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PWD2034

FULL RECOMMENDATION


PW/20/33
ADJ-00024162 CA-00030668-001
DETERMINATION NO. PWD2034

SECTION 7(1), PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT, 1991


PARTIES :
OCS IRELAND
(REPRESENTED BY IRISH BUSINESS AND EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATION)

- AND -

MR BEN QUINN
(REPRESENTED BY MR JAMES MCEVOY)


DIVISION :

Chairman: Mr Haugh
Employer Member: Mr Murphy
Worker Member: Mr Hall

SUBJECT:

1. An appeal of an Adjudication Officer's Decision No(s) ADJ-00024162 CA-00030668-001

BACKGROUND:

2. This is an appeal of an Adjudication Officer’s Decision made pursuant to Section 7(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991. The appeal was heard by the Labour Court in a virtual Court Room on 23 June 2020 in accordance with Section 44 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015. The following is the Court's Determination:


DETERMINATION :

This is an appeal by Mr Ben Quinn (‘the Complainant’) from a decision of an Adjudication Officer (ADJ-00024162, dated 22 January 2020) under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 ‘the Act’). The Complainant’s Notice of Appeal was received by the Court on 21 February 2020. The Court heard the appeal in a virtual courtroom on 24 June 2020.

The Complainant was employed by OCS Ireland (‘the Respondent’) as a Facilities Manager on 14 June 2018. His contract of employment provided for a six-month probationary period during which the applicable notice period was one week. In the event that the Complainant successfully completed his probationary period and was confirmed as a permanent employee, his notice period was to be extended to two months.

The Complainant submits that his notice period was due to expire on 13 December 2018. He had not received any adverse feedback on his performance during the first six months of his employment and, therefore, assumed that he had successfully completed his probationary period. He submits that he had no communication from the Respondent in relation to his probationary period until he was invited to attend a meeting on 5 February 2019 at which he was informed that the Respondent had formed the view that he hadn’t performed to its satisfaction during his probation and that the probationary period would be extended for a further period until 5 May 2019. He was handed a document outlining the details of the extension which, in his submission, he signed under duress. The Complainant’s employment was subsequently terminated by the Respondent on 9 April 2019 for underperformance. The Complainant was paid in lieu of one week’s notice and also received and an ex gratia payment equivalent to three weeks’ pay. He claims that he is entitled to payment for two months’ notice as he was ‘de facto’ a permanent employee in circumstances where he had not freely consented to the Respondent’s purported extension to his probationary period outside the terms of his written contract.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant was informed by telephone in December 2018 that his probationary review meeting would not take place until January 2019 because the period in the run up to Christmas was extremely busy for the Respondent. (The Complainant denies receiving any such telephone call.) The probationary review meeting, in fact, did not take place until 5 February 2019. The Respondent denies that the Complainant was coerced into signing the agreement to extend his probationary period and submits that the extension was mutually agreed.

Decision

The Adjudication Officer found that the Complainant’s claim under the Act was not well-founded as he had agreed to an extension of his probationary period and had signed a document to that effect. The Court upholds that decision and, accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Court so determines.

Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
Alan Haugh
DC ______________________
30 November 2020 Deputy Chairman


NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to David Campbell, Court Secretary.