ADE/24/166 | DETERMINATION NO. EDA2560 |
SECTION 44, WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 2015
SECTION 83 (1), EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY ACTS, 1998 TO 2015
PARTIES:
AN GARDA SIOCHANA
(REPRESENTED BY MS LORNA LYNCH SC AND MR NIALL FAHY BL INSTRUCTED BY THE CHIEF STATE SOLICITORS OFFICE)
AND
TOM RONAN
(REPRESENTED BY MR JOHN LYNCH BL INSTRUCTED BY HEALY LAW DUBLIN LLP)
DIVISION:
Chairman: | Mr Haugh |
Employer Member: | Mr O'Brien |
Worker Member: | Mr Bell |
SUBJECT:
Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00047174 (CA-00058010-001)
BACKGROUND:
The Employer appealed the decision of the WRC Adjudication Officer under Section 83 (1), Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 on 14 November 2024. The Labour Court hearing took place on 25th June 2025
The following is the Determination of the Court:
DETERMINATION:
1 Background to the Appeal
This is an appeal on behalf of An Garda Siochana (‘the Respondent’) from a decision of an Adjudication Officer (ADJ-0047174, dated 21 October 2024) under the Employment Equality Act 1998 (‘the Act’). The Adjudication Officer decided that Mr Tom Ronan (‘the Complainant’) had been discriminated against on the age ground when compulsorily retired on reaching a statutorily determined age. Notice of Appeal was received in the Court on 14 November 2024. The Court heard the appeal in Dublin on 25 June 2025.
2 The Factual Matrix
The Complainant joined the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (as it was then titled) in 2000 as a Civilian Driver in An Garda Siochana. He was subject, at that time, to a mandatory retirement age of 65 pursuant to section 8(1)(b) of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956. The Complainant’s employment transferred to the Respondent in 2006. Prior to reaching age 65, the Complainant sought and was granted a one-year extension to his contract of employment.
Following the commencement of the Public Service Superannuation (Age of Retirement) Act 2018 (‘the 2018 Act’), the mandatory retirement age applicable to the Complainant was raised to 70. This change in the retirement age took effect during the year when the Complainant was on his one-year ‘post-retirement age’ extension and effectively enabled the Complainant to remain in employment until age 70. The Complainant, having reached the age of 70, retired on 24 March 2023. He had, however, unsuccessfully sought an extension of his employment beyond that age by letter dated 11 January 2023.
3 The Claim
The Complainant alleges that he has been discriminated against on the age ground by virtue of having been compulsorily retired at age 70. He submits that there are other Civilian Drivers employed by the Respondent who are not subject to mandatory retirement as their employment commenced between 2004 and 2012, during which period newly recruited public servants were not subject to any mandatory retirement age. The Complainant’s case, in short, is that he has been treated less favourably on grounds of age than those of his colleagues who joined the public/civil service between 2004 and 2012.
It is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the Complainant cannot legitimately seek to compare his circumstances with those of the cohort of public and civil servants recruited between 2004 and 2012 as their employment is subject to different terms and conditions than apply to his cohort i.e. public and civil servants employed prior to 2004. It is further submitted that the Complainant is restricted to comparing himself with a public or civil servant also employed pre-2004.
4 The Complainant’s Evidence
The Complainant outlined how he came to be employed as a Civilian Driver, initially by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and then, from 2006 onwards, by the Respondent. He then gave a detailed account of the range of duties he performed in the course of his twenty-three years of employment. He told the Court that he underwent a medical assessment in February 2023 and received a five-year extension to his driving licence thereafter and was declared fit to perform the full range of duties.
5 Evidence of Ms Eavan Doyle
The witness informed the Court that she is an Assistant Principal in the Department of Public Expenditure NDP Delivery and Reform. The witness outlined the statutory regime that governs the retirement of public and civil servants and provides for a mandatory retirement age of 70 for all such workers other than those who were recruited between 2004 and 2012. She told the Court that there is no discretion within the statutory framework to permit a civil or public servant who is subject to the mandatory retirement age of 70 to work beyond that age. Finally, the witness gave details of the pension benefits that the Complainant is in receipt of arising from his employment with the Respondent and his previous public sector employment.
