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RPD237

FULL RECOMMENDATION


RPA/23/24
ADJ-00040449 CA-00051751-001
DETERMINATION  NO.  RPD237

REDUNDANCY PAYMENTS ACTS, 1967 TO 2014


PARTIES:
O'DONNELL COACH HIRE LIMITED
(REPRESENTED BY SIMON GILLESPIE B.L., INSTRUCTED BY GALLAGHER BRENNAN & PONSONBY SOLICITORS)

- AND -

RAYMOND MCDONALD


DIVISION:

Chairman: Mr Foley
Employer Member: Mr O'Brien
Worker Member: Mr Bell

SUBJECT:

1. Appeal Of Adjudication Officer Decision No(s)ADJ-00040449 CA-00051751-001


BACKGROUND:

2. The Worker appealed the Decision of the Adjudication Officer to the Labour Court on 27 April 2023 in accordance with the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 2014. A Labour Court hearing took place on 27 July 2023. The following is the Determination of the Court:





DETERMINATION:

This matter comes before the Court as an appeal by Raymond McDonald (the Appellant) of a decision of an Adjudication Officer made in respect of his complaint made under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 (the Act) against his former employer, O’Donnell Coach Hire Limited (the Respondent).

The Appellant’s employment terminated in August 2019. The complaint under the Act was made to the Workplace Relations Commission on 15th July 2022.

The Appellant submits that he was made redundant at the end of August 2019.

The Respondent submits that the Appellant resigned his employment and that the role he occupied was not redundant at the date of his termination of his own employment.

The Adjudication Officer decided that the complaint of the Appellant was, having regard to applicable statutory time limits, out of time.

Discussion and conclusion.

The Act at Section 24 makes provision as follows:

  • 24.(1)—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an employee shall not be entitled to a lump sum unless before the end of the period of 52 weeks beginning on the date of dismissal or the date of termination of employment—

    (a) the payment has been agreed and paid, or

    • (b) the employee has made a claim for the payment by notice in writing given to the employer, or

      (c) a question as to the right of the employee to the payment, or as to the amount of the payment, has been referred to the F53[Director General] under section 39.

    (2) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, an employee shall not be entitled to a weekly payment unless he has become entitled to a lump sum.

    (2A) Where an employee who fails to make a claim for a lump sum within the period of 52 weeks mentioned in subsection (1) as amended) makes such a claim before the end of the period of 104 weeks beginning on the date of dismissal or the date of termination of employment, the F53[adjudication officer, if he is satisfied] that the employee would have been entitled to the lump sum and that the failure was due to a reasonable cause, may declare the employee to be entitled to the lump sum and the employee shall thereupon become so entitled.]

    (3) Notwithstanding subsection (2A), where an employee establishes to the satisfaction of the Director General—

    • (a) that failure to make a claim for a lump sum before the end of the period of 104 weeks mentioned in that subsection was caused by his ignorance of the identity of his employer or employers or by his ignorance of a change of employer involving his dismissal and engagement under a contract with another employer, and

      (b) that such ignorance arose out of or was contributed to by a breach of a statutory duty to give the employee either notice of his proposed dismissal or a redundancy certificate,

    the period of 104 weeks shall commence from such date as the Director General at his discretion considers reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.
Having regard to the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2A) it is clear that, save for where subsection 3 has application, the maximum possible statutory time limit for making a complaint under the Act to the Workplace Relations Commission is 104 weeks after the termination of employment. The within complaint was not made until almost three years after the termination of the employment. These underlying facts are not in dispute.

The Court concludes that, having regard to the Act at sections 24(1) and (2A), the within complaint is out of time.

No submission has been made to the Court that section 24(3) of the Act has application to the factual circumstances underpinning the within complaint. Consequently, the Court concludes that the provisions of that section have no relevance to the within matter.

The Court therefore concludes that, by operation of the law, the within complaint is, having regard to applicable statutory time limits, out of time and that the within appeal must fail.

Decision

The Court decides that the within complaint is out of time and that the appeal must fail.

The decision of the Adjudication Officer is affirmed.

The Court so decides.

Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
Kevin Foley
CC ______________________
2 August 2023 Chairman


NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to Ceola Cronin, Court Secretary.