EDA2624

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No.: ADJ-00044296 (CA-00055030-002)

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the decision of the WRC Adjudication Officer under Section 83 (1), Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2021 on 26 June 2024. A Labour Court hearing took place on 19 May 2026.          

The following is the Determination of the Court.

DETERMINATION:

1. This is an appeal by Ms Tessa King against a Decision of an Adjudication Officer (ADJ-00044296/CA-00055030-002), dated 31 May 2024, made under the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2021 in a complaint of sexual harassment against Blockstar Limited. In that decision the Adjudication Officer found that she did not have jurisdiction in respect of the complaint of sexual harassment where the Complainant had not established that the late submission of the complaint was due to reasonable cause.
2. This appeal is linked with appeal no. ADE/24/103 which is an equal pay complaint.
3. In this determination, the parties are referred to in the same way as at first instance. Hence, Ms King is referred to as “the Complainant” and Blockstar Limited as “the Respondent”.
4. The Complainant lodged a Notice of Appeal to the Labour Court on 26 June 2024, which was lacking the relevant complaint reference numbers being appealed. The completed appeal was received by the Court on 12 July 2024. The Court was satisfied that there was sufficient detail included in the appeal documentation submitted on 26 June 2024 for that date to be noted as the date of appeal. In that circumstance the appeal was submitted within the 42-day period for bringing an appeal provided for in section 44(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The Respondent raised no objection to the Court’s conclusion in that regard and was not raising a time limit point as part of its defence to the Complainant’s appeal.
5. A hearing of the Court was held on 19 May 2026 in Limerick. The Complainant was accompanied by her husband at the hearing. The Respondent was represented by Mr Stephen Keogh of MHP Sellors LLP. The Court heard submissions from both parties, and the Complainant gave evidence under affirmation. Ms Daveen Heyworth, Director of the Respondent gave evidence under oath on behalf of the Respondent.

Submission and evidence of the Complainant

6. The Complainant gave evidence that she had been employed by the Respondent as an administrator in Riverdale Nursing Home in Co Clare from 14 December 2021 until she resigned on 13 January 2023.
7. The Complainant made submissions and gave evidence in respect of two incidents which she experienced in her workplace which she considered amounted to sexual harassment of her.
8. The first incident she maintained occurred in her office in December 2021. The Complainant said that she felt uncomfortable in a situation where a man employed by the Respondent, who was the husband of the Respondent’s regional manager, came into the office to fix the safe. She said this man (Mr X) called her over and took her hand and told her to “press this button inside the safe” and that he said “you feel that button it’s like pressing a nipple” while holding her from behind.
9. The second incident, the Complainant said took place in or around March/April 2022, where she was called to a meeting with the same Mr X and an employee of Nigerian descent who was making a complaint of racism among the nursing staff. The Complainant said that after the meeting had concluded Mr X asked her to stay on as he wanted to discuss one of the resident’s accounts that was in arrears. The Complainant said that she felt very intimidated and uncomfortable when Mr X said, “I am locking the doors to the room because I don’t want residents coming in”.
10. The Complainant’s position was that Mr X’s conduct amounted to sexual harassment of her.
11. The Complainant did not report either incident to the Respondent. The Complainant said that she did not feel she had anyone to whom she could report it as Mr X was married to the regional manager of the nursing home and the Director was satisfied with how the nursing home was run so she did not see any point in reporting the incidents to her as she felt she would not be listened to.
12. The Complainant did not give any reason why she had not submitted her complaint alleging sexual harassment to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) within six months of the most recent alleged incident.

Summary Position of the Respondent

13. The Respondent’s position regarding the allegations of sexual harassment is that no complaint was ever received by it from the Complainant and that had such a complaint been made it would have been investigated in accordance with its policy on harassment, which policy had been brought to the attention of the Complainant.
14. Further, the Respondent submitted that the claim is statute barred where the alleged incidents occurred in December 2021 and March/April 2022 and the WRC complaint was submitted on 15 February 2023, outside the statutory time limit.