6 Evidence of Mr Brian Sheehan
The witness informed the Court that he is employed by the Respondent as an Assistant Principal Officer with responsibility for Human Resources and Pensions. He gave further and detailed evidence in relation to there being three different categories of public servants for the purposes of retirement age, as follows:
- (i) Relevant public servants within the meaning of the 2018 Act who joined prior to 1 April 2004 and who initially had a retirement age of 65 which was later increased to age 70 by the 2018 Act;
- (ii) New entrants within the meaning of the 2004 Act who joined between 2004 and 2012 who have never had a mandatory retirement age applied to them; and
- (iii) Single Scheme Members who joined after 1 January 2013 who have had a retirement age of 70 at all times.
The witness also gave evidence in relation to the deliberations of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Longer Working Lives from which the decision to raise the mandatory retirement age to 70 originated. The witness told the Court that that decision was made in consideration of a number of issues such as inter-generational fairness, ensuring a mixture of ages and experience within the public service, budgets and workforce planning and the desirability of mitigating against issues of personal and professional dignity for older workers. Finally, the witness provided the Court with a summary of social protection supports available to that cohort of public servants who retire at age 70.
7 The Law
The issue of the mandatory retirement of public servants at age 70 has been comprehensively considered by the Supreme Court in Mallon v The Minister for Justice, Ireland and the Attorney General [2024] IESC 20. Beginning at paragraph 62 of his judgment, Collins J provides a very comprehensive summary of the jurisprudence of the CJEU on the compatibility of mandatory retirement ages with EU equality law. The learned judge observed in paragraph 63 that many of the CJEU judgments he had referred to, concerned a retirement age of between 65 and 68 and “in none of these cases were the national measures found to conflict with the Directive”.
At paragraph 85, Collins J observes that Member States have a “broad discretion” in choosing which social policy objectives to pursue when setting mandatory retirement ages and, as those aims and objectives have general application, they “do not need to be specific to particular areas of public service”.
Paragraph 88 of the judgment emphatically endorses the State’s decision to apply a mandatory retirement age of 70 to the majority of public servants:
“Leaving aside for a moment the differential treatment of coroners – which, in reality, appears to be the fons et origo of Mr Mallon’s complaint here – the issue of whether the State may reasonably take the view that the adoption of a mandatory retirement age of 70 for sheriffs is “necessary and appropriate” to achieve the aims identified above would appear to admit of only one answer. It is difficult to identify any circumstances in which a retirement age of 70 might currently be said to be disproportionate. Such a retirement age is higher, and in many cases significantly higher, than the thresholds for mandatory retirement considered without criticism or condemnation by the CJEU.”
Finally, at paragraph 92, Collins J observes that the current mandatory retirement age for public servants is “considerably higher than the current ‘pensionable age’ of 66 for the purposes of entitlement to a pension under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005” and that that “is a significant factor having regard to the CJEU jurisprudence”.
8 Discussion and Decision
The claim being advanced on behalf of the Complainant appears to the Court to be, in effect, a collateral attack on the State’s decision to apply a mandatory retirement age of 70 to the majority of its public servants, which decision was given effect by the 2018 Act in the case of the cohort of public servants to which the Complainant belonged. In fact, the Complainant benefitted significantly as result of the enactment of the 2018 Act as he had originally had a retirement age of 65 which was increased to 70 following the commencement of the 2018 Act.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has upheld the State’s policy of a mandatory retirement age of 70 as being entirely consistent with the jurisprudence of the CJEU. This Court, it goes without saying, is bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mallon. That being the case, the Court finds that the Complainant’s complaint that the Respondent discriminated against him by compelling him to retire on reaching the age of 70 is not well-founded. The Respondent’s decision was nothing more than the implementation of the State’s policy as embodied in the 2018 Act and that Act does not give any discretion to individual public sector employers to extend an individual public servant’s employment beyond his or her seventieth birthday.
Furthermore, the Court finds that the Complainant’s attempt to compare his circumstances to those that apply to the cohort of public servants recruited between 2004 and 2012 (including a number of colleague Civilian Drivers) and who do not have a mandatory retirement age to be inappropriate. It is a matter of public record that the State decided against retrospectively applying a mandatory retirement age to this cohort of public servants when enacting the 2018 Act as to have done so could have given rise to a perception of unfairness and may have been inconsistent with those workers’ legitimate expectations.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds and the decision of the Adjudication Officer is set aside.
The Court so decides.
![]() | Signed on behalf of the Labour Court |
![]() | |
![]() | Alan Haugh |
CC | ______________________ |
15 AUGUST 2025 | Deputy Chairman |
NOTE
Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Ms Ceola Cronin, Court Secretary.