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FULL RECOMMENDATION
PARTIES : PMC PAINTING CONTRACTORS LIMITED DIVISION :
SUBJECT: 1. Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No(s) ADJ-00009799 CA-00012817-005 The Adjudication Officer decided that the Appellant was not employed under a lawful contract of employment at times material to her complaint. The Respondent did not attend the hearing of the Court. The Respondent’s representative did, in advance of the hearing of the Court, advise the Court that, having received the relevant notifications from the Court, he was without instruction from his client and consequently would not be attending the hearing of the Court. The Court is satisfied that the Respondent, through his representative, was properly notified of the date, time and venue for the hearing of the within appeal. The Appellant submitted that her employment ended on 12th July 2017. Preliminary matter The Respondent submitted that the contract of employment of the Appellant was tainted with illegality and that this made the contract unenforceable. The Court decided to hear the parties in relation to this matter as a preliminary matter. Summary position of the Appellant on the preliminary matter The Appellant submitted that: A contract of employment existed between her and her employer, the Respondent. The contract was not evidenced in writing. She was paid in cash by the employer, which method of payment is expressly permitted by Section 2(1)(g) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991.• The employer was responsible for deducting PAYE, PRSI and USC from her wages and remitting the appropriate payments to the Revenue Commissioners. She did not agree to be paid without deduction of income tax, PRSI and USC as alleged by the employer and had no knowledge that the Respondent may have failed to make and pay over deductions in relation to such liabilities. She reluctantly returned to work while on maternity leave against her wishes in circumstances where the employer required her to do so. She submitted that, following the Supreme Court in Hussein V Labour Court [2015] IESC 58 and the ratio of Hussein v Labour Court [2012] IEHC 364, the Appellant’s contract was inherently lawful rather than a contract which dealt with unlawful matters and, as such, substantively illegal. In circumstances where the contract was inherently lawful it is not open to the Labour Court to adjudicate on whether the contract is rendered void due to matters of alleged illegality or public policy. There was no evidence of the Appellant’s knowledge of or complicity in any fraud or illegality. Any such fraud or illegality arises solely from the Respondent’s breach of its statutory obligations. Summary position of the Respondent on the preliminary matter. The Respondent did not attend the hearing of the Court. However, the Court was provided with a written submission made in advance on behalf of the Respondent. That written submission asserted as follows: The Appellant was engaged in a fraud upon the Department of Social Welfare and Revenue at times material to the complaint before the Court. The Appellant was paid in cash. The Appellant, at a material time, was in receipt of Maternity Benefit payments from the Department of Social Protection and wages from the Respondent. These matters demonstrated that the contract of employment was tainted with illegality and that the Appellant knew of the illegality and was an active participant in the illegality. Having regard to the decision of Laffoy J. in Red sail Frozen Foods Ltd (in receivership) [2006] IEHC 328 therefore the contract was unenforceable and the within appeal cannot succeed. Discussion and conclusions on the preliminary matter The Respondent has set forward an allegation that the contract of employment of the Claimant was tainted by illegality. No evidence was tendered by the Respondent to support this proposition. In particular, the Court was not provided with detail of the element or elements of the Social Welfare or Revenue codes / regulations / legislation which was or were contended to have been breached. For example, a primary element of the alleged breach of the Revenue code is the assertion by the Respondent that the Appellant was paid in cash. The Court has not been provided with evidence or clarity as to how receipt by a worker of wages in cash constitutes a breach of any code of the Revenue. Neither has any submission been made to set out where responsibility lies for relevant taxation and related matters and whether the employer in the appeal discharged any such responsibility resting upon it. Similarly, no submission has been made that either the Respondent or the Appellant has been found by either the Department of Social Welfare or the Revenue Commissioners to have breached the Social Welfare or Revenue codes / regulations / legislation at any material time. The Appellant has not disputed that she may have been in breach of social welfare regulations but she has contended, including in oral evidence, that any such breach was not intended by her or known to her and, should it have occurred at any time, resulted from pressure from the Respondent. She has asserted, including in oral evidence, that she had no knowledge of any possible fraud on the Revenue. She submitted, including in oral evidence to the Court, that she had no knowledge of an illegality in the operation or content of her contract of employment at any material time. The Respondent in this appeal did not attend the hearing of the Court and, consequently, was not in a position to provide the Court with evidence of an illegality of contract in the within matter or to tender any evidence to rebut the oral evidence of the Appellant as regards her knowledge of any alleged illegality associated with the performance of her contract of employment. In the view of the Court, it is for the party seeking to rely on inherent illegality in a contract of employment or illegality in the performance of an otherwise lawful contract to prove the existence of the illegality and indeed the knowledge of the worker of that illegality and his or her active participation in such illegality. This Court is not at large to determine by reference to unspecified elements of the Social Welfare or Revenue Codes / regulations / legislation to make determinations as regards illegality in the performance or nature of the Appellant’s contract of employment or indeed to determine liability in respect of any such illegality or breach. The Respondent in this appeal has failed to particularise the element or elements of the Social Welfare or Revenue codes, regulations or legislation which it alleges have been breached in performance of the Appellant’s contract of employment such as to render that contract unenforceable. The Appellant however has given sworn evidence to the Court to the effect that she had no knowledge of or willing participation in any act of illegality in respect of the Revenue or Department of Social Welfare codes, regulations or legislation. The Court therefore concludes that it has not been provided with a basis upon which it can determine that the Appellant is not entitled to pursue her appeal under the Act. An unsubstantiated allegation or unproven assertion that an unspecified regulation, code or law of the Department of Social Protection or of the Revenue Commissioners has been breached cannot remove from the Court the jurisdiction to apply the Act to the facts of the case before it. The appeal before the Court therefore must be decided by reference to the statute under which the appeal has been brought. Substantive matter. Summary position of the Appellant The Appellant submitted and gave oral evidence to the effect that, in contravention of the Act at Section 3(1), she was at no time provided with a written statement of the terms of her employment. Summary position of the Respondent The Respondent submitted that the Appellant was not entitled to any compensation for any failure to provide her with a written statement of the terms of her employment. The Respondent asserted that no evidence had been before the Workplace Relations Commission at first instance regarding this alleged breach of the Act. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant was required to provide proof of the alleged breach of the Act. Relevant Law The Act at Section 3, in relevant part, provides as follows: 3.— (1) An employer shall, not later than 2 months after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment, ……. Discussion and conclusion. The Appellant has submitted and given oral evidence to the effect that she was never provided with a written statement of the terms of her employment. The obligation to provide her with such a written statement, by operation of the law, rests upon the Respondent. 7(2) A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of F22 [ sections 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 or 6C ] shall do one or more of the following, namely — (d) in relation to a complaint of a contravention under change section 3 , 4 , 5 , or 6 , and without prejudice to any order made under paragraph (e) ] order the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 4 weeks ’ remuneration in respect of the employee ’ s employment Decision The within appeal is, for the reasons outlined above, well founded. Having regard to all of the circumstances, the provisions of Section 7 of the Act and the standard required by the CJEU in Von Colson, the Court measures the appropriate level of compensation which is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances to be four weeks’ pay. The Appellant provided an affidavit which asserted that she worked 40 hours per week and received €11.00 per hour. The Court therefore calculates that four weeks’ remuneration amounts to €1,760.00. The Court orders the Respondent to pay compensation to the Appellant in that amount. The decision of the Adjudication Officer is set aside. The Court so decides.
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