FULL RECOMMENDATION
SECTION 83, EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACT, 1998 PARTIES : THE IRISH PRISON SERVICE (REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF STATE SOLICITOR) - AND - FR. DONAL MORRIS (REPRESENTED BY FRANCIS WATTERS) DIVISION : Chairman: Mr Duffy Employer Member: Mr Grier Worker Member: Mr Nash |
1. Appeal under Section 83 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 Dec-E2006-015
BACKGROUND:
2. The worker appealed the Equality Officer's decision to the Labour Court on the 26th May, 2006, in accordance with Section 83 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. A Labour Court hearing took place on the 5th February, 2007, in Roscommon. The following is the Court's determination:
DETERMINATION:
This case came before the Court in the following circumstances. Fr Morris (the Complainant) is a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. He was appointed as chaplain to a prison. It is not disputed that he was employed in that capacity by the Irish Prison Service (the Respondent). While his duties involve ministering to the spiritual care and welfare of prisoners he is classified as a Prison Officer for the purpose of the Prisons Ireland Act 1877 and the Rules for the Government of Prisons 1947. He claims that his conditions of employment are less favourable than those applicable to other prison officers in relation to the following: -
�Access to the Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme.
�Access to promotion
�The terms on which his appointment can be terminated.
The Complainant contends that he is the victim of discrimination on the grounds of his religious belief in relation to this less favourable treatment. In advancing that argument the Complainant relies on the definition of the expression “religious belief” contained at s 2 of the Act, as follows:-
- “religious belief” includes religious background or outlook.
It was accepted by the parties that the case turns on the net point of whether or not being a priest is capable of being regarded as the Complainant’s religious background for the purpose of the Act.
Conclusions of the Court
There are two possible meanings which can be ascribed to the expression “religious background”. Firstly, it could be intended to refer to a situation in which a person was reared or educated in a particular religion but has ceased to practice or espouse that religion. Secondly, it could be interpreted as meaning the standing or position of a person within an organised religion or sect. This would ascribe to the expression a significantly wider ambit than if the former construction where to be applied. It would, for example, mean that a person who holds a position or status within a particular church could, on that account, claim to be discriminated against relative to other members of the same church. This could arise in circumstances in which there is no imputed or actual antipathy on part of the alleged discriminator towards the religion in question.
Dictionary definition.
The Oxford Dictionary of English, second edition, defines the word “background” as,inter alia, “a persons education, experience and social circumstances” There is no doubt that an ordained priest would have a different education, experience to that of a person who was never a priest. However, there are other considerations which must be brought to bear in considering if this is the meaning intended by the framers of the statute.
The words in context.
While dictionary definitions are of assistance in the process of statutory construction, a meaning must be attributed to words and expressions by reference to the context in which they appear. Stamp J explained the application of this principle inBourne v Norwich Crematorium Ltd[1967] 2 All ER 576, as follows: -
- English words derive colour from those which surround them. Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of the sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary or decided cases, and then put back again into the sentence with the meaning which you have assigned to them as separate words, so as to give the sentence of phrase a meaning which as a sentence of phrase it cannot bear without distortion of the English language.
That passage was quoted with approval by Henchy J inDillon v Minister for Posts and Telegraphs,Supreme Court, Unreported, 3rd June 1981, and by Hamilton P (as he then was) inUnited States Tobacco International Inc v Minister for Health1 IR 394.
The words “religious background” appear in Section 2 of the Act as a component of the term “religious belief”. They are followed by the words “or outlook”. It would thus appear that the word “background” should be construed in the same context as the words “belief” and “outlook”. Both of these words refer to an opinion or conviction which a person may hold, or to a point of view or an attitude to life. Neither word is capable of referring to a person’s status or position.
It must also be borne in mind that the Act must be construed in harmony with Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and education. Article 1 of the Directive recites its purpose as being to lay down a framework for combating discrimination on grounds of,inter alia, religion and belief. Again, these words suggest that the protection given is for membership of a religious denomination or the espousing of a particular religious belief. It does not appear to extend to the status, standing or position of a person within a particular religious body or church.
Findings
What is at issues in this case is an arrangement or rules which applied a set of conditions to the Complainant when he was a chaplain working in a prisons which were not applied to others who were not chaplains. Thus the difference in treatment is grounded on the office or position which the Complainant held and not on the religion which he professes or practices. In that regard it would, in the Court’s view, be absurd to hold that as a matter of law a Catholic priest working in a prison is of a different religious belief to a Catholic lay person working in a prison.
This absurdity would, in the Court's view, be compounded by the consequences which would flow from adopting the construction contended for by the Complainant. If, for the purposes of the Act, the Complainant is of a different religious belief to a lay prison officer who is a Catholic, and can bring a claim under the Act on that account, the converse must also be the true. This could mean that an ordinary prison officer, who is a practising Catholic, could claim to be discriminated against on grounds of religious belief, using a chaplain as a comparator, in such matters as being obliged to wear a uniform or in being required to undertake more arduous duties involving the maintenance of discipline within the prison. This could not have been intended.
Notwithstanding the careful and forceful arguments made on behalf of the Complainant, it appears to the Court that the reference to religious background in the definition of religious belief is intended to cover situations in which a person suffers discrimination because of their education or upbringing in a particular religion which they may no longer espouse. Had the Oireachtas intended to protect a person's position or statues within a religion it would have said so in clear terms. The Court cannot interpret the Act in a way which has the affect of giving the provision a wider scope than that actually given to it by the legislature.
Accordingly, the Court concurs with the decision of the Equality Officer on this point and must disallow the Complainant’s appeal
Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
Kevin Duffy
28th February, 2007______________________
CONChairman
NOTE
Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to Ciaran O'Neill, Court Secretary.