Evidence of the Respondent

15. Ms Heyworth, as Director of the Respondent, gave evidence under oath that the Respondent had four nursing homes, employing over 400 staff, with the Complainant employed in Riverdale Nursing Home in Co Clare. The witness confirmed that Mr X was engaged by the Respondent and worked in the Clare nursing home and in other homes within the group and that he was married to the regional manager.
16. Ms Heyworth gave evidence that the Complainant never raised any issues of sexual harassment with her or anyone else in the Respondent. She said the first she heard of the allegations was when they were raised in the WRC complaint. The witness said that the Respondent has policies and procedures to deal with such complaints and that there was a Director of Nursing to whom the Complainant could have raised the complaint if she had any concerns about raising it with the regional manager or herself as Director.

Relevant Law

17. Section 14A(7)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2021 (the Acts) defines sexual harassment as any form of unwanted, verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, which has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. Section 14A(7)(b) sets out that such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display, or circulation of written words, pictures or other materials.
18. Section 14A(1) of the Acts provides that:

“For the purposes of this Act, where-

• (a) an employee (in this section referred to as “the victim”) is harassed, or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is employed (in this section referred to as “the workplace”) or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who is-
• (i) employed at that place by the same employer,
• (ii) the victim’s employer, or
• (iii) a client, customer or other business contact of the victim’s employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such that the employer ought reasonably have taken steps to prevent it,

or

• (b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a)-
• (i) such harassment has occurred, and
• (ii) either-
• (I) the victim is treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or
• (II) it could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated,

the harassment or sexual harassment constitutes discrimination by the victim’s employer in relation to the victim’s conditions of employment.”

19. Section 14A(4) sets out that:

“The reference in subsection (1)(a)(iii) to a client, customer or other business contact of the victim’s employer includes a reference to any other person with whom the employer might reasonably expect the victim to come into contact in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his employment.”

20. In respect of time limits for referring a claim for redress, section 77(5)(a) provides that:

“Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.”

21. Section 77(5)(b) provides that “for reasonable cause” the period of time for referring a claim can be extended to a period not exceeding 12 months from the date of its most recent occurrence.

Deliberations

22. Before considering whether the acts complained of by the Complainant constituted sexual harassment the Court had to consider whether the initial complaint was submitted in time. The Complainant complained of incidences of alleged sexual harassment in December 2021 and in or around March/April 2022. The Complainant was not able to assist the Court in providing any more precision in respect of the dates alleged.
23. The WRC complaint, in respect of the complaint of sexual harassment was referred to the WRC on 15 February 2023. The cognisable period for this complaint was therefore 16 August 2022 to 15 February 2023. This meant that the most recent occurrence of sexual harassment would have to have occurred within the six-month cognisable period immediately preceding the referral to the WRC unless there was reasonable cause to extend that time period to a maximum of 12 months. The most recent occurrence of alleged sexual harassment was in or around March/April 2022 which was outside the cognisable period. Therefore, the WRC and the Labour Court would only have jurisdiction if there was reasonable cause justifying the delay in referring the complaint.
24. The established test for deciding if an extension of time should be granted for reasonable cause is that formulated by the Labour Court in Cementation Stanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll DWT0338. The test was set out in the following terms:

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and the circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

25. The Complainant did not provide any reason or explanation as to why she did not submit her complaint to the WRC within the statutory limitation period, and neither did she identify any grounds on which time should be extended.
26. In circumstances where no reasons have been advanced which might explain the delay and/or afford an excuse for the delay the Labour Court sees no basis on which the time for referring the claim can be extended beyond the six-month statutory time period set out in section 77(5)(a) of the Acts.
27. A failure on the part of a Complainant to refer a claim for redress within the statutory limitation period deprives the WRC and the Labour Court of jurisdiction to investigate the claim.

Determination

28. The Court affirms the decision of the Adjudication Officer that she lacked jurisdiction to investigate the complaint of sexual harassment in circumstances where the Complainant has not established that the late submission of the complaint was due to reasonable cause and there were no acts of harassment complained of within the cognisable period.

The Court so determines.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Niamh McGowan
AR	______________________
15th June, 2026	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Mr Aidan Ralph, Court Secretary.