender ground.
Determination
As set out above the Court finds that the Complainant’s claim alleging constructive dismissal is outside its remit and therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this complaint. Therefore, the Court overturns the Equality Officer’s finding and Decision in that regard.
The Court has found that the Complainant’s claim that she was victimised within the meaning of Section 74 (2) of the Act is not well-founded and accordingly overturns the Equality Officer’s finding and Decision in that regard also.
The Court finds that the Complainant’s complaint that the Respondent discriminated against her regarding her terms and conditions of employment on the ground of gender is well-founded.
Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court orders the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €16,000 for the discrimination which she suffered. For the avoidance of doubt, no part of the award made is in respect of remuneration. The Equality Officer’s Decision in varied accordingly.
The Court so Determines.
Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
Caroline Jenkinson
12th May, 2014______________________
JFDeputy Chairman
NOTE
Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to John Foley, Court Secretary.